



THE LEHIGH REVIEW 2009

Each year for the past seventeen, Lehigh University publishes the *Lehigh Review*, an entirely student-produced journal of the arts and sciences. We seek out the best scholarly writing to showcase the breadth and depth of Lehigh's undergraduates.

Any scholarly articles, academic essays, or book reviews written for a Lehigh course may be submitted. The *Review* does not ordinarily accept fiction or poetry.

All submissions should reflect sustained intellectual engagement in any of Lehigh's many fields of study. We are especially interested in essays that draw from the content or methodology of more than one discipline. We expect well-researched and well-written work that enriches our understanding of our changing world. Readers of this year's *Lehigh Review*, we would like to think, will reconsider the role of the student in deciphering some of today's complex issues to reach inclusive, sustainable, and peaceful solutions.

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
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LETTER

FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the *Lehigh Review*, Volume 17. Within this edition, you will find a compilation of some of the best student scholarship in a variety of disciplines alongside student photography and artwork. All published essays were originally written for Lehigh University courses and were edited and reviewed by our staff of undergraduates. This year our theme is relationships: the often rewarding but also tension-filled relationships that can be formed between friends, lovers, town and gown, industry and nature, consumers and producers, ourselves and our bodies, living communities and the urban landscape, and governments and their citizens are explored in this volume. As you read through these pages of text and images, it is our hope that you will join us in celebrating, critically evaluating, and reflecting upon these issues with the sincerity of the student authors themselves. Thank you for reading, please enjoy!

Sincerely,
Sanjana Bhatia
Editor-in-Chief



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Milton's Christian Hero

Paradise Lost and *Samson Agonistes*, two of Milton's most widely acclaimed works, each begin with a character that has fallen from the grace of God. Samson's loss of the physical prowess that defined his life and Godly mission is arguably equally as dramatic as Satan's fall from the very height of Milton's divine hierarchy to the pits of Hell. However, Samson's ability to relinquish his pride and physically-based values in favor of devotion to God contrasts sharply with the continued descent of Satan after his initial fall. This disparity exemplifies the major differences between the Pagan Hero of Classical mythology and the Christian Hero developed by Milton in several of his works. Although Samson successfully undergoes the change from the former to the latter, he retains some satanic qualities that prevent him from becoming the true Christian hero as Milton envisions him, which is only fully realized in Adam's complete understanding of Christian virtue at the end of *Paradise Lost*.


Perhaps the most controversial figure in *Paradise Lost* or any of Milton's other writings is Satan. His individualism and courage to battle the most powerful being in the universe, coupled with the moral dilemmas that he faces,

make him a more dynamic and attractive figure than a one-dimensional character like Milton's God. Criticism varies widely on his place in the heroic context of *Paradise Lost*. Support for Satan's heroism spans across centuries, from William Blake's radical pro-Satanic assertions in the 18th and 19th centuries to Neil Forsyth's in the 21st. Others see a downward spiral in his morality throughout the play, perceiving him as 'sufficient to have stood' but ultimately 'self lost.' To understand who Milton's heroes really are, however, we must understand how he defined his ideal hero.

One of the primary reasons for Milton to have written *Paradise Lost* was to "justify the ways of God to men" (Milton *Paradise I*, 26), largely in an attempt to explain why evil is present in the world. Many people, even devout Christians, were struggling with this question during Milton's lifetime. For this end to be accomplished, Milton's hero simply couldn't be the Pagan hero of the Classical tragedies. The violent nature of heroes such as Odysseus and Heracles provide endless examples of the inexplicable presence of evil in the world. Milton refuses to place value in the ability "to indite/Wars, hitherto the only Argument/

Heroic deem'd" (Milton *Paradise IX*, 27-29).

Milton's hero had to be a man who not only shunned the infliction of harm on others, but could also endure the suffering of life with a determined faith in the goodness that will eventually come of evil. A.B. Chambers calls this patient endurance "sapientia et fortitudo," or "wisdom and fortitude," (Chambers 315). Under this definition, the physical fortitude of the original Epic Hero is transformed into what Milton calls "heroic fortitude of mind" (Chambers 315). Chambers' view accurately perceives the shift from a focus on aggressive courage to a wise and patient courage. William Herman expands on this idea, referring to the two types of heroism as Hellenic and Biblical. He points out that the former is not concerned with morality, as seen in the character of Achilles, and that the major difference can be boiled down to two opposing values: "The Hellene obtains glory through defiance; the Biblical hero obtains glory through submission" (Herman 13). Milton's Christian hero is wise, obedient, and has the moral fortitude to endure and reject the evils and temptations of the world.



Herman and Chambers both recognize that Satan cannot be the Christian Hero that Milton advocates. He has numerous opportunities to take the path of the Christian hero after “his Pride/ Had cast him out of Heav’n” (Milton Paradise I, 36-37), but favors the defiance of Herman’s Hellenic hero instead. His pride makes him unwilling to repent “from sense of injur’d merit” (Milton Paradise I, 98), preferring to “reign in Hell, than serve in Heav’n” (Milton Paradise I, 263).

It is important to understand that Satan knows what he is getting himself into, and more importantly, he knows that the actions produced by his Hellenic values are unwise and unjust:

O Sun, to tell thee how I hate thy beams
That bring to my remembrance from what state
I fell, how glorious once above thy Sphere;
Till Pride and worse Ambition threw me down
Warring in Heav’n against Heav’n’s matchless
King: Ah wherefore! He deserv’d no such
return from me ... (Milton Paradise IV, 37-43)

He attributes his fall to pride and “worse” ambition, acknowledging that these attributes of the Classical hero are responsible for his moral degradation. This passage also shows that he is aware of the injustice of his rebellion, for God “deserv’d no such return.” We are thereby less awed and sympathetic when we see the

courage of Satan’s Hellenic heroism, as in the passage in which “he with difficulty and labor hard” passed through Chaos, “harder beset and more endanger’d, than when Argo pass’d/ Through Bosphorus betwixt the jostling Rocks:/ Or when Ulysses on the Larboard shunn’d/ Charybdis” (Milton Paradise, III, 1021, 1016-1020).

Samson shares many of Satan’s Hellenic qualities, but unlike Satan, is initially unaware of his folly in valuing them over the principles of the Christian Hero. Unlike Satan, his grief at the beginning of the poem is due to the inadequacy he feels from his loss of strength and sight, not from the injustice he has done God in revealing his divine secret. His loss is also social. He laments, “O glorious strength/ Put to the labor of a Beast, debas’t/ Lower than bondslave!” (Milton Samson, 36-38). Samson’s status as famous hero has been reversed, injuring his pride. As Chambers puts it, “his sorrow concerns that ignominious fall from the heroic condition which he claims once to have possessed” (Chambers 317).

Samson’s superficiality gradually gives way to the sapientia et fortitudo of the Christian Hero. Carol Barton sees his conversations with his father, Dalila and Harapha as temptations to sin that appeal to his former Classical heroic values. She cites his rejection of Dalila’s seduction as a key moment in his

transformation from Hellenic to Christian hero. Barton says of his rejection of her “warbling Charms” (Milton Samson 935); “In this declaration, Samson aligns himself with the only classical warrior ever celebrated for his intellect [Odysseus], who likewise refused to let himself be transformed into a beast by his passion for a beautiful seductress” (Barton 11). Samson’s refusal to become a ‘beast’ is now in regard to Christian fortitude rather than the fame and social standing he had previously alluded to.

Chambers’ article argues that Samson’s heroism is most likely the greatest form of Christian Heroism. Because his martyrdom displays fortitude in the face of death, the greatest mortal fear, it requires the greatest amount of courage, similar to the sacrifice of Christ on the cross (Chambers 316). Closer to the other end of the spectrum is Brendan Quigley, who grants Samson the possibility of becoming a Christian hero, but says that “the question of heroism precedes that of religious identity” (Quigley 529). He believes that Samson is a “tragic” hero first and foremost, all the way through the end of the poem, calling his decision to go to the temple with the messenger “unprincipled” (Quigley 544), or without religious consideration.

The different interpretations of Samson offered by Quigley and Chambers both

The strengths of the Christian hero are summed up in these final reflections. The love, patience, and meekness “deem’d weak” by some are “fortitude to highest victory.”

present important insights into the nature of his character, but each is taken to an extreme. Samson would be better understood as somewhere between the two; he is undoubtedly a Christian Hero by the end of the poem, but his pride and tendency toward violence keep him from being the ideal religious hero personified by Adam. In many ways, Samson and Satan exude these tragic or Hellenic qualities throughout their respective poems.

The Muse and the more virtuous characters of *Paradise Lost* continuously stress that the use of violence, an attribute so highly valued by the Classical Epics, is ineffective and even harmful to whoever uses it. In Book V, God tells Raphael that Adam should be wary of Satan’s antagonism, but “By violence, no, for that shall be withstood” (Milton Paradise V, 242). Abdiel proves this at the end of the book by challenging Satan’s disobedience in the face of a horde of his followers, with the wise and courageous fortitude of the Christian hero; he is “Unshak’n, unseduc’d, unterrifi’d ... From amidst them forth he pass’d,/Long way through hostile scorn, which he sustain’d/Superior, nor of violence fear’d aught” (Milton Paradise V 899, 903-905). Compare Abdiel’s courage to hold tight to his values without fear of violence to the physical struggles of Satan in Chaos, which are motivated by revenge. God commends Abdiel for his obedience, saying he is “in word mightier than they in Arms;/And for the testimony of Truth hast borne/Universal reproach, far worse to bear/ Than violence ...” (Milton Paradise VI, 32-35). Milton believes

that the mental strength to overcome false ideas is much more difficult to maintain than withstanding physical assault.

Satan is clearly more concerned with the effects of violence. This is most evident in the battle in Heaven. He scoffs at Michael’s threats, saying, “Nor think thou with wind/Of airy threats to awe whom yet with deeds/Thou canst not” (Milton Paradise VI, 282-284). Satan reverses the power of words and violence that God makes clear in his speech to Abdiel, giving precedence to action rather than the conviction of words. The weakness of his “Arms” is demonstrated during the battle, when the angels “... fell/ By thousands ... The sooner for thir Arms; unarm’d they might/Have easily as Spirits evaded swift” (Milton Paradise 593-596), and later on, when the opposing army’s “armor help’d thir harm” (Milton Paradise 656).

The peak of Satan’s Hellenic heroism – his victorious speech in front of a crowd of fallen angels after his temptation of Eve and revenge on the Almighty – is the final, anticlimactic moment in which Milton shows us the folly of his vengeful agenda. Instead of the fame and veneration that a Hellenic hero expects from the masses, Satan is met with hissing:

So having said, a while he stood, expecting
Thir universal shout and high applause
To fill his ear, when contrary he hears
On all sides, from innumerable tongues
A dismal universal hiss, the sound
Of public scorn ...
(Milton Paradise X, 504-509)

Satan’s moment of triumph becomes his moment of defeat. Like Samson at the beginning of *Samson Agonistes*, he is reduced from the peak of social recognition to the shame of public scorn, “Lower than bonds slave” (Milton Samson 36-38). In Satan’s case, his transformation into a serpent makes him literally reduced to a beast.

Samson’s comparable passion for individuality and violence is disconcerting if we are to see him as becoming the perfect Christian hero that Chambers believes him to be. Even as his transformation to Religious hero takes place, he maintains some of his satanic qualities. Like Satan, he recognizes God’s justice; he tells Manoa, “Appoint not heavenly disposition, Father,/Nothing of all these evils hath befall’n me/But justly” (Milton Samson 373-374). However, he differs from Satan in his willingness to be punished, asking Manoa to “let me here,/As I deserve, pay on my punishment” (Milton Samson 488-489).

What is troubling, however, is that after he makes these morally heroic statements, he lapses back into the logic of the Hellenic hero. He selfishly wishes for death to alleviate his pain: “This one prayer yet remains, might I be heard,/No long petition, speedy death,/The close of all my miseries, and the balm” (Milton Samson 649-651). Quigley notes that his rejection of Dalila is not nearly on the same level of Eve’s temptation of Adam. “For Sampson, the tearful Dalila is unquestionably and obviously false, and in such a case there can be no possibility of genuine temptation” (Quigley 533). Even in his forgiveness of Dalila,

which is religiously heroic in principle, he warns her to keep a distance, “lest fierce remembrance wake/My sudden rage to tear thee joint by joint./At distance I forgive thee, go with that” (Milton Samson 952-954). He does not trust himself to resist his violent inclinations, betraying his satanic propensity to violent action.

Samson’s encounter with Harapha is equally revealing. According to Barton and other optimistic readers of “Samson Agonistes,” “Samson’s confrontation with this swaggering boor forces him at least temporarily to see himself as others see him, and to realize both what he was, and what he has become, a Janus-like perspective that is unavailable to the fallen

fact, the God of *Paradise Lost* doesn’t ever create physical conflict or death; it’s Satan who ultimately brings them about. Harapha only taunts Samson. Samson is unable to have the ‘wise fortitude’ to withstand the verbal assault, and although his challenge is in God’s name, it demonstrates his satanic tendency to play the Hellenic hero.

For much of “Paradise Lost,” Adam is susceptible to some of the same faults as both Satan and Samson. For instance, all three of them suffer similar falls. Samson chooses a wife, Dalila, and is eventually tempted into sin by her feminine charms, just as Adam asks God for a woman in the form of Eve, whose charms lead to his fall as well. Satan’s seduction by Sin,

Though Samson successfully resists temptation and learns to obey the will of God, his trial proves that the remnants of pride and violence within him through his death, which is “dearly bought revenge, yet glorious!” (Milton Samson 1660). Adam is also inclined to seek revenge at one point. He is told that Satan will suffer the consequences of his temptation when the seed of Eve will “bruise” his head. After the fall, Adam tells Eve they should avoid suicide because “... to crush his head/ would be revenge indeed; which will be lost/ By death brought on ourselves, or childless days/Resolv’d, as thou proposest” (Milton Paradise X, 1035-1038). Adam’s language is the same violent, aggressive language that we see

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archangel” (Barton 12). If his confrontation with the powerful and aggressive giant does grant him some revelation of his previous faults, his violent tendencies still make one question how complete his revelation actually is. Samson challenges Harapha to violent combat, saying “Defy thee to the trial of mortal fight,/By combat to decide whose god is God” (Milton Samson 1175-1176). Although Samson is using his strength for the glory of God rather than his own glory, showing his progression towards the Christian hero, he is still the instigator. The epic battle of *Paradise Lost* is a result of Satan’s violent aggression, not God’s desire to inflict harm on Satan. In

although a bit more obscure, is also presented as the result of feminine “attractive graces” (Milton Paradise II, 762). The result of this is the situation of all three characters in a similar starting point. They have all given into sinful temptation (although Satan’s is less influenced by outward provocation) and are fallen because of their disobedience to God. The difference is in the final outcome of each character’s moral progression. While Samson has only sorted out some of his moral issues before his death, the Adam we see sauntering out of Eden is fully ready to face the world with the patience and wisdom of the Christian hero.

throughout *Samson Agonistes*. Not only does he want to get revenge by bruising Satan’s head; he wants to crush it.

However, unlike Samson’s adherence to his violent ways, Adam learns that violence is not the path to God. In his explanation of the “Patience and the Education of Adam in *Paradise Lost*,” Gerald Schiffhorst uses Milton’s Christian Doctrine to explain that “hope, constancy, temperance, and perseverance – are explicitly defined as constituting the ideal Christian response to adversity” (Schiffhorst 55). The patience needed to uphold these ideals requires that the passions are held under control; as Michael tells Adam in the final book,

“ ... upstart Passions catch the Government/
From Reason, and to servitude reduce/ Man till
then free” (Milton Paradise XII, 88-90).

The violent passions of Samson and Satan are nowhere to be found in Adam at the end of *Paradise Lost*. However, images of such passions are plentiful in the last two books. The last visions given by Michael before the flood are of uncontrolled violence:

“...on each hand slaughter and gigantic
deeds ... till at last, Of middle Ago one rising,
eminent, In wise deport, spake much of Right
and Wrong, Of Justice, of Religion, Truth and
Peace, And Judgment from above: him old and
young, Exploded, and had seiz'd with violent
hands, Had not a cloud descending snatch'd
him thence, Unseen amid the throng ...”
(Milton Paradise XI, 659-671)

Michael's lesson to Adam is clear: the man whose courage allows him to surmount the social pride of the Hellenic hero becomes the real hero. Like Abdiel, Enoch is rewarded for valuing virtue over violence, even while “beset/
With Foes for daring single to be just ... to
show [Adam] what reward/Awaits the good,
the rest what punishment”
(Milton, Paradise XI, 702-710).

Adam must finally come to understand that violence is never endorsed by God, for it is by definition averse to the “Religion, Truth and Peace” of Enoch. Upon learning that Christ will be the agent of Satan's punishment, he is at first eager to know “where and when/
their fight, what stroke shall bruise the Victor's
heel” (Milton Paradise XII, 384-385). Michael explains that Christ's punishment of Satan will manifest itself through the opposite of violence: “The Law of God exact he shall fulfil/
Both by obedience and by love, though love/
Alone fulfil the Law ...” (Milton Paradise XII, 402-403). Love is the active element, not feats of strength. Like Enoch and Abdiel, he will have to have the fortitude of the Christian hero, because like them, “For this he shall live hated,
be blasphem'd,/Seiz'd on by force ...” (Milton Paradise XII, 411-412).

Thus Adam has finally learned the virtue of the Christian hero. He must resist his passions and endure the scorn of others with love and patience, knowing that in the end he'll receive Divine reward. He thanks Michael, saying,

“Henceforth I learn, that to obey is best,
And love with fear the only God ...
... with good, Still overcoming evil, and by

small, Accomplishing great things, by things
deem'd weak, Subverting worldly strong, and
worldly wise, By simply meek; That suffering
for Truth's sake, Is fortitude to highest victory.”
(Milton Paradise XII 561-570)

The strengths of the Christian hero are summed up in these final reflections. The love, patience, and meekness “deem'd weak” by some are “fortitude to highest victory.” Although Adam has still not proven that he will abide by this philosophy, he has proven to Michael that he has “attain'd the sum/Of wisdom” (Milton Paradise XII, 575-576). Neither Satan nor Samson ever get this far. Samson does sacrifice himself for the glory of God, but before ever proving wholly that he has attained the wisdom to lead a life guided by Christian fortitude. Christ, Abdiel and Enoch provide examples for both Adam and the reader to live by; it remains to be found whether those examples will be followed.

by Matt Stayman





A Family Tree: Nietzsche's Genealogy in Foucault

Morality and sexuality have become structures so ingrained in and common to our understanding of modern society that questions rarely arise concerning the purpose they serve or the roles that they play within our lives. To us, these ideas simply exist without debate or contention; we are raised to believe certain facts or hold specific opinions concerning these subjects and those views (far too often) become the end of it. Thankfully, this generality does not apply to the occasional "madman" of society who is able to escape the accepted and traditional views of his age and challenge notions commonly assumed to be fact. The nineteenth century philosopher Frederick Nietzsche and the twentieth century historian Michel Foucault were two such madmen who, through their unique approaches to each of these subjects respectively, applied revolutionary new methods of analysis that have changed the way we understand morality and sexuality.

In the late nineteenth century, Nietzsche pioneered a new mode of philosophical thought concerned with tracing and understanding the development of societal conceptions of morality. In his *On the*

Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche endeavors to examine the value of morality itself. His process is to dissect the "conditions and circumstances under which [these] values grew up, developed and changed" in an attempt to better understand how certain values came to be appropriated with their modern meaning and significance (GM 1, 393). Nietzsche takes the reader through a unique and, at that time, un-attempted historical survey of Christian thought that critically engages common ideals (such as Good and Evil or Guilt) using an interdisciplinary analysis aimed at finding their roots and tracing the development of their significance throughout the ages. This methodological "trace" is the process that Nietzsche has fittingly termed his genealogical approach. Like our usual understanding of the term "genealogy", the method Nietzsche employs is an attempt to trace the ancestry of certain ideas and structures in society that have complex roots systems and paths of influence stretching into the past.

Almost a century later, Foucault, an ideological descendent of Nietzsche's, employed a similar method in his critique of the previously accepted view of sexual repression.

Like Nietzsche, Foucault's *The History of Sexuality* applies a history based analysis that integrates numerous other fields of study into a critique of the normative view of human sexuality's role in social functioning. While Nietzsche enacted his genealogical approach in order to achieve a more comprehensive picture of Judeo-Christian morality, Foucault uses genealogy as a means of deconstructing the traditional view of sex in Victorian society and reconstructing a new view of sexuality that pivots on the theory of discourses. Drawing from history, philosophy, psychology, biology, philology, sociology, and many other disciplines, the two analyses employed throughout these works bear remarkable similarities. However, before any comparison between the two bodies can be made, it is first necessary to see how each author applies the genealogical method to his own particular subject of inquiry.

Nietzsche on Morality

On the Genealogy of Morality is the primary work in which Nietzsche undertakes a serious reevaluation of the concept of morality through a genealogical analysis. Nietzsche's work is

By willing the ascetic life and believing that through this life we can achieve truth, we are essentially giving meaning to our lives.

Truth becomes the meaning, the final answer, and the ascetic ideal is the means to this truth.

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divided into three main essays, each concerned with a different key aspect of morality that he actively seeks to critique and undermine through rigorous examination of the forces and drives that led to its formation. Respectively, these sections are entitled “Good and Evil,” ‘Good and Bad,’ “‘Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscious,’ and Related Matters,” and “What Do Ascetic Ideals Mean?” (GM 395, 408, 424).

In “Good and Evil,” ‘Good and Bad,’ Nietzsche aims to analyze the linguistic development of the common moral terminology ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as compared with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to illustrate the different circumstance surrounding the evolution of

selfless or selfish actions; rather, they were just the linguistic representation of the possession of power. Quite simply, those with power were ‘good’ and those lower peoples without it were ‘bad’.

However, from this rather simple valuation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ by the “chivalric-aristocratic”, Nietzsche contends that the “priestly-aristocratic” devised their own reactionary method of valuation that quickly became the first’s opposite. The oppressed “priestly-aristocratic”, feeling powerless and hateful and denying everything other than themselves, assigned a new system of values through which they termed themselves ‘good’ and assigned

Because, while ‘bad’ is just “an afterthought, an aside, a complementary colour” to the original idea of ‘good’, ‘evil’ is “the original, the beginning, the actual deed in the conception of slave morality” that creates ‘good’ as its afterthought (GM 1. 11).

If the act of denying is the clear problem of ‘evil’ but not of ‘bad’, we must then ask what the problem of the second ‘good’ is when it is compared to the nobility’s original idea of ‘good’. Nietzsche answers this question through an analysis of power and the respective expression of power. In the nobility’s original definition of the word, ‘good’ was all that was alive, active, happy, and flourishing. Then,

In reality, the judgments ‘good’ and ‘bad’ have no origins in selfless or selfish actions; rather, they were just the linguistic representation of the possession of power.

each and thus spark a revaluation of their accepted meanings. He begins this process by dispelling the notion that the term ‘good’ was originally applied to some “unegoistic acts” by the “recipients” of these acts who found them to be “useful” (GM 1. 2). Instead, Nietzsche argues that the “judgment ‘good’ does not emanate from those to whom goodness is shown ... [but rather] it has been ‘the good’ themselves, meaning the noble, ... who saw and judged themselves and their [own] actions as good” (GM 1. 2). This nobility, the higher class, saw a separation between their own “fundamental superiority of [their] higher ruling kind in relation to [the] lower kind” and thus created the category of ‘bad’ to encompass all those others who were not of noble breed (GM 1. 2). If this interpretation holds true, then any modern association made between the label ‘good’ and altruism would be an association made on false pretenses. In reality, the judgments ‘good’ and ‘bad’ have no origins in

their enemies, the nobility, the category of ‘evil’. According to Nietzsche’s analysis, this round of revaluation was quite different (and far more problematic) than that conducted by the nobility. While the “chivalric-aristocratic” first affirmed themselves and all the “blossoming, rich, [and] effervescent good health which” surrounded them by calling themselves ‘good’, the “priestly-aristocratic” were doing just the opposite (GM 1. 7). The priestly ideal of ‘good’ formed first out of a negative, out of a hate that denied the fortune of the nobility and instead venerated its opposite, all that the priestly people represented. Thus, states such as suffering, poverty, powerlessness, and sickness came to be seen as ‘good’ or right because these were conditions common to the priestly peoples who were oppressed by the nobility (GM 1. 7-10). This original denial is the reason that the term ‘evil’, derived from the second round of revaluation by the slaves, is so much more problematic for society than ‘bad’.

when the priestly revaluation occurred, the oppressed saw all the power and happiness that they lacked and, instead of striving for that power, they assigned any expression of said power the category ‘evil’ while deeming the willful repression of power ‘good’. This is exactly Nietzsche’s problem with the second ‘good’: it makes a deliberate separation of power and the expression of power. For Nietzsche, “it is just as absurd to ask strength not to express itself as strength, not to be a desire to overthrow, crush, become master, ... as it is to ask weakness to express itself as strength” (GM 1. 13). The morality of the ‘good’ person that evolved from this second valuation bases its judgment on the false assumption that ‘the doer’ has “the freedom to manifest strength or [to] not” and is therefore free to choose ‘good’ over ‘evil’. However, in reality, “there is no ‘being’ behind the deed ... the ‘doer’ is invented as an afterthought, --the doing is everything” (GM 1. 14). It is through this mistaken separation

of power and power's rational expression that the oppressed are able to turn their state of weakness into a moral situation to be strived for, making their revaluated 'good' just as flawed as its counterpart 'evil'.

In his second essay, entitled "'Guilt,' 'Bad Conscious,' and Related Matters," Nietzsche examines the development of the Christian ideas of conscious and guilt in order to better account for their functioning in modern society. Nietzsche traces the feelings of conscious and guilt back to the "contractual relationship between the creditor and the debtor," in which the debtor owes a payment to the creditor and, in the event that he is unable to pay, he gives the creditor the right to not only amend the debt by inflicting pain on the debtor, but also to derive "a sort of pleasure ... [from] having the right to exercise power over the powerless without a thought" (GM 2. 5). Therefore, the suffering of the debtor becomes the payment of the debt itself. In this way, the relationship between creditor and debtor mirrors that of society and citizen; the citizen derives certain benefits from his position in society and thus is "indebted" to society and subject to whatever pain that society wishes to extract as compensation (GM 2. 9). This presupposition that everything borrowed, every debt owed, has an equivocal payment works its way into the individual will and so, even when society ceases to punish minor or unnoticed offences, the individual will still "treat every offence as something which can be paid off" through self-inflicted suffering (GM 2. 10). This self-suffering becomes our understanding of guilt or bad-conscious; it is that "instinct of freedom forced back, repressed, incarcerated within itself and finally able to discharge and unleash itself only against itself" (GM 2. 17).

In Christian context, the entrenched idea of 'guilt' within the human psyche as seen through the creditor-debtor relationship manifests itself perfectly in the relationship of the Judeo-Christian God to his people. God is established as the ultimate creditor through whom we as 'guilty debtors' are able to satiate our desire to self-punish. He becomes the representation of

the individual's guilt that we have inherited from Adam and to which we are eternally bound unless God, our creditor, "sacrifice[s] himself for man's guilt" and "out of love for the debtor" frees us from ourselves (GM 2. 17). Thus, through this genealogical analysis of 'bad conscious', Nietzsche suggests that the feeling of 'guilt' is not an innate state indicative of a true objective morality, but is a result of the ways in which humans satiate their needs and desires over time.

The final essay of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*, "What Do Ascetic Ideals Mean?", critiques the ascetic model of existence that has come to be idealized in modern society by exploring its self-contradictions and functional purpose as a way of life. In the Christian ascetic ideal, man "treats life as a wrong path which he has to walk along backwards"; that is, life is something that we as people are 'guilty' of possessing (GM 3. 11). The ascetic denies the physical, the sensual, essentially life itself, and instead strives "to will nothingness" (GM 3. 1). Nietzsche argues that this "will to nothingness" present in an ascetic ideal that "demote[s] physicality to the status of an illusion" is really the expression of man's ultimate "sickness": his exhaustion, "disgust at life", and wish for the 'end' (GM 3. 12-13). The ascetic is the practical application of the human desire to be "otherwise, [to be] elsewhere" (GM 3, 13).

However, even though this ascetic ideal is a denial of the physical and the sensual, and thus in part a denial of life, it is still a will. The fact that we as humans have adopted a will to "nothingness" rather than the alternative, not willing at all, indicates that man would rather partially self-deny than surrender all willing. By willing the ascetic life and believing that through this life we can achieve truth, we are essentially giving meaning to our lives. Truth becomes the meaning, the final answer, and the ascetic ideal is the means to this truth. The sense of purpose that this ideal gives us is therefore the reason for its existence and widely based support, because without the 'truth' it gives us, we would have no explanation or justification for the suffering in our lives. Nietzsche's

analysis of this ideal then serves as a mode of explanation and justification for the existence and predominance of this ideal. Though Nietzsche does not necessarily support what this ideal promotes (and, in fact, he personally rejects the ascetic values), he does provide comprehensive account of the psychological and sociological function that the ideal serves (Large and Pearson 302-303).

Foucault on Sexuality

While the primary concern that Nietzsche identified and sought to account for was the value of morality, Foucault's focus in *The History of Sexuality* is on a critical reevaluation of our accepted understanding of the role of sexuality in culture and society. Like Nietzsche, Foucault undertakes this endeavor by applying a genealogical analysis to what he terms the "repressive hypothesis" which has come to represent the commonly accepted view of how sexuality functions in history. Through this study, Foucault seeks to understand the competing drives and forces that have led to their perspective's growth, acceptance, and popularity.

Foucault begins his work by first laying out in detail the traditionally acknowledged theory of the role that sexuality occupies in society, i.e. the "Repressive Hypothesis" (*see below*). According to this interpretation of sexuality, the coming of the seventeenth century marked a definitive shift in the social acceptability of sexual acts, speech, and thought. A large scale reduction and repression of normative sexuality began to occur as the bourgeoisie, a practical and conservative class, steadily gained power. As this class's power grew increasingly stronger, their influence over sexuality likewise expanded, leading to a simultaneous repression of acts of frivolous sexuality that operated outside of the traditional marital model and served no practical purpose aside from pleasure. Through this understanding, the bourgeoisie have a power which they exert, either directly or indirectly, over sexuality; sexuality is thus made to be an object of power. The newly established Victorian age no longer supported or tolerated the public display of any type of "abnormal"

sexuality (anything outside of a marital heteronormativity) which prompted many of the outsiders of society, these “other Victorians,” to take their sexual abnormality to either the brothel or the psychiatric hospital—the only two places where this outsider sexuality was seen as profitable and thus was considered acceptable (HS 4).

According to this hypothesis, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are just as subject to sexual repression as was the eighteenth. Though our social discourse may seem to be more open and free, in reality the only truly free speech of sexuality we have exists solely within the realms of theoretical discourse or scientific study. If we want to completely break from an old state of repression then there must be a revolutionary “transgression of laws, lifting of prohibitions, irruption of speech” that reinstates “pleasure within reality” (HS 5).

After giving a fairly comprehensive account of the traditional understanding of sexuality through the “repressive hypothesis,” Foucault offers his opinion as to why this perspective has been the dominating ideology for so long. He rationalizes that, by discussing and debating our continuing “repression,” we as participants in the discussion believe ourselves to be outside of the influence of social custom. By breaking the norms of sexuality, “we are placing [ourselves] to a certain extent outside the reach of power; ... we know we are being subversive” and we engage in such revolt willingly in anticipation of the coming freedom which we see ourselves as helping to establish (HS 6-7).

As Foucault moves away from his introduction to the “repressive hypothesis,” he begins to evaluate more closely the claim that speech concerning sexuality was repressed. While he recognizes that certain subjects and vocabulary were most defiantly forced out of common speech, Foucault suggests that there was an overall “discursive explosion” in the quantity of discourses dedicated to sex (HS 17). This trend is best exemplified, Foucault believes, by the Christian confessional, in which “though the language may have been refined” the “scope of the confession” expanded

exponentially (HS 19). The sexuality of children is another model that Foucault believes illustrates the discursive increase in the subject of sex. Though the actual range of speech concerning the sexuality of children diminished during this time, the overall discourse on the topic expanded as technical language and scientific studies belied the public’s increasing obsession with controlling the sexual relationships and desires of children (HS 27).

This transformative shift from open and frank discussion of sex to a multiplicity of discourses policed by social acceptability and technicality marked a decisive new mode of thought concerning sexuality. Sex was now seen as a public matter of scientific study and rational approach. It was as if, by forcing sex into a discourse, society sought to control its influence within the human body; as though rationalizing the subject as something that could be studied scientifically somehow reduced its importance within our lives and bodies (HS 23). However, by thus driving sexuality into a discursive form, the range of this subject’s influence only expanded, encompassing and enveloping whole worlds of thought and practice previously unconnected to sex. Our desire to approach sex as if it is a secret matter, the ultimate secret, in fact, only fuels our thirst to uncover the “truth” behind it by expanding its reach into every field imaginable (HS 33-34).

In the next section of the work, Foucault critiques the opinion that the bourgeoisie rise to power established a standard of productivity and efficiency against which all sexual acts were measured and judged. Foucault argues that this interpretation of sexuality from the Victorian age to the present age is inaccurate because, while this theory claims a reduction of abnormal sexualities, in reality there was an expansion of non-normative sexual activity. The idea of sexual “perversions” actually developed and expanded during the eighteenth century as discourses increasingly focused on the classification and identification of sexual practices that fell outside the marital heteronormative standard. Power, therefore,

was acting through sexual differentiation as a means of proliferating perversions rather than suppressing them (HS 40-41). This creation and “multiplication of disparate sexualities,” along with the multiplication of sexual discourse, form the basis of Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis’s role in Victorian Society (HS 49).

In Foucault’s eyes, the expanding discourse of sex in the nineteenth century was quickly swallowed into the realms of science and medication. Sexual discourse became an object of knowledge: something that could be learned and that had an implicit truth to be gained. This truth was “incorporated into two very distinct orders of knowledge”: the scientific study of biological reproduction and the “medicine of sex” (HS 54). Despite the perceived “interplay of truth and sex” within these two realms, Foucault observes that “the aim of such a discourse was not to state the truth but to prevent its very emergence” by limiting our knowledge of sexuality to a purely scientific understanding (HS 55). This “scientia sexualis” was then combined with the act of confession to create our modern view of sex: something which is as secret and private as the confessional and yet has an innate truth to it which it becomes our task to uncover (HS 68-73). Through this combination, sexuality has evolved to become a key aspect of how we as humans come to understand ourselves.

It is a secret knowledge that can only be gained through rigorous self-examination and yet, once it is achieved, holds the possibility of explaining us to ourselves.

A Comparison of Methodology in Nietzsche and Foucault

Though they are dealing in two apparently separate subjects, both Nietzsche and Foucault approach and dissect their respective topic in remarkably similar ways. While Foucault is traditionally associated with the archeological method that he pioneered and Nietzsche typically employs his genealogical analysis, through a comparison of these two projects, we are brought to the conclusion that both are, in fact, working off of the same genealogical basis.

But just what is this genealogy? In Nietzsche's preface to *The Genealogy of Morality*, he explains to us his understanding of the analysis that he pioneers. According to Nietzsche, the project that psychologists and moralists have been undertaking for the past few decades, the approach that has thus far been termed 'genealogy', has not been a true genealogy. These "researchers have not been carrying out a genuinely historical inquiry or engaging in ... 'real' or effective history... their questioning [was] simply not radical or deep enough" (Pearson and Large 300).

It was this observation that led Nietzsche to then redevelop the genealogical method into a process of inquiry that satisfactorily traced the progression of Christian morality, adding to the analysis what he felt was previously lacking from the other attempts. Nietzsche's re-appropriated genealogy was a revolutionary new approach that endeavored to not find the origins of morality as the previous faulty genealogists had (because he believed that morality had an invention rather than an origin), but rather to "uncover the different senses of morality, that is, the different 'meanings' morality has acquired in the history of human development" (Pearson and Large 299). He sought to pay particular attention to the "conditions and circumstances under which the values emerged" and, from this, derive an adequate explanation for why these particular values hold significance or importance in society today. Thus, Nietzsche's overall aim through his radically interdisciplinary inquiry of morality is to use a counter-historical analysis to illuminate the previously muddled reasons for society's valuation of certain beliefs and practices.

Heavily influenced by Nietzsche's work, Foucault found real resonance with the methodology the Nietzsche created and used it as a jumping off point in his own analysis, varying between his own interpretations of the genealogical process and a related mode of analysis that he himself created cleverly termed "archaeology". Foucault describes his own archaeology as a process of uncovering discontinuities in history. According to

Foucault, while most historians attempt to impose a uniform continuity on historical events or proceedings by ignoring or displacing those happenings that do not conform, archaeology seeks to do just the opposite. Its concern is not the Structuralist imposition of themes and patterns as has been the aim of past historians, it instead "wishes to uncover ... the play of analogues and differences as they appear at the level of rules of formation" (Arch. of Know. 160). By examining these differences (and the historians who regularly unify them to create cohesion), Foucault's archaeology is, on its most basic level, an examination of the ways in which meanings are formed through the unification of specific historical discourses. Foucault's interest is in demonstrating how historians derive certain meanings and assign certain values to those discourses that they study (Dreyfus and Rabinow 106).

While this process shows a striking similarity to Nietzsche's genealogy, at their core the two analytic approaches deal in fundamentally different spheres. While an archaeology aims to decode the process by which historians synthesize events to produce discursive meaning, a genealogy looks at any given historical interpretation of events and reevaluates those events from alternative perspectives that are not typically considered. In a sense, a genealogist "concentrates on the relations of power, knowledge, and the body in modern society", focusing on the series of events themselves rather than the meaning that a historian derives from this series (Dreyfus and Rabinow 105).

If these definitions of the two different methodological approaches are accepted, then both Foucault's work in *The History of Sexuality* and Nietzsche's work with *The Genealogy of Morality* would, without doubt, be identified as genealogies. Discounting the blatant reference to his method in the title of the book, Nietzsche's work with morality is easily seen to be a genealogical trace for numerous other reasons. Essentially, Nietzsche breaks down the category of morality into three main topics (which I have just described) and traces

their invention and changing connotations through history. With 'good' and 'evil', for example, Nietzsche employs the studies of philology, psychology, sociology and history to account for the changing understandings of the terms 'good' and 'evil' as compared to 'good' and 'bad'. He explores how these terms have come to take on their modern meaning and significance as moral designations by investigating certain realms of history and psychology, such as the Jewish revaluation, that are typically overlooked by historians. He pays particular attention to the changes in the meaning of the terms being used and notes the different sources and forces at play from which they were given their current value. He then repeats this approach in his deconstruction of the concepts of 'guilt' and 'bad conscious', this time focusing on how the physical suffering associated with the basic creditor-debtor relationship eventually became our modern understanding of 'conscious' and 'guilt'. By using a psycho-historical analysis, Nietzsche explores 'guilt', not as something innate to the human psyche as it was previously thought to be, but as the result of an interplay of competing forces and drives. And again, in his final essay on the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche examines the unexplained contradictions present in the idealization of asceticism, such as a disregard for natural wants and attempts to account of its modern importance and prominence through looking a man's psychologically rooted need to will.

Even though the topics may initially seem unrelated, Foucault's work with sexuality is, essentially, also an examination of morals. In Foucault's own opinion, *The History of Sexuality* "is a historical ontology [related] to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents" (Gen. of Ethics 262). The book explores one of the moral codes, (in this case sexuality), that determine "the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself ... and [determine] how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions" (Gen. of Ethics 263). Therefore, Foucault's understanding of ethics is concerned

with the type of relationship that a person has to himself, thus leading him to analyze the process by which we subjugate ourselves to our perceptions of sexual morality. This is a book about the morality of personal sexuality and the forces and power relations at work that contribute to the creation of our current understanding of our own sexualities.

Foucault then logically interoperates sexual events and trends in much the same way that Nietzsche interoperates moral ones. Though he does introduce some differentiation through changes in dialogue, such as the integration of terms like discourse, subject, and power and the disregard of 'the will', Foucault performs a genealogical analysis of the process by which sexuality came to its modern meaning. He begins by identifying a concept that he sees as troubling and contradictory (i.e. the Victorian age of repression) then reevaluates the historical

conditions and circumstances (focusing on power relations) that account for the concept's emergence and acceptance. This project stops short of becoming an archaeology and remains a genealogy because it focuses the majority of its analysis on the re-interpretation of the historical events themselves rather than attempting to find the rationale behind the meanings that historians have derived from the creation of Structuralist unifications.

By employing the same genealogical methodology, both philosophers are using an interdisciplinary analysis of a subject that they find problematic to give an account of that subject's invention without invoking any sort of metaphysics. Though he wrote almost a century after Nietzsche, Foucault's work exemplifies the powerful ideological connection that he shared with his predecessor.

by Carolyn Laubender

Hydden Homosexuality

As novella from the late 19th century, Robert Louis Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* struggles with and embodies many of the anxieties and apprehensions that plagued the changing Victorian society. In fewer than 100 pages, the narrative explores traditional class assumptions, prevalent colonial theorizations, the rapidly expanding fields of psychology, evolution and medicine, Western philosophies of human nature, and countless unspoken fears of sexuality and eroticism. Its text reveals the fissures and dissonances, the paradoxes and ironies, the inconsistencies and contradictions that are often cited as structuring this unstable time of social change. In spite of its often historically contextual interpretations, *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* should not function exclusively as "a material product to be understood in broadly historical terms" (Murfin 318); rather, its entangled insinuations about homosexuality, desire, morality, and Darwinian evolution are applicable to both ancient and contemporary societal norms and taboos. Mr. Hyde's "undignified" pleasures and his erotic, almost Sadeian indulgences coupled with his repeated characterizations as "ape-like", "troglodytic", and "savage", link him to a complex

characterization of deviant homosexuality that is still prevalent today (Stevenson 60, 22, 16, 15). By casting Hyde, the novella's only expression of overt homosexuality, as an animalistic and violent "deformity" of the moral Jekyll, the narrative subtly shades the entirety of same-sex desire as innately brutal and amoral (10). Though Hyde's bestial descriptions are often derogatory and degrading, exposing his character as "evil", this unilateral interpretation is complicated by the fact that the very animalism that degrades him also makes him more natural (58). He is tied to nature, bound to it by his homosexual desire which paradoxically signals both abnormality and naturalness. Thus, the text's social commentary is multi-layered, revealing the psychological justifications and assumptions of many social disgraces (most prominently homosexuality) while simultaneously emphasizing the contradictions that trouble these assumptions.

Even from Edward Hyde's first appearances on the pages of *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, his physical and mental character are described in almost exclusively animalistic terms. Upon first sight, the observers feel that there is "something wrong with his appearance";

"he gives a strong feeling of deformity" that can neither be verbalized nor located on his face or form (10). Physically, he has a small stature, "pale" and "dwarfish", reminding one of something "hardly human"—somehow lower on the evolutionary scale and more "troglodytic" than any properly evolved and morally conscious man (16). Psychologically, he is a "damnable man", "inherently malign and villainous" with a "devilish fury" and a "murderous mixture of timidity and boldness" (9, 60, 67, 16). The interpretations and descriptions provided by the characters that surround him, Hyde is not only reduced to animalistic appearances and behaviors, but is, through this bestial coding, tied to religious sin and amorality. Playing into Darwinian assumptions about the hierarchical nature of human evolution, the simian and "ape-like" Hyde is assumed, from his very looks, to be evil. His physical looks cast him as someone lower on the evolutionary scale, thus prompting observers to subconsciously link him to the ideas of primitiveness and savagery associated with the animal world. This type of evolutionary mindset, which works both with and against traditional morality, posits that



contemporary moral thinking is “the latest and highest product of mental evolution”, thereby making its human possessors hierarchically superior to other forms of “primitive” life (Maudsley, Henry qtd. in “Introduction” xxiv). Hyde, then, “is the physical expression of moral lowness according to post-Darwinian thought” (“Introduction” xxiv). His evil is that of the unthinking beasts and reptiles that indulge every whim and desire, every selfish impulse, without regard to their surroundings.

Carefully tangled within the animalistic and moralistic connotations of Hyde, and his originary counterpart, Jekyll, are the unspoken homosexual and erotic desires that the characters (and the reader) draw from the text regarding both Jekyll and his chemically created counterpart. Though references to Jekyll’s (and consequently Hyde’s) homosexual inclinations are never explicit, they are certainly alluded

to and hinted at, often through Jekyll’s own self-reflective declarations. In a posthumous letter, Jekyll confesses to Mr. Utterson, his friend and the narrator of the story, that his desire to create and maintain Hyde, his alter-ego of sorts, developed because Hyde allowed Jekyll the freedom to, “like a schoolboy, strip off these lendings [the social conscious and morality that plagued Jekyll’s mind] and spring headlong into the sea of liberty” (Stevenson 60). Not only does this confession describe Jekyll’s desire to be free of social restraint --restraint that would surely prohibit any type of deviance from a standard sexually hetero-normative model-- but his allusion to an adolescent “schoolboy” only makes his homosexuality more explicit. Jekyll confides to Utterson:

“The worst of my faults was a certain impatient gaiety of disposition, such as made the happiness of many, but such as I found hard

to reconcile with my imperious desire to hold my head high, and wear a more than commonly grave countenance before the public . . . I concealed my pleasures . . . Many a man would have even blazoned such irregularities as I was guilty of; but from the high view that I had set before me, I regarded and hid them with an almost morbid sense of shame” (55).

Although homosexuality and similar sexual “perversities” are not mentioned strictly as being those “concealed . . . pleasures,” those irregular guilts, that Jekyll suppresses out of social conformity, the ambiguity of the language only enhances their decidedly erotic significations. Confessions of shameful and secretive sexual abnormalities rarely appear in explicitly descriptive language. Rather, out of some psychological desire to preserve the full horror of the transgression from the light of harsh and critical judgment, confessors often

He is tied to nature, bound to it by his homosexual desire which paradoxically signals both abnormality and naturalness.

Thus, the text's social commentary is multi-layered, revealing the psychological justifications and assumptions of many social disgraces (most prominently homosexuality) while simultaneously emphasizing the contradictions that trouble these assumptions.

speak only in vagaries, trying to simultaneously divulge and protect their secrets. Jekyll never names his indulgences, but does recount that his "pleasures were (to say the least) undignified" thus leading him to seek out a "disguise" through which he could fulfill them without incurring any of the public disgrace (59, 60).

Eventually, Jekyll discovers this "disguise" in his own pharmaceutically altered form, Edward Hyde, who is the living embodiment of "the evil side of [Jekyll's] nature" entirely uncaged and released to transform while Jekyll's "virtue slumbered" (58, 59). In Freudian terms, Hyde was Jekyll's pure id, selfish, impulsive, and uninhibited by his learned super-ego. If Hyde is the embodiment of Jekyll's every repressed desire, his every unacceptable impulse (most of which are assumed to be homosexual), then it follows that Jekyll makes arrangements for Hyde to live in a "dismal quarter of Soho" that looked "like a district from some city in a nightmare" (23). Not only is the area itself portrayed as nightmarish and foreboding—two characteristics that often accompany descriptions of Hyde—but Soho is culturally known for its associations with "seediness and criminality" and is still a leading sex entertainment district in England (Mighall, 164). Jekyll logically hides Hyde in a place where he will have 'easy access' to those evil indulgences that comprise his nature, a place where those types of indulgences would never be subject to suspicion.

The immoral and animalistic interpretations of Hyde's character, which often describe him as "evil," "black," "hellish," and "monstrous," are, according to social Darwinian

Theory, really are inextricably linked to one another (Stevenson 57, 18, 69, 60). They arise from both his violent crimes and from a larger social fear of his homosexual and perhaps even sadistic desires. Because the ethical concerns of religion and Social Darwinism overlap so thoroughly in these circumstances (they both, after all, do serve the same purpose of societal regulation), the narrative's layered coding of Hyde as both Satanic and savage makes perfect sense. His character is socially transgressive in the most extreme ways: homosexual, violent, sadistic, uninhibited, and unabashedly indulgent. He conforms to no standard of Victorian utility or respectability. His designation as both the "lower side" of Jekyll and a "secret sinner" speak to the extent to which previously religious devaluations of non-procreative sexuality influenced contemporary scientific ideology (65). Hyde serves, within the novella, as an archetype for homosexuality more generally and is seen as both animalistic and amoral because of his selfish desire to satisfy personal pleasure instead of catering to more productive or transcendent values.

Although Hyde does commit violent and despicable crimes, the "horror" he incites in all those who see him is more clearly understood as resulting from the socially constructed fear of and abhorrence for homosexuality itself. Society feared (and still fears) the homosexual "taboo" and so automatically assumes it to be an innately violent desire, linked to both the animalism of self-indulgent pleasure and the animalism of violence. By stigmatizing Hyde and his homosexuality as not just sexually "deviant" but also as dangerous and violent, *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*

seems to support the normative opinion that homosexuals are dangerous. I would argue, however, that the novella's emphasis on Hyde's animalistic and "wild" nature along with the text's almost parabolical tone works to subtly challenge this cursory judgment of "mere animal" inclinations, revealing the latent self-contradictions and ironies of these views (44). Though the novella does cast Hyde's homosexuality in an undeniably amoral light by describing his bestial inclinations, this ostensibly derogatory connection actually troubles a simplistic reading of this form of "deviant" sexuality by aligning homosexuality with nature. By repeatedly characterizing Hyde as animalistic—a lower form of existence only from a Darwinian perspective—the text subversively (but subtly) questions the validity of these theories by suggesting that homosexuality is a natural (and normal) desire that only becomes problematic if suppressed. Thus, in a complex and ironic twist, the naturalness and animalism that make homosexuality the "lower" and more base orientation also make it a completely natural and authentic one.

It is, then, just this type of social inconsistency, both historically relevant and a-temporally applicable, that the text of Stevenson's work brings to light and exposes through its characters and contrasts. Regardless of the text's intention, Hyde's character simultaneously reinforces and deconstructs the homosexual stereotype, painting the picture of animalistic homosexuality just to show the viewer all of the logical cracks.

by Carolyn Laubender

queering marriage

"Love, the strongest and deepest element in all life, the harbinger of hope, of joy, of ecstasy; love, the defier of all laws, of all conventions; love, the freest, the most powerful moulder of human destiny; how can such an all-compelling force be synonymous with that poor little State and Church-begotten weed, marriage?"

Emma Goldman, "Marriage and Love," p 236

Queering marriage is not a single act, it is a deviant attitude. In the United States of America, marriage is a social, legal and religious institution available for heterosexual couples. For those outside the norms of heterosexual relationships, marriage is an alienating force that marginalizes other gender expressions by binarizing gender. Deconstructing and reconstructing marriage to undermine its restrictive conventions will allow a diversity of practices, traditional and queer, to replace the monolith. In this way, our culture will change from one of compulsory heterosexual marriage to one where varying expressions of unity are accepted. In this essay, I argue that traditional marriage perpetuates a culture of impossible and undesirable social standards by privileging heterosexual relationships. I also address the possibility of a redefinition of marriage to include same-sex couples and discuss alternative unions.

For the purposes of this investigation, I define "queer" as an intentionally broad term used to subvert norms. Vital to an understanding of queer studies is the acknowledgement that gender is nonessential characteristic of personhood, but rather an

acquired attribute imposed by the culture particular to one's upbringing. Queer theorists recognize the differences between biological sex, gender identity, gender expression and sexual orientation, and often place these concepts on a continuum. Queer expression is nonessential and fluid; assuming all people fit into the category of either 'man' or 'woman' is unrealistic and incomplete. Identifying as queer "implies a self-conscious deconstruction of heteronormativity and a breaking down of arbitrary boundaries based on sex, gender, and sexual orientation" (Bernstein and Reimann 3). The term 'queer' can be ambiguous, but it is strategically so in the face of the oversimplification of gender and sex. According to this definition, queer marriage is one that moves beyond rigid categories.

Traditional marriage involves the legally, socially, and often religiously recognized union between one man and one woman. The definition of marriage proposed by traditional marriage advocates relies on an essential understanding of gender, which prevents those who do not identify with the stereotypical definition of 'man' or 'woman' from engaging in the socially validating practice of marriage.

Despite copious evidence that masculinity and femininity are not biological characteristics of humans, traditional marriage advocates continue to enforce the different gender requirement of marriage. From this evidence, it seems any marriage law based on the genders of its participants cannot apply universally. When the definition of marriage depends on an incomplete picture of human identity, it violates basic human rights to self-expression. The existing marriage laws in the United States appeal to religious and outdated conceptions of identity and invalidate the love shared in nonnormative relationships. Queering marriage, then, is deconstructing the rigid definitions of institutionalized marriage in order to allow for multiple interpretations and expressions.

A Straight Situation

Marriage is a regulated, pervasive cultural characteristic of American society. Patriarchal norms, which place the man at the head of the heteronormative family, flourished mostly unquestioned in the United States until the women's suffrage movement in the late nineteenth century. These practices limited both the sexual and gender expressions of men



and women by expecting particular behavior as individuals and as a married couple.

Some of these expectations include the rearing of a family, women's deference to men, and a husband's ability to lead and support his family. Emma Goldman provides an account of traditional marriage in her 1911 essay, "Marriage and Love". She argues that, while marriage parades as an expression and result of love, it really is an unhealthy power structure that places women far below men, keeps married couples under the control of the state and church, and supports exploitative economic practices. Her account is an interesting reflection on the complex role of marriage.

This unfairness is also shared in the workplace. Women face sexism and make less money than their men counterparts. Meanwhile, men are still expected to hold steady lucrative careers in order to provide for their families. They are to leave domestic duties to their wives and head the household. These examples illustrate the problems implicit in traditional marriage.

Traditional weddings are emblematic of the various pressures and expectations of marriage. Young girls are still raised to marry the ideal masculine man and dream of a fantasy wedding. Goldman adds, "From infancy, almost, the average girl is told that marriage is her ultimate goal; therefore her training and education must be directed towards that end" (240).

There have been some important movements to personalize weddings and redefine marriages in the past decade, but these reformations remain in the minority.

Thus far we have considered the effects of traditional marriage on those who are in marriages. Marriage also has a large effect on those who are not, do not want to, or cannot participate in it. Socially, marriage is still obligatory, complete with a set of religious and political expectations that reinforce gender inequalities. Staying single or unmarried is perceived as a social failure that comes with legal disadvantages: "Laws that treat married persons in a different manner than they treat single persons permeate nearly every field of

Despite copious evidence that masculinity and femininity are not biological characteristics of humans, traditional marriage advocates continue to enforce the different-gender requirement of marriage.

Since 1911, marriage has certainly expanded its liberties for women; American women can vote, they are no longer bartered like property, and they have a much larger stake in family decisions. However, these achievements are underdeveloped. The most prevalent image of the family is still one man and one woman married with children in the same household, where men are the primary decision makers and financial supporters and women are homemakers and child raisers. Contemporary wives now have the choice to work outside the home, but often only as long as they continue to raise children and take care of the home even while their spouses' role remains the same.

These desires are enforced by the media and are encouraged by the commodification of weddings. Commercialized images of couples show models of masculinity and femininity. Images focus on the wedding day, indicating that this single day will determine the marriage's success. Wedding traditions in the United States vary, but most include conventions that symbolize outdated patriarchal ideas such as a white dress signifying the bride's premarital sexual purity and the bride's father giving her away to the groom, indicating a passing of ownership of the woman from one man to another. These traditions do not always signal the start of an unhealthy marriage, however, they reinforce underlying, exclusionary norms.

social regulation in this country --taxation, torts, evidence, social welfare, inheritance, adoption, and on and on" (Chamers 306). Even with ever-increasing divorce rates, single parent families and general acceptance of unmarried cohabitation, marriage is still the paradigmatic life goal of the American person (Popenoe). Modern marriage, though constantly evolving, is still problematic in its perpetuation of unhealthy traditions and in its marginalization of those not married. While it sometimes represents the choice to live a committed loving life with another person, the conventions that guide it are entrenched in patriarchy and sexism that can be harmful for all involved.

Guardians of Tradition

The common criteria of a traditional family include a heterosexual couple that is married, intends to procreate, and lives in the same household. This definition invalidates the already-existing, accepted marriages of those who decide to marry beyond the ages of fertility, infertile couples, couples living apart together (LATs), those in commuter or long distance marriages, as well as same-sex partnerships and alternative relationships. These relationships challenge the traditional family in unique ways, yet, it is the queer relationship that is cited as the main threat to marriage. Robert Knight, a strong voice in conservative journalism, finds a variety of excuses in order to accommodate these other non-traditional marriages: “even childless marriages are a social anchor for children, who observe adults as role models. Besides, childless couples can be ‘surprised’ by an unexpected pregnancy, and they can adopt, giving a child a mother-and-father-based family. Single parents can eventually marry. And marriage is a stabilizing force for all. Even when a couple is past the age of reproduction, the marital commitment may keep an older man from fathering a child with a younger woman outside wedlock” (“Talking Points”).

Knight does not provide an equally arbitrary argument for including the queer community, implying that queers cannot adopt or provide a healthy family. The increasingly narrow definition of marriage proposed by traditionalists specially excludes same-sex relationships. The rationale for this exclusion is that same-sex marriages are seen as a gateway to normalizing queer people, which will lead to the crumbling of the foundation of society, as we know it. This critique seems more a fear of same-sex marriage than a credible prediction.

The strongest critiques of queer marriage come from conservative Christians. Many cite the Bible as evidence that homosexuality is unnatural and immoral, and expect the American government to enforce these beliefs. In his first public address of 2008, the Catholic Pope Benedict XVI defined family as strictly between a man and a woman,

then cited the nuclear family as “the primary place of ‘humanization’ for the person and society; and a ‘cradle of life and love’” (“The Human Family”). He stated anything else “constitutes an objective obstacle on the road to peace”. Neither the Pope nor the Catholic Church explains why heterosexual parents are best for society or why they are obstacles to peace. The Catholic Church’s has allowed the exclusion of queers from families and has supported the continued legal and social battle to prevent same-sex marriage and other non-heteronormative lifestyles from gaining equal standing in the United States.

In an interview for www.protectmarriage.com, Massachusetts citizens Robb and Robin Wirthlin worried that, after gay marriage was legalized, “rights would be infringed, particularly if you disagreed with gay marriage” (“Rob and

When the definition of marriage depends on an incomplete picture of human identity, it violates basic human rights to self-expression.

self-expression

Robin”). Neither individual commented on historical denial of queer citizens’ basic rights to education, jobs, housing, etc. The couple found it “shocking” that their son, who attends public school in Massachusetts, was taught about gay marriage as an acceptable lifestyle and felt their religious freedom was violated. The Wirthlins took their case to court, hoping to either stop public schools from teaching children about non-heteronormative lifestyles or force them to contact children’s parents when any conversation about homosexuality took place, formal or informal. They lost their case on the grounds that public schools are allowed to discuss diversity issues as long as they do not target the beliefs of a particular religion or force students to agree with the ideas (Thurston).

According to the Wirthlins, homosexuality is an “adult issue”. Eve Sedgwick, a prominent feminist and queer theorist, critiques this viewpoint citing “queer teenagers are two to three times likelier to attempt suicide, and to accomplish it, than others” and “up to 30 percent of teen suicides are likely to be gay or lesbian” (Sedgwick 1). Preventing educators from mentioning queer lifestyles is another way of reinforcing narrow norms and could cause damage to queer adolescents. By excluding mention of queers’ role in society, educators are indicating queers are abnormal and not worth recognition, despite the fact of their existence. According to Sedgwick, “The complicity of parents, of teachers, of clergy, even of the mental health professions in invalidating and hounding kids who show gender dissonant tastes, behavior, body language” is appalling

(Sedgwick 2). Those who wish to “protect” their children from an education that includes knowledge of the existence of queers are denying their children basic truths about our world and human history.

Each of these examples --targeting queers as the only group for which the definition of marriage has no flexibility, citing hypocritical religious reasons for excluding queers from our world family, and preventing the education of children about the basic existence of queers-- follows a similar logic: “Marriage is a critical social institution; stable families depend on it; society depends on stable families; gay marriage will break that connection” (Kurtz). This argument is based on an essentialized picture of human sexuality that ignores multiple

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...OR THE MORE FAMILIAR: SKID MARKS

heterosexuality has been
observed as a means of bettering
permitted to masquerade so
fully as History itself, as when
it has not presented itself
as the totality of Romance

“[U]nder its institutional pseudonyms such as Inheritance, Marriage, Dynasty, Family, Domesticity, and Population, heterosexuality has been permitted to masquerade so fully as History itself—when it has not presented itself as the totality of Romance.”

Eve Sedgwick, *Tendencies*, p 10

expressions of identity. The restrictive values of one group of people should not rule the lives of others. As evidenced by the stable divorce rate in those states with legal same-sex marriage, it seems same-sex marriage will not prevent, invalidate, or break apart traditional marriage (religioustolerance.org). Extending the benefits of marriage to committed parties of all kinds will begin to correct a case of institutionalized discrimination in America.

Queered Marriage

Some feminists and queer theorists bring a different perspective to the debate. According to Ann Ferguson, “the issue of gay marriage thus highlights a contradiction in American national identity: if gay marriage is supported, the normative status of the heterosexual nuclear family is undermined, while if gay marriage is disallowed, then the individual freedom and the civil rights of homosexuals are undermined” (Ferguson 40). Either way, one group of Americans will end up either normatively or legally challenged. Defenders of traditional marriage, as discussed, support a heteronormative picture of humanity that supports a historical norm, yet denies queers equal footing as citizens. Although both sides

have a substantial stake in this debate, one is socially and legally at a disadvantage, while the other is not. From a civil rights perspective, extending marriage to same-sex couples seems a matter of granting entitlements. This act would confer social and legal benefits to a group of Americans while not removing any from traditional marriage supporters. However, could a legal change result in a cultural shift towards a more accepting society?

Paula Ettelbrick believes legalizing same-sex marriage will not further the goals of the queer movement. Instead “it will constrain us, make us more invisible, force our assimilation into the mainstream, and undermine the goals of gay liberation” (Ettelbrick 637). It could be that same-sex marriage is not a large enough change to alter the norms associated with marriage, many of which are harmfully, or at least inappropriately, old-fashioned. Ettelbrick also argues same-sex marriage is at risk of reaffirming the power of marriage as the only legitimate type of union and thus, continuing to marginalize groups of Americans. She recognizes that legalizing same-sex marriage could be a step in the right direction, but hopes to deinstitutionalize marriage altogether (Ettelbrick 637). This calls into question the

role of the state. The government’s role is to provide protection for its people, especially those who have been denied rights for centuries, not to protect one group’s religious freedom over the rights of others. Ettelbrick calls for an American culture that “respects and encourages choice of relationships and family diversity”. This is the culture a queered marriage encourages. These are complicated problems are at the core of the same-sex marriage movement.

Eve Sedgwick asks, “What if instead [of a monolith] there were a practice of valuing the ways in which meanings and institutions can be at loose ends with each other?” In our case, a queered view marriage, inclusive of all plural traditions, participants and beliefs, can lead to this practice. If marriage is defined by its diversity and inclusiveness rather than its selectivity, marriage will become an obsolete distinction. In this new framework, traditional marriage will need to integrate with new conceptions of marriage. I leave you with Emma Goldman’s words, “If the world is ever to give birth to true companionship and oneness, not marriage, but love will be the parent.” This is the culture I wish to live in.

by Deborah Strehle





Gender Politics within Art of the Harlem Renaissance

Commonly known as the Harlem Renaissance, the cultural revolution taking place in Harlem at the beginning of the twentieth century gave African Americans an opportunity to subvert the racial oppression caused by over two hundred and fifty years of slavery. Emerging around the end of World War I, the movement marked the first time that mainstream publishers and critics took the artistic endeavors of African Americans seriously. As a result, many African Americans used art as a means of conveying the struggle to understand newly gained freedom as well as the historical and contemporary experiences of being black in America. Black women in particular began to attempt to undo the devastating effects of slavery, often finding the damages too profound to negate.

Meta Vaux Warrick Fuller's sculpture, *Ethiopia Awakening*, transfixes the female at the heart of the rebirth of African American culture, and emphasizes that black women need to be liberated from oppression in order for the rest of the race to progress. Although it also conveys difficulties faced by African American women, Archibald Motley's painting, *Brown Girl After the Bath*, positions the need for social change

within the male viewer and, consequently, caters to the male's dominant status. Within these portrayals of gender politics, both of the artists examine the role beauty plays in a society dictated by males, as it has the power to deepen and relinquish the objectification to which African American women were subject.

Harlem offered itself as a progressive milieu where art was employed not only as a means of self-expression, but as part of an intensive effort by African Americans to redefine their cultural and individual identities. As a result, the majority of fine art produced during the Harlem Renaissance has political, social, and religious undertones. Therefore, it is not surprising that radical changes in established gender roles began to influence the work of both male and female artists, as they attempted to convey what it meant to be at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

By providing a representation of the agency possessed by African American women to surmount oppression, Meta Vaux Warrick Fuller's *Ethiopia Awakening* reveals some of the major transformations in the self-conception of women during the Harlem Renaissance. For many members of the black community,

symbolized a religious and historical means of redefining what it meant to be an African American. Considering this, Fuller's sculpture urges African Americans to overcome subjugation by awakening the race's past. In America, the African American past was often associated with ugliness and hate; however, Fuller believes it is necessary for black people to embrace their background as an integral element of the beauty within their race.

Because Fuller personifies Ethiopia as a female, she implies that the call for change requires not only a racial awakening, but a gender vivification as well. According to this conception, African American people can only truly be liberated once black women are freed from oppression. Had the same sculpture been produced using a male as the subject, it could be argued that Fuller's plea for liberation would be unsuccessful. For in order to successfully free a race from subordination, discrimination within the race must first come to an end.

Fuller's interpretation of the cultural re-emergence of African Americans appears as a woman with the lower portion of her body wrapped tightly with woven cloth. The distinct pattern created by the entwined fabric

is reminiscent of the wrapping of a mummy, alluding to the idea that someone else has deliberately bound her. Yet, although she has been constricted by those around her, Ethiopia is depicted holding the loose end of the constraining fabric, suggesting she is capable of removing it. Like *Ethiopia*, African American people should not feel responsible for their subjugation but should instead recognize that they have the power to free themselves from its constraints.

Ethiopia's mummified body is a symbol for the preservation of African American culture and offers hope by suggesting that African American people already possess what is necessary for them to overcome oppression. For the Ancient Egyptians, mummification



was a means of preserving the physical body so that the deceased person could experience the afterlife. During the process of mummification, the body is embalmed in a way that prevents it from deteriorating. Since Ethiopia is wrapped in the same manner, her beauty and identity have likewise been preserved. According to this formulation, once they have freed themselves from the constraints with which society binds them, African Americans will expose a concealed beauty and culture that already exists underneath societal constraints.

The fact that Ethiopia's legs are bound while the upper half of her body is free demonstrates that in order to gain social mobility, members of the race must first find individual power. By placing the figure's hand on her heart

and rendering her with closed eyes, Fuller implies that the beauty required to overcome oppression does not originate from the outside world, but rather from reverence found within oneself. In Fuller's representation, the things projected onto the individual by society serve only to restrict and cover genuine beauty. As she is the one holding the end of the fabric, Ethiopia is able to unwrap herself and will eventually grant herself social mobility.

In using a woman as the representative for the re-emergence of African American culture and beauty, Fuller extends the meaning of the metaphor and calls attention not only to the oppression of the race, but specifically to the oppression felt by females within the race. While struggling to comprehend the ways in which the objectification of women masks their real beauty, she finds that it is a self-realized beauty that is required for the entire race to move forward. Fuller renders the figure unwinding the constraints from around her head and chest, the core of her mind and heart, first because it is only after the individual is free that the entire race will be able to advance.

By clothing Ethiopia, Fuller refutes female beauty that is reliant on sexuality and attributes prescribed by the beholder, and repositions it as existing within the woman herself. The majority of the detail found within *Ethiopia Awakening* is on the figure's face and hands, while the center of the subject's body, the location of her sexual organs, is sculpted with very little detail. Fuller avoids over-emphasizing Ethiopia's breasts and has the cloth she is holding cover her stomach and vagina. Furthermore, she refuses to show the subject's hair by rendering her wearing a large headdress. By downplaying her physicality, Fuller situates the source of beauty within women.

Another portrayal of female beauty that expresses the individual's attempt to understand the difficulties associated with being an African American woman during the early twentieth century is Archibald J. Motley's *Brown Girl After the Bath*. In this painting, a nude African American woman is seen sitting in front of a vanity. While in traditional nudes the figure's

face is frequently left out or illustrated looking away, Motley chose to render his subject in front of a mirror that is reflecting her staring back at the viewer.

Unlike Motley's painting, classical renditions of female nudes prompt the viewer to objectify the figure which is regarded strictly in terms of her physical, and sexual, features. In this context, the woman is transformed from a person into an image created solely for the audience's viewing pleasure. By having the subject stare back at the viewer, Motley challenges this idea. His creation of a painting where the spectator is forced to look into the subject's eyes requires that the person looking at the woman's body become engaged on a more personal level.



Because the way in which the woman is sitting would have yielded a reflection much different from the one that appears in the painting, it is evident that Motley deliberately altered the mirror image. Had the reflection been rendered the way it would have actually appeared, the subject would be seen staring back at herself rather than at her viewer. Beyond challenging the voyeur to reevaluate how they view the nude, this conveys the female's search for beauty lies not within herself, but by the way she is perceived by others. When looking into the mirror, the figure is unable to see a genuine reflection, and can only see the way in which others see her.

In order to satisfy society's prescribed definition of beauty, African American women often felt as though they needed to conceal the features distinctive to their race. Motley depicts this problem by choosing to show the figure in the middle of applying powder to her face. Because make-up is generally used to enhance physical appearance, the subject's application of powder implies that she believes she needs lighter skin to be beautiful. Similarly, powder is also used to hide imperfections, which suggests that the subject thinks of her dark skin as a flaw. The woman's application of make-up masks her identity as an African American woman.

Within Motley's painting, the subject's beauty is unnatural, as all of the things she feels she needs to be beautiful are being applied over top of her true identity. Like Fuller's representation of Ethiopia mummified by constraints, Motley's figure is covered with

predetermined roles. Here, the female is put on display for the satisfaction of an audience even within her own bedroom.

Because she is sitting on stage looking out at the audience, it is clear that the woman has some understanding of her position within society. However, in this depiction, the viewer witnesses the process through which she becomes this character as they see her before she puts on the clothes and make-up that make her beautiful. Motley might have chosen to highlight this process in an effort to understand, and prompt others to recognize, what it felt like to be forced to play a role as if life were a theatrical production.

The attempt to understand the oppression of African American women living in the early twentieth century was pursued by male and female artists within the Harlem Renaissance. While both Fuller and Motley demonstrate

male, inherently supporting the existing social structure. Therefore, while Motley's attempt to gain an understanding of women's place in a society dominated by males is admirable, as a male he is unable to illustrate the female's position without objectifying her himself.

By clothing her personification of Ethiopia, Fuller focuses less on portraying the details of the subject's physicality and proposes that both the gender and racial awakening required to bring African Americans out of oppression necessitates black women's quest for internal beauty. Because she gives her figure a certain degree of agency, as she holds the end of the fabric she is confined by, Fuller suggests that women possess both the power and responsibility needed in order to change the way they are treated.

Attempts to understand the position of African American women during the early

In their inability to understand the objectification and oppression felt by females within their race, male artists were restricted in their view of freedom.

other people's interpretation of beauty, leaving her real appearance hidden underneath. The reflected image in the mirror is lighter than the portion of the subject's body that is facing the audience, implying that those that look at her see only the applied aspects of her appearance.

The conception of beauty as something that is superficial, appreciated for the pleasure it gives others, is also revealed in *Brown Girl After the Bath*. The curtain in the left hand corner of the painting makes the subject appear as though she is on a stage. Similarly, the vanity that the figure is sitting in front of is on wheels and seems to have been placed in the center of the room as part of a set. Using this formulation Motley positions women on a stage where they unavoidably become idealized objects acting within the constraints of

what it meant to be positioned at the bottom of a society founded on subordination, the intensity of this objectification is yielded in the fact that Motley found it necessary to portray the female subject of his painting in the nude.

Motley, although successful in challenging the viewer of *Brown Girl After the Bath* to recognize the way in which an outside perception of beauty affects women, undermines his message and participates in the same objectification by using a nude female. As a result, his painting deals more with challenging the viewer, and in particular the African American male, than with relieving the female subject of oppression. By requiring that the person looking at the painting think what it means to be objectified, Motley seems to situate the potential for change within the

twentieth century were beneficial in their recognition of existing subjugation. However, in their inability to understand the objectification and oppression felt by females within their race, male artists were restricted in their view of freedom. As part of the class responsible for the damages, men were often unable to fully separate themselves from the power allotted to them by the patriarchal social structure. Artistic representations yielded by many male artists of the Harlem Renaissance illustrate male's failure to see women as part of a movement for social change, as even in their attempt to understand oppressive gender politics, women remain objectified.

by Danielle Palencar



Italian Health Care Systems

Ranked Second Best in the World
Ranked Second Best in the World



Health care systems differ from country to country in terms of policies, prevention, treatment, and management of disease and illness. The quality of these health care systems is based on five factors, as determined by the World Health Organization. These factors include overall level of population health, health inequalities within the population, overall level of health system responsiveness, distribution of responsiveness within the population, and the distribution of the health system's financial burden within the population (World Health Organization). Though the United States spends more on health care than any other country, the WHO ranks it as being thirty-seventh on the list of world health systems. To understand how such a decision is reached, a comparison of the U.S. health care system to another health care system of a higher rank is necessary.

This paper will specifically examine the health care system of Italy, which is ranked as having the second best health care system in the world (WHO). I will focus primarily on Italian health policies and programs by looking at both the standard indicators of health and at the major causes of illness and death. From this standpoint, I will then evaluate the World Health Organization's claim that Italy's health care system is better than that of the United States.

Standard Indicators of Health

Presented in Table 1 are epidemiological measures of the Italian population. All data was taken from the CIA World Factbook and the WHO.

Compared to the Italian standard indicators of health, presented in Table 2 are the epidemiological measures of the American population. Similarly, all data was taken from the CIA World Factbook and the WHO.

Major Causes of Illness and Death in Italy

There are certain risk factors that contribute more so than others to the burden of illness and death in Italy's population. The WHO assesses such health risks in terms of DALYs,

or disability-adjusted life-years, which combine the impact of illness, disability, and mortality on population health. Out of the top ten risks to health in developed countries, the WHO identified the Italian population's top five health risks as being tobacco, alcohol, excess weight, intake of fruits and vegetables, and physical inactivity (World Health Organization).

While there will always be a number of health risks in any given country, it is important to judge the extent to which certain illnesses

affect a population. According to the WHO, four illnesses that play a major role in the health of Italy's population are cancer, HIV, Hepatitis C, and Tuberculosis.

Italian Policies and Programs

The Italian health care system is the third largest in the European Union and follows a system similar to the British National Health Service. Both run under universal health care, which provides coverage to the entire population. In 1978, the Italian National

Table 1

Italy	
Population (July 2009 est.)	58,126,212
Life expectancy at birth (2009 est.)	total population: 80.2 years male: 77.26 years female: 83.33 years
Infant mortality rate (2009 est.)	total: 5.51 deaths/1,000 live births male: 6.07 deaths/1,000 live births female: 4.91 deaths/1,000 live births
Total expenditure on health per capita (Intl \$, 2005)	2,494
Total expenditure on health as % of GDP (2005)	8
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate (2007 est.)	0.4%
HIV/AIDS - people living w/ HIV/AIDS (2007 est.)	150,000
HIV/AIDS – deaths (2007 est.)	1,900

Table 2

United States	
American Population (July 2009 est.)	307,212,123
Life expectancy at birth (2009 est.)	total population: 78.11 years male: 75.65 years female: 80.69 years
Infant mortality rate (2009 est.)	total: 6.26 deaths/1,000 live births male: 6.94 deaths/1,000 live births female: 5.55 deaths/1,000 live births
Total expenditure on health per capita (Intl \$, 2006)	6,714
Total expenditure on health as % of GDP (2006)	15.3
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate (2007 est.)	0.6%
HIV/AIDS - people living w/ HIV/AIDS (2007 est.)	1.2 million
HIV/AIDS – deaths (2007 est.)	22,000

Health Service (NHS) was established with the intention to follow article 32 of the Italian Constitution, which declared that “the Italian state has the responsibility of safeguarding the health of each citizen as an individual asset and a community interest.” Article 32 further asserts that the Italian state must provide free care to those who cannot afford to do so on their own. Within the Italian NHS, administrative and organizational responsibility and authority are divided among the central government, the regions, and the local health care agencies (Maio et al., 2002).

Universal Health Coverage

Under the Italian National Health Service citizens are provided free primary care, hospital care and community health and hygiene, as well as prevention, health promotion, and education. Hospital care includes diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation and is free or available at a

responsibility, as financing comes directly from regional taxes (Maio et al., 2002).

Public versus Private Care

Health Care providers in Italy can be placed into one of two broad classes of providers: public specialists and private specialists. Because public providers are subject to significant co-payments and individuals heavily rely on private professionals, around 1992 large shares of expenditures for physician services began to be financed out-of-pocket. At the cost of higher out-of-pocket payments in comparison to public practices in Italy, private consultation consists of higher accuracy and shorter waiting times (Fabbri & Monfardini, 2003). Public services require cost-sharing, such as co-payments for diagnostic procedures, pharmaceuticals, and specialist consultations. On the other hand, users pay directly for private health care services as well as over-the-counter

came as a direct result of the increased spread of formerly unknown diseases, along with the discovery of damaging agents present in the food chain. Greater citizen awareness has resulted in increased efforts at creating stronger Italian health policies. One specific action taken was implementing Article 152, which states that “a level of elevated protection of human health is guaranteed in the definition and implementation of all policies and activities of the Community” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

But Italian citizens are currently facing a powerful question: Does universal health coverage lead to inadequate quality and quantity of health care? As noted by Maio et al., “In spite of universal coverage, it appears now that citizens rely more on their own financial resources for health care, especially for pharmaceuticals, dental care, specialist consultations, diagnostic examinations, and

The longer the United States goes without having a national health plan, the wider the gap between the best health system and the 37th best health system will appear to be.

minimum charge at the time of use. General practitioners and pediatricians are also free at the time of use, as they are paid on a capitation basis with a maximum of 1,500 patients per general practitioner and 1,000 patients per pediatrician (Maio et al., 2002).

Universal health care is made possible by tax revenues provided to the Italian NHS. The government establishes an annual budget for health financing through a “per capita quota” system, which is the national cut sum per person necessary to cover the costs for essential health care services. While the Ministry of Health maintains overall control of the health care system, funding for health care is a regional

responsibility. As of 2002, public sources covered about 75% of health expenditure, while private expenditure amounted to about 25% (World Health Organization). Thus, since more people use public services, it can be argued that public care is the greater contributor to the health of Italians.

How Effective is Italy's Universal Health Care?

Italy has made great strides over the past ten years in increasing the availability of comprehensive health information. According to Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italian citizens have demanded greater awareness and understanding of the causes of illness. This

elective surgery” (Maio et al., 2002). While coverage for all may allow for every person to have health care, there may be negative consequences regarding the quality of care. While something is definitely better than nothing, when it comes to receiving any health care, it is that “something” that needs to be assessed as to its cost–benefit ratio.

Is it worth it?

Rose Weitz, a professor of women's studies and sociology at Arizona State University, discusses the issue of health care in Chapter 9 of her book, titled *The Sociology of Health, Illness, and Health Care*. When writing specifically about the Italian health system, Weitz explores

the importance of consumer choice. In evaluating certain aspects of health care systems throughout the world, Weitz reflects on the importance of the consumers' ability to choose providers. While this is definitely an indication of a good health care system, consumer choice relates to more than just provider flexibility. In the Italian health care system, "consumers cannot choose a generic when a branded drug has been prescribed; only physicians can decide whether to substitute the branded drug prescribed with an equivalent generic at a lower price" (Maio et al., 2002). While generic drugs are only a very small piece of the health care puzzle, how much does choice impact outcome? Are limitations necessarily bad? What is the trade-off?

Universal Health Care in the U.S.?

In her book, Weitz seeks to answer the question why the United States lacks national health care. As she goes through American history, Weitz outlines several events that have led to national health care being a nearly impossible state for the U.S. to reach. In part of her historical critique, Weitz focuses on opposition groups to national health care

during the first half of the 20th century. These groups included the AMA, labor unions, and conservative politicians. Collectively, these organizations have served as a major roadblock to the United States creating a universal health care system.


Upon comparison of the Italian Health Care System to that of the United States, it is my personal conclusion that Italy's health system is justifiably ranked higher than that of the United States. Italy's National Health Service's ideologies, I believe, are not only health necessities, but human rights. Such human rights can be identified by the Ministry of Health of Italy, which states that the six basic principles underlying the Italian National Health Service are human dignity, protection, need, solidarity, effectiveness and appropriateness, and equity. These values are certainly important regarding health care, but are even more so in basic quality of life.

The Italian health care system is one of the most advanced health care systems in the world, as it provides universal coverage for an entire population, with services provided for free or at modest costs (Maio et al., 2002). Even with the

potential lack of optimum care, providing health care for everyone is a tremendous feat that Italy was able to accomplish decades ago. While mandatory health insurance was established in Italy in 1943, the United States finds itself with no realistic plan of how to successfully establish national health care in 2009.

The WHO ranks Italy as having the second best health system out of 190 countries; 35 rankings above the United States. I believe it would be very difficult to establish what a truly perfect health care system would be. However, what I can say with confidence is that the longer the United States goes without a national health plan, the wider the gap between the best health system and the 37th best health system will appear to be. As long as the U.S. goes without implementing national health care, the stronger the emphasis will be on the fact that we do not have it. Countries like Italy prove that having such a system benefits not only every citizen individually, but the general wellbeing of the entire society.

by Elena Myers





PEYOTE

The Legalization of

An eight year old girl respectfully bows her head before she reaches up for the chalice; the red wine delicately moistens her lips and fills her mouth; experiencing the religious rite of communion brings her closer to God. Meanwhile a forty-five year old man cleanses his body with sage in preparation of receiving two Peyote buttons; this ritual of ingestion brings him closer to the Great One by bestowing protective and curative powers upon him. In Christianity it's normal for children to drink wine for ceremonial purposes; in Peyotism it's normal for practitioners to use Peyote for ceremonial purposes. In mainstream society it is against the law for minors under the age of 21 to drink wine and illegal for anyone to use Peyote. Why is it socially acceptable for Christians to illegally consume, while the same society continually questions the legality of allowing Peyotists to use Peyote? Is it because Christianity is the most widespread religion in the United States? Is it because hallucinogenic drugs are an unfamiliar, feared, underground substance? Does society have a double standard for the majority religious practitioners versus the minority practitioners?

In *Multicultural Citizenship*, William Kymlicka confronts the increasingly controversial but also increasingly modern issue of recognizing the identity of minority groups and making accommodations for the cultural differences of those minority groups within dominant culture. He shows how minority groups can be integrated into political communities in several ways, ranging from individual or familial voluntary immigration to colonization through conquest of entire communities. Not surprisingly, the way in which a minority group is incorporated into a larger political community affects the group's nature as well as the type of relationship that the minority group wants to enter into with the larger society. Kymlicka focuses on what he believes are the two major patterns of cultural diversity. The first case of cultural diversity involves the incorporation of formerly independent, "self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state" (Kymlicka 10). These minority groups are referred to as "national minorities," and they want to remain alongside the larger society and majority culture by maintaining their own distinct society through cultural practices

and beliefs. In order to ensure the survival of the national minorities' distinct culture and society, they demand various self-government and autonomous rights. Kymlicka's second pattern of cultural diversity consists of familial and individual immigration where immigrants commonly band together in "ethnic groups." Unlike national minorities who wish to be a self-governing nation remaining separate from the larger society, ethnic groups want to integrate into the main stream society by being recognized as fully accepted members. Often times, ethnic minorities seek more recognition of their distinct identity through the accommodation of their cultural differences by revising and changing the current laws and institutions of the larger society (Kymlicka 11-2).

In this paper I examine whether or not Native Americans should be allowed to use drugs, such as peyote, in their religious ceremonies, while non-Native American citizens would face prosecution for its use; I focus on Kymlicka's first pattern of cultural diversity, which involves national minorities, to support the legalization of peyote use for religious purposes. While some believe that the

United States should place the use of peyote under the control of narcotics laws as an illegal, habit-forming, recreational drug, others argue that the consumption of the peyote plant is essential to religious ceremonies and culture; the banning of this drug will negatively impact the religion, culture, and identity of Native Americans who partake and believe in the Peyote Religion.

Native Americans want to be placed alongside the main stream society while maintaining their cultural distinctions, such as their religious practices; William Kymlicka defends similar aims of national minorities by examining the group's rights. He argues that national minorities do deserve group differentiated rights which he subdivides into self-government, polyethnic, and special representation. Kymlicka's examination of self government and polyethnic rights are relevant in the issue of whether Native American religious ceremonies should be permitted to use drugs that are deemed illegal for non Native American citizens of the United States; according to Kymlicka's theory of multicultural liberalism, it is unjust for the use of peyote in Native Americans' religious ceremonies and practices to be prohibited and deemed illegal. I will argue that, first, Native Americans have justly been given self-government rights and as a result should be able to establish their own laws and rules of prosecution, laws which legalize the use of peyote in native religious ceremonies. Secondly, national minorities, such as Native Americans, should be granted polyethnic rights; these rights would allow exemptions from regulations and laws which would negatively impact them because of their religious practices.

All of Kymlicka's group differentiated rights can be used in providing minorities with external protection from the economic and political power of main stream society by reducing their vulnerability of decisions made by larger society, but each set of rights responds differently to external pressures. Self-government rights transfer power to the smaller, minority political groups, so that

minorities are not overpowered on issues which are particularly important for their culture, such as language, immigration, resource development, family law, and education (Kymlicka 37-8). These smaller minority groups or "individual nations," which comprise the larger multinational state, want to act on behalf of the interests of their people and ensure that their people's culture can fully and freely develop. Therefore, these nations are liable to demand rights involving territorial jurisdiction or political autonomy, but if they believe that they cannot achieve their self determination within the larger multinational state, than they may want to separate themselves from it (Kymlicka 27). National minorities demand self government rights and claim that these rights were not surrendered or abandoned during their involuntary incorporation. In the United States, national minorities are more vulnerable because their self-government powers do not receive the same constitutional protection as the states' rights, but this lack of constitutional protection provides national minorities with more flexibility when redefining their powers to suit the interests and needs of individual minorities (Kymlicka 29).

In 1930, the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs revised and authorized the creation of tribal governments in an effort to give Native American tribes self-government rights ("Plateau Indian"). Since national minorities have a better understanding of cultural practices and will not be over ruled or vetoed due to lack of numbers, they will be better at establishing just and unjust legislation concerning their cultural practices and beliefs. By providing Native American tribes with self-government rights, issues such as ceremonial peyote ingestion will not be construed or subject to the same laws as the misuse of peyote.

Native American tribes that practice the peyote ritual believe that peyote buttons have strong protective and curative powers, but they claim that they do not worship the peyote plant itself. The peyote is merely a medium that the believer travels through to reach communion with God. A Kiowa-Apache claimed that he

was healed by peyote tea after contracting the influenza epidemic during World War I, while a Cheyenne peyote participant relates his experience of giving up on white doctors after being told that he had tuberculosis. He was initially skeptical when offered peyote and told that the buttons would heal him. After a while of attending meetings and eating peyote buttons he was cured, testifying to others that the peyote does have the power to heal and cure (Brant 219).

When the United States courts examine peyotism, they have difficulty distinguishing the religious use from the misuse of peyote as seen in the 1990 court case of *Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith*. The Oregon Supreme Court claimed that religious peyote use violated the state's drug laws, but the free exercise clause made the prohibition invalid. Scalia from the Supreme Court held that (1) the ceremonial use of peyote was not exempt from the Oregon state drug laws due to the free exercise clause and (2) while remaining consistent with the exercise clause, the state could deny unemployment compensation to Native Americans on the basis of misconduct for using peyote. Four years after this case, Congress prohibited states from penalizing Native Americans who used peyote in their religious ceremonies by passing the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments ("Federal Indian Law Outline"). In this Act, Congress recognized that Native American tribal councils better understand the cultural practices and beliefs of their people and as a result will be more accepting of customs and better judges of just and unjust actions within their tribal context. In reference to peyotism, self-government rights would allow Native Americans to ingest peyote in ceremonial practices because they witness and experience the importance and necessity of expressing this religious belief.

Polyethnic rights protect the cultural and religious practices of minorities which receive insufficient support through funding, such as arts or language programs, or protect religious groups from existing legislation which may

unintentionally disadvantage them, such as conflicting dress codes and religious beliefs (Kymlicka 37-8). Kymlicka claims that within the last thirty years minority groups have challenged the notion of conformity, which assumes that minorities must adopt the cultural customs and norms of main stream society and abandon their own heritage. Initially, minority groups demanded rights which allowed them to be able to freely express their cultural beliefs without fear of retaliation from the larger society, through discrimination or prejudice (Kymlicka 30). The demands of minority groups have expanded in an effort to eliminate bias and bigotry, especially in instances involving “visible minorities,” while other minorities have demanded public funding of and for their cultural practices, such as magazines, festivals, etc. Many liberal

the military dress code so that they could wear the yarmulke during their military service (Kymlicka 31). The intention of these group specific rights, which Kymlicka refers to as “polyethnic rights,” is to help minority groups in their expression of cultural individuality and pride without being disadvantaged by the larger society’s economic and political institutions. Similar to self-government rights, polyethnic rights protect cultural differences, are not viewed as temporary, and are intended to promote, to a certain degree, integration into main stream society.

While government funding of Native American religions can be disputed, the existing legislation which unintentionally disadvantages minorities due to their religious beliefs is more prevalent in regards to the legalization of peyote. While peyotism is a religion with

anthropologist who studied peyotism, found no evidence that the opponents of peyote tried to interfere with the Native American tribes’ religious practices (Brant 220). While the verbal dissention of the use of peyote was not alarming, the American Medical Association began to carry out investigations of peyote, causing the Native American tribes to fear that peyote would be classified as a habit forming drug, subjecting it to the control of narcotics laws. Narcotics are characterized as drugs which are controlled by the government because they produce pain relief, addiction, a state of stupor, and may even result in a feeling of euphoria. Since narcotics are responsible for relieving pain, they also reduce the side effects associated with extreme pain such as fear, suffering, panic, or worry (“Narcotic”). When people are caught with illegal narcotics, such as peyote, they are

The demands of minority groups have expanded in an effort to eliminate bias and bigotry, especially in instances involving “visible minorities,” while other minorities have demanded public funding of and for their cultural practices, such as magazines, festivals, etc.

states fund museums and arts in an effort to preserve cultural diversity and richness, but they fail in providing funds for areas in studies and associations.

Usually, one of the minority groups’ most controversial demands involves being exempt from regulations and policies which would hinder them from their religious practices and beliefs. Kymlicka refers to the cases of exemption from animal slaughtering and Sunday closing for Muslims and Jews in Britain, as well as the Sikh men living in Canada who wanted exemption from the police force dress code and motorcycle helmet regulations so that they could wear their turbans. In France, Muslim girls wanted the right to wear the chador and so sought exemption from their school dress code, while within the United States, Orthodox Jews sought exemption from

devoted followers who attend meetings weekly to pray and sing for the health and strength of the tribe, there are many instances of people misusing the peyote, which makes the peyote religion vulnerable to attack. The Native American tribes cited two instances in which they believe peyote can and is misused: (1) that people use peyote while under the intoxication of alcohol and (2) at some meetings peyote is commercialized so that participants must pay for each peyote button consumed. Due to the misuse of peyote as a commercial, addictive, hallucinogenic drug, the Baptists in that region looked down upon the practices of peyote rites by referring to the effects of the peyote buttons as “distinctly deleterious, physically, mentally, and morally.” Although some religious groups, including the Baptists, publically spoke out against the use of peyote, Charles Brant, an

prosecuted. But if US law recognized polyethnic rights, the use of peyote in Native American religious ceremonies would be outside the jurisdiction of larger society because it is an important cultural practice.

It is important to examine why national minorities deserve these rights which appear to advantage them over the rest of society. Kymlicka raises similar questions after examining what group differentiated rights are and how they protect the culture, practices, and beliefs of national minorities. Providing minority groups with group differentiated rights and protecting their personal culture not only impacts the minorities, but places costs on other interests and other people, so it is necessary to determine if and when these trade-offs are justified. Kymlicka is useful in this regard as well. He responds to these issues

of justice with three points: equality, historical agreements, and diversity. His first two points are based upon the positive impact on national minorities while the last point shows how the larger society benefits from group differentiated rights. Since his last argument concentrates on the benefits provided to majority groups for minority rights, it does not directly focus on if and why these minority groups deserve separate and distinct rights to protect the culture of the minorities, which is the intention of this paper; the diversity argument is also problematic because it is advantage based and not morally based. Although Kymlicka does not expand upon the moral relevance of the diversity argument, it does allow for a greater scope for autonomy and provides more options for individuals to determine the best life for themselves.

(Kymlicka 109). Enacting these measures would impose restrictions on the majority, which could include giving minorities priority in using certain resources, forgoing specific rights when entering the minority's homeland, or paying more to move into the minority's territory. These restrictions placed upon the majority are a burden, but the sacrifice of the restrictions on the majority is much less in comparison to the sacrifices that the minorities would have to make if action is not taken. Without the restrictions to promote external protection, the minority may lose its culture, which is too great a cost to request of people.

Kymlicka's argument for equality endorses group differentiated rights only when the national minorities are truly disadvantaged and the special rights correct this disadvantage. When examining this notion in reference to the

peyote buttons, with the belief that these peyote buttons were given to them by the voice for physical and psychological healing (Brant 213-215). In order for Native Americans to have the freedom to choose which religion to practice and to be equal with the larger society by having the same religious freedom, ceremonial peyote use needs to be legalized. This ritual of ingesting drugs is not uncommon in religious beliefs; Christians consume blessed wine and unleavened bread, referred to as the Eucharist, which they believe is a gift from their God to remember and honor Jesus Christ. The religious ceremony of Christianity centers on receiving the Eucharist because it brings the followers closer to God; similarly the ingestion of peyote allows the Native Americans to reach a state of communion with the voice of the Great One. Since the United States allows other religions to

While peyotism is a religion with devoted followers who attend meetings weekly to pray and sing for the health and strength of the tribe, there are many instances of people misusing the peyote, which makes the peyote religion vulnerable to attack.

The equality argument is based upon the notion that group specific rights are necessary to ensure true equality for all citizens of ethnic and national minority groups. The opposition will respond that true equality for all can only be achieved by providing equal rights for individuals despite factors such as ethnicity or race, but Kymlicka argues that some of the minority rights "eliminate, rather than create, inequalities" (Kymlicka 109). For instance, political and economic decisions of the majority may undermine the societal culture of national minorities, making the minorities suffer injustice. To ameliorate this injustice the government needs to lessen and eliminate minority vulnerability of the majority's decisions through "territorial autonomy, veto powers, guaranteed representation in central institutions, land claims, and language rights"

Native American religious use of peyote, other drug uses of peyote must also be considered, as well as the costs concurred to the national minorities and the larger society. Peyotism, the most widespread religion of North American Indians, is based upon the story of a mother and boy who are left alone and hungry after escaping an attack by another tribe of Native Americans ("Native American Church"). While they are trying to locate other displaced survivors their strength starts to fail, but the boy hears a voice instructing him to eat the peyote buttons of the cactus. The boy obeys, his hunger is satiated, and the voice then reunites him with survivors from his tribe. To honor the voice that saved them and to share the healing powers that they discovered with others, the boy began to hold peyote ceremonies. At these ceremonies the members would each consume

ingest drugs, such as alcohol, and promotes the notion of religious freedom, it should allow the legalization of ceremonial peyote ingestion, as defined by Kymlicka's equality argument.

Another argument in defense of legalizing peyote use involves historical agreements which focus solely on national minorities' rights. Kymlicka explains why ethnic groups are not considered, claiming that immigrants are not normally promised rights before entering into a new country. National minority rights were granted and necessary in the agreement of being federated through signed treaties. Previous generations signed these treaties undemocratically, under duress and/or ignorance while lacking equal negotiation power as their partners. These historical agreements define the terms under which the United States acquired authority over Native

Americans. Therefore, if the United States breaches its trust and does not abide by its treaty then the Native American communities' agreements to be part of the United States is void. There are two main costs associated with historical agreements: if these agreements are broken the trust between the minority citizens and the government will be breached and the respect of the self-determination of the society will be violated, neither of which are acceptable costs for a society. Since the costs of breaking a historical agreement are so high, these treaties must be examined for fairness on the basis of involuntary or voluntary federation. There are two questions vital in determining if national minorities entered voluntary federation through treaties or involuntary federation through colonization: what were the terms and conditions under which the two parties decided to become partners and what are the limits and restrictions on the state's right to govern its national minorities?

What are the historical agreements between the United States government and Native and Americans and what were the terms and conditions under which the Native American tribal groups agreed to enter into a partnership with the United States? Historical agreements, in the form of treaties between the United States government and Native Americans, were perpetually broken by the United States and recreated to the United States' advantage. For instance, the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868 gave the Western Sioux Indians the rights to their native hunting grounds and sacred territory in the Black Hills. But George Custer found gold in the Black Hills, causing thousands of miners to swarm the area. This unwanted influx and intrusion of whites into the sacred territory of the Western Sioux Indians led to war. Although the Native Americans won the Battle of Little Bighorn, they were forced to relinquish their treaty rights to the Black Hills, which contained the largest goldmine in the United States ("Black Hills"). Another instance of forcible removal was when 100,000 people from the Eastern Woodlands were forced to leave their homeland at gunpoint;

it is estimated that over 15,000 people died while traveling the Trail of Tears ("Southeast Indian"). Due to (1) the dishonesty of the United States by constantly entering and breaking treaties with Native American tribes and (2) the notion that the United States forced the national minorities into these agreements through violence and colonization, most of the historical agreements involving Native American tribes should be reevaluated. In regards to the promise of Native American self-government rights, the United States forced Native American tribes onto reservations and as a result their self-government rights are directly tied to tribal reservation lands where tribal councils are responsible for governing the reserve. The United States should keep their promises made to the Native American tribes by recognizing tribal councils as self-governing.

When people are caught with illegal narcotics, such as peyote, they are prosecuted. But if US law recognized polyethnic rights, the use of peyote in Native American religious ceremonies would be outside the jurisdiction of larger society because it is an important cultural practice.

While indigenous issues concerning health, criminal justice, resource development, family law, education, and policing have increased the Native Americans control over their lives, Native American tribes greatly differ in the types of powers that they want for their people. Their territorial locations within states also create problems because the Native Americans must co-ordinate their native self-government with the federal state agency. These claims of self-government transfer political power to the smaller subgroups under the control of the national minorities, which generally correspond to the national minority's historical territory or homeland (Kymlicka 29-30).

The value of cultural diversity, insofar as it pertains to the interests of the majority and adds richness to people's lives, makes national minority rights deserving of support.

Kymlicka suggests that diversity is seen as valuable because it is aesthetically pleasing in its creation of a more interesting global society and it expands the options and choices of individuals; but Native American tribes want to retain their cultural practices and beliefs by remaining alongside the larger society. So by protecting these national minorities and granting them group differentiated rights, the larger society may actually be reducing diversity. The tribes would no longer have to assimilate into the larger society where their culture would be integrated, benefiting the majority through its aesthetic value. Another reason why cultural diversity may be seen as valuable is because other cultures have differing social and political organizations, which could be used as a reference when future problems arise, such as adopting aspects of the Native Americans'

traditional lifestyle that focuses on preserving the environment (Kymlicka 121).

All of Kymlicka's reasons supporting group differentiated rights on the basis of cultural diversity are centered upon the advantages received by protecting and preserving cultural diversity, not a morally based argument. Advantage based arguments are problematic because they do not produce consistent or morally right actions; the degree of the importance of the advantages may change or people may commit an unjust crime because it is advantageous for them to do so. For instance it would cost less to increase the immigration from various countries than to protect national minorities, but that advantage does not justify the mistreatment of Native Americans, just as the protection of Native American culture cannot be morally justified by this argument.

Even if the educational and aesthetic values of cultural diversity justify the costs associated with promoting and protecting the diversity of minority cultures, these values do not explain why the minority culture should not have to be burdened with extreme costs. If the benefits of the majority can justify restrictions on individual opportunities or liberties, why should it matter whether the restrictions are enforced on the minority or majority? This problem brings up another issue with the diversity argument; Kymlicka believes that it is just to protect national minorities through external restrictions, but since the value of cultural diversity argument appeals to the mainstream society, it fails to explain whether or not the national minorities should be able to decide on their own if and how their culture should be maintained (Kymlicka 123).

Kymlicka believes that decisions about what specific aspects of culture should be maintained should be left up to the culture to decide because state intervention would unfairly penalize and/or discourage others' choices. He claims that people should be free to choose which type of life they believe is best; to come to this conclusion he examines why people should be given the option of determining what is the best life for them, even though some people make unwise decisions by wasting their effort and time on trivial or impossible pursuits (Kymlicka 80). Why should the government not force people into living a truly good life by intervening when people are making imprudent decisions and mistakes? The government may be untrustworthy, some people may have needs that a well intentioned government may fail to take into account, or civil strife could result if the government supports conceptions of the good which are controversial. Kymlicka also points out that individuals will be more likely to adopt and live by values which they endorse, as opposed to being forced into a lifestyle in accordance with principles that contradict or stray from their own profound ethical convictions (Kymlicka 81). Since people can choose to follow their conception of the good, people can choose to make mistakes. People

can be wrong in their belief of the conception of the good or about the value or importance of what they are doing, but no one wants to live a life that is based upon false beliefs or worth; therefore it is important that people are able to use new information and experiences to assess and revise their conceptions of the good.

According to Kymlicka's theory of multicultural liberalism, Native American tribes should be allowed to ingest peyote in religious ceremonies and this cultural practice should be protected by group differentiated rights: specifically self-government rights

In order for Native Americans to have the freedom to choose which religion to practice and to be equal with the larger society by having the same religious freedom, ceremonial peyote use needs to be legalized.

and polyethnic rights. Self-government rights would give tribal councils the power to establish and enforce laws and rules of prosecution that correlate with their cultural beliefs and practices. Polyethnic rights ensure that minorities are not disadvantaged because of their religious practices by granting these groups with exemptions from such laws and regulations; the ceremonial tribal ingestion of peyote would be allowed because it is the foundation of the most wide spread Native American religion and denying the right to use peyote is equivalent to denying them the right to practice the religion of their choice. This argument leads into why Native American tribes deserve group differentiated rights and whether the costs of the majority and minority are acceptable. Kymlicka argues for group differentiated rights on the grounds of equality, historical agreements, and the value of cultural diversity. To promote equality between the majority and minority, Native American tribes need to be given the same religious freedom and since the ingestion of peyote is the basis of a Native American religion, the use of peyote

cannot be prohibited. In regards to historical agreements it is necessary to determine whether the agreement was entered into voluntary or involuntary; Native American tribes were forced into accepting unfair terms and as a result these treaties need to be revised, but the United States must keep its promise by recognizing Native American tribes as self-governing. The argument of valuing cultural diversity fails because it is morally based, advantages the majority, and does not explain whether or not Native American tribes should be able to decide if and how their own culture is

maintained, but it can promote autonomy and protect other cultures that may have a different form of government, organization, or lifestyle, which may be helpful in the future. National minority groups of Native American tribes deserve self-government and polyethnic rights; these group differentiated rights underwrite the ceremonial ingestion of peyote for these tribal groups, but not for any non-religious use because these rights require costs to minority and majority groups that are acceptable.

by Faith Roncoroni



Racism, Reaction and Resolution:
Proposal for the Eradication of Bigotry at Lehigh University



FOCK

YOUR

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VI

DEATH
NEEDS TIME
FOR
WHAT IT KILLS
TO GROW IN

- W.S. BURROUGH

YOUR MOUTH

Although the outburst of racist, often misogynistic, attacks on campus following the presidential election came as a shock to some, neither the attacks themselves nor the reaction that ensued surprised me. While my lack of astonishment may initially seem crass, allow me to clarify why I would make such a statement.

First and foremost, the constant effort throughout both the primaries and general election to cast Barack Obama as an outsider was certain to result in some sort of backlash. The campaigns of Senators Clinton and McCain were solely focused on winning, and seemed to give little thought to the potential effects of their libelous attack ads. In the month leading up to the election, these consequences were already being made evident as McCain supporters voiced their lack of trust in and contempt for Senator Obama. Therefore,

Based on these two assertions, I agree with the institution of a mandatory class proposed in the "List of Resolutions Presented to President Alice Gast and the Council for Equity and Community (CEC) by a Group of Concerned Black Students" at the town-hall meeting. This class could exist as one of the freshman English courses, and should focus on the history of slavery and racism in America and violent/nonviolent reactions to the systematized oppression of Blacks in America. Therefore, the goal of this class would be to educate and expose students to why racism exists in the United States and the myriad of forms it has taken throughout our country's history. Furthermore, by incorporating both violent and nonviolent responses to racial oppression, the class would aim to illustrate the shortcomings of violent action, and encourage

packed curriculum. This fear is understandable since students are attending Lehigh in order to get educated in particular fields, and do not want to sacrifice some aspect of their education for a topic that may seemingly have nothing to do with their career path. However, racism is omnipresent within American society, and will undoubtedly be encountered in one's work environment — one cannot separate the oppression of Blacks in the United States from any field. Therefore, we must modify this line of thinking, and should view the education of Lehigh students in this respect as paramount to every career path. We do not allow engineering majors to graduate without an understanding of calculus, or computer science majors to get their degrees without a firm grasp of programming — this is no different. By allowing students to leave Lehigh ignorant of why and how racism functions and how to counteract it, we are doing them a great disservice; we send students into their respective fields unprepared to deal with a problem that they will unquestionably be faced with. Should such a course exist, Lehigh students would indubitably become enhanced agents of social justice rather than those who unwittingly propagate further injustice.

If the course were to exist as one of the freshman English courses, nothing would have to be sacrificed from any student's curriculum. Students could read first-hand accounts of the brutality of slavery by Frederick Douglass or Harriet Jacobs, as well as reports of the shortcomings of reconstruction and post-emancipation racism by T. Thomas Fortune, Charles Chesnutt, or W.E.B. Du Bois. These works, when coupled with the writing of Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., would provide students with a sound knowledge of the history of racism in America and how to confront it nonviolently. Moreover, a study of the speeches and literature by these great progressive thinkers would enhance close reading and interpretation skills. In-class discussion and peer review would improve articulation and writing skills, while also exposing students to

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one must understand that the reaction was largely prompted by fear, and not merely the disappointment inherent in every election.

Secondly and sorrowfully, racism has cast a pall over my experience at Lehigh. During the time I have spent here since the fall of 2004, I have heard countless racist jokes and ignorant comments from white students. The Greek system of the Hill also tends to encourage social segregation, and frequently promotes racism and misogyny with theme-parties such as "pimps and hoes." Additionally, similar large occurrences have almost invariably taken place at some point every year, and are met with the same responses of anger and condemnation by some and skepticism by others. However, these reactions are always fleeting, and eventually the subject of racism on campus returns to ostensible quiescence.

students to engage in nonviolent forms of protest on campus. Ideally, this course would make interest in resolving racism a continuous force on Lehigh's campus. If unwavering concern and awareness existed it would emphasize to accepted African-Americans that Lehigh was truly concerned with becoming a more diverse institution, and that people of all races were welcomed and respected here. Although the institution of such a class was proven controversial and highly criticized by some people at the town-hall meeting, it is my opinion that it could dramatically alter the understanding and combating of racism on campus if properly constructed.

Much of the resistance voiced that the establishment of a class focusing on racism would not be possible for many students, particularly engineers, due to an already jam-

the opinions of their classmates. Additionally, by educating first-year students in the art of conflict resolution, all Lehigh students would be better equipped to write persuasive essays and engage in effective discourse. Nevertheless, the administration seems unsure about the installation of a mandatory course and it will take time for a decision to be reached. It would be highly irresponsible to wait for change to take place. Hence, I encourage all professors teaching English 1 or 2 to modify their syllabi, even if only to include a brief section on the aforementioned subject. By doing so professors would not only assist the progression of the atmosphere on-campus, but also demonstrate to students that they cannot idly wait for others to generate change.

Another frequently espoused apprehension is that a course on racism would be incapable

assume that voting is the alpha and omega of democracy, and leaders should be expected to create change, rather than concerned citizens. However, the Lehigh administration is not an instrument of change, but like King's "white moderate," are "more devoted to 'order' than to justice;" they opt for "a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice." This is not a consequence of any fault of the members of the administration, but is caused by their necessity to regulate between the desires of the Board of Trustees and other alumni, current and prospective students, and faculty. Lehigh is constantly striving to improve its rank among other schools, and is subsequently slow to enact change due to fear of public opinion. Therefore, Lehigh is "in dire need of creative extremists" (King) that will dramatize tension

discourage matriculation from those who held intolerant, bigoted views. Conversely, the enrollment of African-Americans and other "minorities" would surely increase, as would that of white students interested in combating racism or simply looking to attend a school where diversity exists and is fostered. If a course were required, it would send a formidable message to prospective students about the type of community that exists on Lehigh's campus.

The need for a class that educates students in conflict resolution and Gandhi's nonviolent method — love in the face of hatred — was made highly evident in the town-hall meeting on November 11, 2008. Although the anger of everyone present was justifiable, questions and statements were often poorly directed and frequently demonstrated a failure to listen to the comments of others. The administration

There is no way to attack racism on campus in its entirety. Instead, it would be more beneficial to "chunk" the problem into smaller, more specific parts, and then set goals for that facet of the predicament.

of changing the views of students who clung to ignorant, archaic attitudes and thus should not be mandatory. Although this trepidation is natural, it is also counterintuitive in a democratic society; it seems to imply that beliefs are unshakeable and inborn, rather than ever changing and acquired. Indeed, such an opinion would entail that debate is merely the futile clashing of opposing ideas, and does not produce any form of innovation or discovery. This perspective is also akin to the viewpoint presented in the "Public Statement by Eight Alabama Clergymen" to Martin Luther King Jr. that "a case should be pressed in the courts and in negotiations among local leaders, and not in the streets" (Carpenter). Undergraduates of this university, like too many members of my generation, possess the jaded outlook that public protest is ineffectual and cliché. They

on campus and force the administration to act; students must bring problems to the fore, so that the administration has no choice but to solve them or witness the waning of public opinion. By doing so, students will undoubtedly improve the ranking of this institution, and, if they do not act, problems will remain cloaked and dormant until further incidents of bigotry occur.

The aforesaid belief that the class should not be mandatory also connotes that if such a course existed but was not required those who are interested would either enroll in it, or already know the material. However, dozens of such courses do exist and are rarely full, and few Lehigh students completely comprehend the systematic and economic nature of American racism. Additionally, by making a course in racism a requirement, the University would

was bombarded with misplaced anger, and was constantly placed on the defensive. Students wanted to attack people rather than the problem, and we were subsequently unable to "discuss underlying needs" (Conflict Resolution Network). Ergo, we must change the nature of "conflict from adversarial attack and defense, to co-operation" (ibid.). By advocating a "win-win approach" and "creative response" to first-year students, we would also reify to the faculty and administration that "errors can be regarded as splendid opportunities for learning" (ibid.); in the process of improving Lehigh, we must take chances and mistakes will surely be made, but they will ultimately be the means for enlightenment and improvement.

The hostility that existed at the town-hall meeting was indicative of Lehigh students' current inability to perform Gandhian



nonviolence. Tempers flared, and though people were not physically violent, many spoke with anger and frustration; it was an exhibition of “a negative state of harmlessness” (Gandhi 101). Students, and even faculty, must be taught that true nonviolence is not simply the absence of brute force; “it is a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evildoer” and “means conscious suffering” (101). While simply teaching students what comprises nonviolence will not make them masters in its practice, (even Gandhi admitted that the “ocean of compassion” he preached was not always possible due to the human desire to respond to hatred with more hatred (101) it will hopefully lead to its implementation by organizations such as the Movement who seek social justice on campus. Nevertheless, “it is an ideal which we have to reach”, and must be strived towards constantly (104). With a thorough knowledge of nonviolence students will be more likely to understand that ignorance is not a fault of the individual, but of the system; we must separate the evil from the evildoer. Racist and sexist ideology is generally provoked by fear and misinformation from outside sources (e.g. attack ads). By compassionately seeking to educate and inform students who demonstrate a lack of knowledge, we are able to perform simple “experiments in the practice of truth and nonviolence” in our daily lives (49).

The frustration expressed was symptomatic of not only fear and anger, but also demonstrated the difficulty of battling an unseen, unorganized group of people. However, we should take the opportunity afforded by the current tension to modify our own beliefs instead of concerning ourselves with those of others. As Kofi Appiah-Nkansah '09 stated at the town-hall meeting, we should all have friends of different racial backgrounds. Education should not only exist in the classroom, and associating with a diverse group of people ensures that we will encounter scores of distinctive perspectives. The current campus climate is ripe for meeting individuals we may not have otherwise. Students should take this occasion to step outside of their comfort

zones and seek new friendships by attending events focused on multicultural activity, such as CEC meetings. Furthermore, when students are confronted with racist jokes or comments they should not shy away from conflict, but must utilize the chance to modify another's ideology. As James H. Kavanagh states, “The distinctive effect of ideology is not theoretical but pragmatic, to enable various social subjects to feel at home, and to act (or not act), within the limits of a given social project” (Kavanagh 314). Therefore, by not speaking we connote to everyone present that such action is acceptable and appropriate; whereas by confronting prejudiced statements we illustrate that it is offensive and intolerable.

An instruction in nonviolent action will also educate students that there is no way to attack racism on campus in its entirety. Instead, it would be more beneficial to “chunk” the problem into smaller, more specific parts, and then set goals in regards to that facet of the predicament — the participants in the 1960 Nashville lunch-counter sit-ins utilized this aspect of conflict resolution. Those brave students knew that they could not simply fight segregation on a whole, but could dramatize an explicit element of the system of segregation. As I stated briefly, one of the commonly criticized portions of Lehigh's campus is the Hill. Although this is not a condemnation of the Hill in and of itself, it does systematically preserve social segregation and there have been numerous accounts of Black students being refused access to parties. Therefore, it may prove advantageous to conduct fraternity party “stand-ins,” where numerous African-American students attempt to gain admittance at specifically targeted houses that are reputed to refuse entry. The students would have to make sure the parties were open to the public and that they were properly attired. Unlike the Nashville sit-ins, interracial, mixed gender groups would be encouraged, and the groups would have high girl-to-guy ratios so as to increase the likelihood of admittance (*A Force More Powerful*). Should the groups be turned away or told to “come back in half an hour,” they would calmly wait

adjacent to the house, and return after thirty minutes. Hence, if declined entry a large multicultural group would be located outside of the house, demonstrating to other students that the given fraternity discriminated right of entry based on race. Based on the results of these “stand-ins,” students could lead boycotts of parties. Parties with racist or misogynistic themes could also be boycotted. If well conducted, “stand-ins” and boycotts on the Hill could potentially dissolve much of the social segregation caused by the Hill.

In conclusion, a single class and the resultative action that it might cause would dramatically alter the climate of Lehigh's campus. By teaching first-year students the history of racism in the United States and encouraging nonviolent action on campus, the interest in “diversity” would be less likely to be contingent upon racist attacks, and may possibly flourish as a self-sufficient movement. Moreover, prospective students that were discouraged from attending Lehigh due to its largely homogenous student-body will also be more likely to accept admittance once they realized that such a course existed. Experiments in truth such as “stands-ins” and boycotts of parties can also contribute to the atmosphere on-campus by dramatizing, and thus teasing out the tension that already exists. A required course in nonviolent conflict resolution will also dramatically improve students at forming and articulating persuasive arguments and essays. Although the resolutions I have prescribed would surely lead to Lehigh becoming a more open, accepting community, the ultimate power lies in the hands of every individual on-campus. Students, professors, and the administration must struggle, both together and separately, to ensure that no one feels discriminated against.

by Patrick Murphy



SUSTAINABILITY

The New Industrial Revolution: From Green to Sustainable

In 2006, more than 251 million tons of municipal solid waste was produced in the United States alone (Municipal 1). This stark statistic serves as proof that there is a need for dramatic change in human industry, a transformation William McDonough and Michael Braungart refer to as the New Industrial Revolution. The over abundance of waste is not a problem exclusive to the United States; it is a global issue that relies heavily on industrial design as a source for transformation. To effectively keep products from entering and/or remaining in landfills, we must begin by redesigning them. Hence, efforts must be made to produce things that go beyond merely referencing the problem and instead work independently towards amending ecological issues.

While a few decades ago the term “green” was used to define an environmentally conscious approach to design, it has more recently been replaced with the word “sustainable.” In her article, “Ecological Design: A New Critique,” Pauline Madge claims that the “transition from ‘green’ to ‘eco-’ to ‘sustainable’ represents a steady broadening of scope in theory and practice, and to a certain extent, an

increasingly critical perspective on ecology and design” (Madge 44). Although the change in terminology may at first seem arbitrary, the shift from “green” to “sustainable” denotes an entirely new approach to industrial design on both the part of the designer and the consumer.

In the 1980’s ecological issues began to materialize as topics that needed to be addressed by designers. At the time it was tagged, green design most simply represented the recognition of environmental issues. This recognition later led to provisional ‘solutions’ such as recycling and the reconstitution of materials. Yet, little was done in terms of changing the way products were designed as pressure was placed on consuming less rather than designing better (Madge 46).

Sustainable design, on the other hand, embodies a more sophisticated initiative to avert future ecological problems by making deliberate decisions throughout the design process. Because environmental issues have become increasingly pertinent, designers and consumers are beginning to consider the importance of sustainability. With an increasing demand for more sustainable products, designers are allotted a higher degree

of responsibility. They must consider not only whether the materials their product is composed of are recyclable, but also “the life cycle of the product through time.” For these reasons, “sustainable design” is more complex than “green” or “eco-” design as it “moves the interface of design outwards toward societal conditions, development and ethics” (Madge 52).

The “critical perspective on ecology and design” Madge alludes to is exemplified in Braungart and McDonough’s book *Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things*. The book stresses the need for a ‘New Industrial Revolution’ by delineating the ways past approaches to environmentally mindful design fail in meeting current needs. While green design embraced the three Rs --Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle-- and identified reduction as one of its main tenets, Braungart and McDonough advocate a different approach. It is their belief that past methods only make “the old, destructive system a bit less so” and offer only an illusion of efficiency (Braungart and McDonough 62). In fact, their proposed revolution abandons the idea of “less is more”

and promotes “a world of abundance” (Braungart and McDonough 91).

Because we live in a society obsessed with the accumulation of wealth and material goods, it would be futile to position a reformation within the relinquishment of products. Such a change would also prove detrimental to industrial design, as it would restrict creativity and limit diversity in future designs. In truth, as Braungart and McDonough advocate, the problem does not lie in the amount of goods that exist, but rather that they are constructed in ways that make them difficult to dispose of or safely reuse. For these reasons, instead of criticizing consumers for the things they own, focus should be shifted on encouraging designers to generate products that are completely sustainable.

Considering that the majority of goods are thrown into landfills after they have served their purpose, it seems a misnomer to call the intermediary between the store and the landfill a “consumer.” “They are the ultimate products of an industrial system that is designed on a linear, one-way cradle-to-grave model. Resources are extracted, shaped into products, sold, and eventually disposed of in a ‘grave’ of some kind, usually a landfill or incinerator” (Braungart and McDonough 27). These “cradle-to-grave” products govern current manufacturing

methods and are deliberately designed to be thrown away after serving their decided purpose (Braungart and McDonough 27). The re-evaluation of such a system raises the question: how much responsibility does the consumer have for an object they voluntarily introduced into their life?

While it seems absurd to require human beings to hold on to every thing they ever purchased, it is equally unreasonable to assume they have no obligations in the manner in which they get rid of these things. One available solution is to adopt a “cradle-to-cradle” system. While this method encompasses motives contrary to the Industrial Revolution, the system as a whole is not as foreign as it initially may seem. Braungart and McDonough suggest we look to nature for examples. According to their model, “To eliminate the concept of waste means to design things—products, packaging, and systems—from the very beginning on the understanding that waste does not exist” (Braungart and McDonough 104). Products that provide easy, guilt free disposal or, even better, could potentially dispose of themselves, are the ideal solution.

Many of the best examples of sustainable design are applauded for their self-sufficiency. One such example is Jurgen Bey’s Garden Bench made in 1999 for Droog Design

(Figure 1, Appendix I). Using high-pressure extrusion containers, Bey compresses natural waste such as hay, leaves, and wood chips into a bench form. The finished product does not attempt to disguise the identity of the materials, but rather features their organic nature by contrasting them with simple geometric form. Alastair Fuad-Luke’s *Eco-Design Handbook* commends Bey’s designs, claiming they may even “represent the current best practice in biodegradable furniture” (Fuad-Luke 25).

Although furniture is by no means the number one item constituting landfill waste, Bey’s bench signifies the endeavor to revolutionize all designed objects. Cradle-to-cradle design requires that thought be put into how every product is made so no valuable resources are wasted in the creation of objects that do not need them. In following this example, McDonough and Braungart’s book, *Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things*, is not made from a tree, but “synthetic ‘paper’ ... that can be broken down and circulated infinitely in industrial cycles—made and remade as ‘paper’ or other products” (Braungart and McDonough 5). Wood is an exhaustible resource necessitated for specific uses. This being said, using trees to create products that can be made from other materials is extremely improvident, especially when new materials have the potential to be “circulated infinitely.”

With its finite lifespan, Bey’s *Garden Bench* is unlike typical products which rely on the consumer for removal. Bey, in reference to his *Garden Bench* states, “It’s up to nature to decide when it’s reclamation time” (International 65). The context in which the bench is being used coupled with the strength of the raw materials it is composed of ultimately determines the length of its life. Therefore, while the consumer can act in ways to lengthen or shorten the bench’s existence, the duration of its lifespan is not entirely their decision. In a sense, Bey’s bench represents a product of the New Industrial Revolution as it takes a considerable degree of responsibility away from its user.



Figure 1. Jurgen Bey, Garden Bench, 1999. Photographer: Marsel Loermans

In *Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things*, Braungart and McDonough promote the creation of “products that, when their useful life is over, do not become useless waste but can be tossed onto the grounds to decompose and become food for plants and animals and nutrients for soil” (Braungart and McDonough 91). Bey’s *Garden Bench* encapsulates this model, as it portrays a complete cradle-to-cradle manufacturing model. Moreover, there are no negative impacts to the environment by its disposal.

Because the original intended purpose of materials is often overlooked when they are being reconstituted, it is typical for products made from reprocessed materials to be used in ways that could potentially prove detrimental to the environment. Consequently, the modern conception of recycling, or ‘down-cycling,’ is not as advantageous as it may seem. Braungart and McDonough stress this idea claiming, “blindly adopting superficial environmental approaches without fully understanding their effects can be no better—and perhaps even worse—than doing nothing” (Braungart and McDonough 59).

However, this is not to say that effective modes of recycling do not exist. *Cradle to Cradle: Remaking The Way We Make Things* presents a system in which all products are made up entirely of materials that can be broken to supply either biological or technical cycles. In accordance to this structure, Bey’s bench is composed of “biological nutrients,” or “materials that can be tossed on the ground or compost heap to safely biodegrade after use—literally to be consumed” (Braungart and McDonough 104-5). Likewise, because it is made by compressing—a process that in itself enacts little to no negative effect on the environment—all natural materials, from start to finish the creation of the *Garden Bench* poses little to no inherent ecological threat. When the consumer is finished with it, the bench could either be left to decompose or the leftover materials could even be re-recycled into new benches.

In some ways, the cradle-to-cradle initiative symbolizes a return to pre-industrial conditions. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, nearly all goods were made from natural materials that, regardless of the consumer’s intent, would decay after a certain period of time. The ability for these objects to disappear was not premeditated, and in many instances their temporary existence was considered to be one of their principle weaknesses. Although it was not a consciously designed movement, one of the goals of the Industrial Revolution was to create products that were long lasting or, if they were not durable, at least easier to throw away. Paradoxically, the New Industrial Revolution is an endeavor to negate the results of the Industrial Revolution and in some ways recover the transitory nature products had previous to the 19th Century.

Braungart and McDonough view the Industrial Revolution, which is accountable for the majority of our modern environmental problems, as principally unplanned. At the time it took place, few people considered resources inexhaustible; little thought was put into the consequences that might occur from such rapid development of industry. Consequently, the “industrial infrastructure we have today is linear: it is focused on making a product and getting it to a customer quickly and cheaply without considering much else” (Braungart and McDonough 26).

Because we now have a better understanding of the limitations of our resources and the influence our actions have on the environment, it is inefficient to operate under the same standards that were used decades ago. “Green design” is no longer sufficient in addressing current environmental issues. However, more than just a change in terminology is required: it is necessary for industrial designers to embrace sustainable design as a significant effort to alter destructive consumption patterns.

Whereas the Industrial Revolution was unplanned, the New Industrial Revolution must be thought out. Designers must put considerable thought into the objects they

introduce into the world. Concurrently, a degree of responsibility must be taken away from the consumer by the creation of objects that are autonomously sustainable. Bey’s *Garden Bench* takes this initiative by offering a solution for furniture which represents full circle cradle-to-cradle design. Therefore, the *Garden Bench* not only signifies a shift towards sustainable design, but a move towards the New Industrial Revolution.

As Braungart and McDonough insist, a new design infrastructure does not require that humans lead lives of constraint. Yet, a conscious effort must be made to separate products into the two modes of production, biological cycles and technical cycles. Having done this, there will be no need for goods to be restricted as they will be either completely biodegradable or infinitely renewable (Braungart and McDonough 104-5).

The New Industrial Revolution is representative of an effort not only to reverse the negative effects of the Industrial Revolution, but also to regenerate the past short-lived nature of products with the use of new technology and innovative materials. The movement relies heavily on industrial designers who “have more potential to slow environmental degradation than economists, politicians, businesses and even environmentalists” (Fuad-Luke 15). This being said, the future of industrial design lies in the need for designers to surpass the mere acknowledgement of environmental problems by making a conscious effort to strive for sustainability.

by Danielle Palencar

Cohousing in Cuenca

"It has always proved hard to adapt European doctrines to an entirely different context."

Halperín Donghi, Argentine Historian

Architectural theory, planning, and design are imperative global issues. Space dictates the manner in which people live their lives and in few other fields can cultural sensitivity have such an important role in the safety, security, livelihood, and happiness of a community. Local philosophies and approaches to architectural design are as globally diverse as the countries in which they originate: they are direct, immediate reactions and reflections to a particular society. This article brings to light the concepts of a remarkably successful design method from Northern Europe and attempts to translate it to a South American country that is very much in need of the solutions it promises: social equality and sense of community. This transition is much more complicated, unfortunately, than simply procuring a bilingualist; an in-depth understanding of the political, social, and economic histories, local values, traditions, ecologies, topographies, and heritages of both locations are essential to gain a proper sense of the context. Good

design requires a broad range of study. Only through understanding this information and finding key relationships between the Denmark, in Northern Europe, and Ecuador, in South America, can one properly localize this architectural concept and make it successful.

The idea for this enterprise is now over five years in the developing. I lived in Ecuador for four summers and I studied in Denmark for nine months. While both countries are equally rich in diversity, culture, and natural beauty, they are nearly opposite in wealth distribution, public infrastructure, social equality, and public well-being. Denmark has one of the world's most generous social welfare systems, as it believes all citizens should have access to education and healthcare. This starkly contrasts with Ecuador, which, like most countries in South America, was developed most drastically by Spanish Conquistadors and their culture of corruption, social inequality, and exploitation. It was rare to see a homeless Dane in Copenhagen and it was safe to walk the streets and parks at night. The minimum wage is roughly 18 USD an hour. In Cuenca, virtually every street had at least one local beggar and to walk anywhere after dark, even in groups,

was extremely dangerous. In 2004, the average monthly salary in Ecuador was 100 USD, the equivalent of what a typical Dane will make after working for five hours at a local kiosk.

Ecuador suffers from seemingly countless social problems. In addition to high levels of racism towards the indigenous population and tension between the few rich and many poor, a more recent social issue has come about because millions of Ecuadorians who currently live in the United States (both legally and illegally) are sending cash back home to their families. Many Ecuadorian children are now growing up with a constant flow of money that is relatively high compared to the local standard of living. Because many of the Ecuadorian expatriates are fathers working away from their families, many Ecuadorian children are left with no authoritative father-figure to guide them in a country where machismo is one of the highest in the world, the levels of gang memberships and violence has increased among the youth.

While studying architecture in Denmark, I learned about the fascinating concept of cohousing. It is a community design movement that began in Denmark in the 1960's as a reaction to dissatisfaction with



existing housing options. The result is a varied number of families, of all sizes and economical backgrounds, living in planned communities in which extensive common facilities are shared among the group. Each family has its own private house and there is no set ideology or values holding the unit together, allowing for total freedom of individuality. The sites are designed to maximize social activity, sustainable living, and security. While the social and economic benefits of the system are many, the most important aspect is the fact that children are brought up in a safe environment where they have companions to play with and a safe environment to grow up in. A child who lives in cohousing with a single mother now has thirty fathers to look after him. Applied in both the urban and rural context, there are hundreds

proposals for a housing community in the quiet town of Hareskov. Fully expecting to complete and occupy the newly purchased site within a few years, the cohort was shocked to find local neighbors opposed the plan in apprehension that its proposal for collective living was too radically leftist. After a year of negotiations and attempts of compromise, the once visionary group of Danes became discouraged and was forced to sell the property. While most of the twelve families gave up, Gudmand-Høyer refused to submit to what he saw as a complete failure in modern living situations.

His frustrations had arisen two years prior to the incident at Hareskov. Eager to begin a family, Gudmand-Høyer and his wife, a psychologist, had become disillusioned with the potential housing options in Denmark.

environment with social and economic benefits not available to a traditional single-family household, multi-storied apartment buildings, or row housing that existed in Denmark at the time. The plan for Hareskov called for twelve terraced houses set around a common house and a swimming pool. This first attempt at what today in Danish is known as *bofællesskaber* (directly translated as ‘living communities’) would serve as a model for all future efforts.

Jan Gudmand-Høyer’s shortcoming at Hareskov were short lived; the late sixties brought a drastic shift in values to Western society. Student anti-war demonstrations exploded at major universities in the United States and Europe, including Copenhagen. “Collectives,” or shared households with an underlying ideology, became popular housing

Underlying Ecuador’s beauty, however, is a confusing muddle of corruption, economic failure, political disunity, and callow racism that is profoundly engrained in nearly every aspect of Ecuador’s continuously conflicted history.

of cohousing communities in Denmark and Northern Europe. Attention to cohousing has recently reached the United States, with over eighty communities currently existing and over a hundred in the planning process. I feel that cohousing could bring positive social changes to Ecuador if applied in its proper context.

Cohousing: Beginnings

“I know I live in a community because on a Friday night it takes me forty-five minutes and two beers to get from the parking lot to my front door.” Danish Cohousing Resident

The story begins at the end of 1964 in the outskirts of Copenhagen. After nearly a year of careful planning and collective organization, Danish architect Jan Gudmand-Høyer and a group of close friends confidently submitted a

proposal for a housing community in the quiet town of Hareskov. Fully expecting to complete and occupy the newly purchased site within a few years, the cohort was shocked to find local neighbors opposed the plan in apprehension that its proposal for collective living was too radically leftist. After a year of negotiations and attempts of compromise, the once visionary group of Danes became discouraged and was forced to sell the property. While most of the twelve families gave up, Gudmand-Høyer refused to submit to what he saw as a complete failure in modern living situations.

Influenced heavily by Charles Moore’s 1967 book *Utopia*, the assembly envisioned a housing complex reminiscent of a traditional country village; they sought to maximize interaction with one another, both spontaneous and organized, through increased use of common spaces. This, combined with shared common facilities, would provide an

environment with social and economic benefits not available to a traditional single-family household, multi-storied apartment buildings, or row housing that existed in Denmark at the time. The plan for Hareskov called for twelve terraced houses set around a common house and a swimming pool. This first attempt at what today in Danish is known as *bofællesskaber* (directly translated as ‘living communities’) would serve as a model for all future efforts.

Jan Gudmand-Høyer’s shortcoming at Hareskov were short lived; the late sixties brought a drastic shift in values to Western society. Student anti-war demonstrations exploded at major universities in the United States and Europe, including Copenhagen. “Collectives,” or shared households with an underlying ideology, became popular housing options among young people at this time. Jan Gudmand-Høyer began writing articles promoting the idea of cohousing as a long-term housing equivalent to a collective, offering a greater network of support to the needs of the nuclear family. This, accompanied by Danish author Bodil Graae’s 1967 publication of *Children Should Have One Hundred Parents*, aroused a much broader interest in the idea of cohousing. Graae called for a housing collective with a common denominator for children. By 1968, Graae, Gudmand-Høyer, and a few of the original families from the Hareskov project had joined forces with others now interested for another attempt at a cohousing community. After years of relentless dedication and work, two cohousing communities had been realized by 1973. Cohousing was born.

As a result of the undeniable successes and benefits, the idea of cohousing spread across Denmark like wildfire. Today, hundreds of these communities exist not only in Denmark but all across Northern Europe, and only recently has it become a trend in the United States. Because each community is planned with careful attention to the context, the site, and the future inhabitants, cohousing can be applied to nearly any setting and in a variety of ways, be it urban, suburban, or rural. It addresses the fact that the majority of today's population lives in planned isolation. Amidst the incredible diversity offered from this system, cohousing is held together by the fundamental belief that it is necessary to focus on the housing of the community rather than the individual house, where community and sustainable living are stressed above all things.

Ecuador: Continuity & Contradiction

"To rule in Ecuador makes enlightened despotism necessary."

Vicente Rocafuerte, Second Ecuadorian President (1834-1839)


Slightly smaller than the state of Nevada and with a population nearing fourteen million, The Republic of Ecuador is as culturally rich as a country can get. Ecuador's ancestral heritage consists of over eighteen different ethnic groups, almost as many dialects, and nearly

five centuries of racial mixing. Distinguished as the smallest of the 17 megadiverse countries by Conservation International, the nation lies directly atop the equator (for which it was named) and is intersected from north to south by the stunning Andean mountain chain. This 40 million-year-old warped backbone of snowcapped volcanoes and highlands descends onto a relatively wide coastal zone to the west and into the Amazon Basin to the east. The unlikely landscape graciously sustains thousands of flora and fauna species and it has the highest concentration of species on Earth, including fifteen percent of the world's known birds. Just over 600 miles west of the coastline, Ecuador claims ownership to the Galápagos Islands. Geographically, ecologically, and culturally, Ecuador is a model of diversity. Underlying Ecuador's beauty, however, is a confusing muddle of corruption, economic failure, political disunity, and callow racism that is profoundly engrained in nearly every aspect of Ecuador's continuously conflicted history. For even a basic understanding of the complexity of Ecuador's contemporary social context, it is necessary to closely scrutinize several key driving forces: the Incan Empire and Spanish colonial heritage, fierce topographical regionalism, and heightened political conflict upon independence combined with boom and bust economic cycles.

A Nation of the Conquerors and the Conquered

Like many South American countries, the Republic of Ecuador suffers from a deep history of repeated invasions and conquests. Beginning with the Incan Empire's expansion to the northwest side of the continent and followed by the conquest of the Spaniards in the 16th Century, present day Ecuador's two primary cultural heritages have stemmed from foundations of violence and the assertion of dominance over subordinate peoples. With the latter invasion, the Spaniards, driven by the martial qualities and culture acquired during the seven hundred-year Reconquista, combined techniques equivalent to modern day terrorism with the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism. They stormed into South America and brutally overthrew virtually all Incan and native resistance within a mere forty years. From colonization and onward through independence, every effort was made to eliminate Andean culture.

Contemporary Ecuadorian class structure is so strongly tied to a Spanish colonial system of classification that was never fully implemented to begin with. Known as the Régimen de Castas, the system was adopted from the hierarchical, estate-based, corporate society of medieval Castile (Present day Spain). A socio-racial hierarchy that addressed a classification of the conquerors and the conquered, it did not address the reality that these two groups would remain in place and that miscegenation between the two would ensue. With each new generation, the complex mixture of legal status, ethnicity, racial (or physical) categorization, and economic roles became progressively more difficult to apply, particularly in Ecuador. Proportionately, Ecuador's Amerindian population is one of the largest in South America. Roughly 65% of today's population is mestizo, or mixed Amerindian and white. About 25% are purely Amerindian, 7% white (typically claiming descent from Spanish colonizers), and 3% black. The complex social and economic organization became a ridiculously tangled web as it tried to adapt



The Hareskov project: Designed by Jan Gudmand-Høyer, the community consisted of 12 houses around a common house.

Photo Credit: McCamant & Durrett

to the growing ethnic groups with various measures of status and social ranking. The Régimen de Castas system essentially ensured social arrogance, divide, and tension as Ecuador grew and changed. Despite the fact that nearly two thirds of the population is racially mixed, today's Ecuadorian society still maintains its self-definition in terms of essentially two classes: the elite white, and the large Indian underclass.

Topographical Regionalism

The differences that come with climate, natural dangers, and economies between coastal and highland living in Ecuador are stark, and they have led to a fierce regionalism that has unfortunately been a great detriment to Ecuadorian unity. Only until recently, geographic barriers have severely crippled communication and trade between the nation's two largest and powerful cities: coastal traders of Guayaquil and the highland textile-based capital of Quito. A 1960s United States Minister to Ecuador once stated, "Guayaquil monopolizes at present the business of importation, because its roads to the interior are

mule paths ... It is common saying in Ecuador that 'Our roads are roads for the birds, but not for men.'"

Even as late as 1920 it took over five days to travel a critical 140-mile pass in the highlands from Quito. During the rainy winter season, roads in the mountains washed out and the roads in the coastal lowlands became partly underwater, making any movement impossible. Unlike the commercially international-minded highland wool districts in Southern Peru, isolation of the Ecuadorian highlands from the outside world concocted strong regionalist sentiment in the mountain cities and fostered a bitter rivalry with the coast. Loyalties in Ecuador lie first with the region and second, if at all, with the nation. These tensions only heightened with the nation's struggle for independence in the early 1800's.


War of Independence for a Land of Disunity

An important fact to keep in mind when studying the great push for liberation from Spain is that it was a civil war in just as many ways as it was a war for independence. Freedom

from the Spanish Crown in the Andean region, as Latin American historian Magnus Mörner explains, "Had been imposed from the outside rather than achieved from within ... Against this background, the concepts of 'patria' and 'freedom.' So abundantly used, deserve keen critical scrutiny. The cultural dimension of patria may have been more determined than its geographical limits."

The international trade exposed enlightened ideas under Bourbon central reformism, and many prosperous Creoles were growing tired of paying tribute and taxes to an ever distant King. Coinciding with Napoleon's invasions across Europe and his occupation of the Spanish Crown, the only political link between Spain and Spanish America was broken and the two nations seized the opportunity to break free, with Venezuelan Simon Bolivar leading the movement from the north, and Argentinean Jose San Martin from the South.

As a result of the imposed war against Spain and the loyalists, there was absolutely no sense of national unity in Ecuador upon Independence. With an economically depressed textile industry, Quito and its isolated region in northern Ecuador had long favored a break from the Crown, as they saw opportunity for increased upward mobility for its city's large Creole population that was bureaucratically dominated by Peninsular Spaniards. They saw independence as an economic interest; tribute payments burdened an already impoverished region and hopes of redistribution of coastal wealth into the sierra. For this reason, coastal skepticism of independence grew. With a protected harborage and an abundant supply of high quality hardwoods, Guayaquil claimed ownership to the principal shipyard of the Pacific Coast and a lucrative cacao export industry. In addition, its coastal proximity made Guayaquil as a likely target for invasion and attack by the Spanish fleet, so independence was generally disregarded until Bolivar and San Martin's armies had taken most of the Andean region.




A boom and bust export economy: Growth rates of Andean exports

Photo Credit: Mörner

Eminent Instability

Dr. David W. Schodt has described the Ecuadorian political landscape to be “as bewildering as its topography... one government has followed another as if on some sort of political merry-go-round, driven by recurrent economic crises and constantly shifting political alliances.” From its very beginnings as an autonomous nation, the bitter disunity and regional economic rivalry that smoldered between the sierra and coast gave little incentive for collaboration, and as a result has always hindered Ecuadorian rulers’ attempts to govern the country. Ridden with an uneasy relationship between populist politics and democracy, leaders had to attempt to please the masses with regional public works, and more and more had to assert themselves as authoritarian figures to maintain control. Having established a formal presidential democracy in 1830, Ecuador had 86 governments and 17 constitutions in its first 159 years of independence. If you could control your military, you had a promising future. Towards the end of the 20th Century, Ecuador found itself in one of its worst states of emergency in its Republican history. Rising debts, irresponsible banking, and a volatile oil export economy put the nation on the verge of hyperinflation and amidst a governance crisis, Ecuador adopted the U.S. dollar as a “policy of last resort.”

As a nation defined by competing regions due to geographical isolation combined with a lasting dependency on a notoriously volatile export economy, Ecuador has been one of the least politically stable South American republics for most of its history. The only thing that seems certain about Ecuador’s future is a continued trend in polarizing politics. While dollarization in January 2000 brought some relative economic stability, there have already been four different presidents since that time. The current, a left-wing populist, Raphael Correa, won the 2007 election in a landslide after popular opinion turned heavily against the conservative Congress in Quito. In the fall of 2008, Correa passed a sweeping



Isometric Drawing of the Posadas House in Cuenca: The House is an attempt to create a microcosm of the larger urban society, with its centralized meeting place for more “public” activities. Photo Credit: Jamieson

referendum for a new constitution (Ecuador’s 20th since Independence), which allows him the possibility to remain in power until as late as 2017 as a way to ‘consolidate power’, and bring political stability back to the country. Is this yet turning into another Chavez-style left-wing autocracy? It is too early to tell... what is certainly clear is a definite growing identity crisis in Ecuador.

Cohousing to Address the Issues

“Societies are about people, and how we organize ourselves in relation to one another is an issue that every culture must sort out for itself.” Dean Foster

The modern day social problems that Ecuadorian society has inherited are many, if they are not addressed they could have lasting negative affects on the rising generation of Ecuadorian youth. I believe that these very issues are incredibly similar to those that Jan

Gudmand-Høyer spearheaded against with his concept of living communities in the late sixties. This is by no means an attempt to claim that cohousing is the can-all and do-all solution for Ecuador’s immensely complicated situation; I argue instead that cohousing has the capacity to significantly help many Ecuadorian families confront the burden of current socioeconomic and political problems.

Transnational Migration

The American Dream Transplanted Transcending from the muddled and confusing class system that grossly generalizes its diverse peoples as either white elite or poor Indian, racial mixing will inevitably continue. Ecuador is suffering from a serious identity crisis. As politics continue to move into the unknown and the economy remains uneasy, transnational migration is an increasing phenomenon that is

adding a dangerously complicated dynamic to an already convoluted issue.

Ecuadorian migration to the United States first occurred on a larger scale just after Guayaquil's coastal banana boom in the late 1950's. There was a modest amount of migration flow throughout the 80's and by the time the economy began to plummet, mass migration occurred, this time primarily from the south-central highlands of the country. A sample survey of the Azuay and Cañar provinces in the 90's indicated that 39% of the households had at least one member in the United States, most undocumented, and most living in New York City. Indeed, the New York Metropolitan area now has the third largest concentration of Ecuadorians in the world, after Guayaquil and Quito. What makes the Ecuadorian mass migration so extraordinary, however, is the fact that the majority does not come to the United States with an intention

to live the 'American Dream' and remain permanently. The migrants, most often young men, acquire cheap service and labor jobs that pay much higher than anything available to them in Ecuador. Through intricate networks of friends and family they live in the United States for as cheap as possible, sending remittances back to Ecuador to sustain their family, and saving money to someday return to Ecuador with enough cash to jumpstart a new life. Dollarization has only facilitated this process, and it is turning the lower income nuclear family in Ecuador on its head.

Ecuadorian migration is essentially the American Dream transplanted without any sensitivity as to how it will affect the families in the long run. After sixteen months of dissertation field research, Jason Pribilsky of Syracuse University observed that "young men feel tremendous pressures to both migrate to the United States and to marry women and

start families before they leave. Thus, many migrants head to the United States as husbands and, in many cases, as fathers."

The effects of a young father leaving his wife and newborn children behind while he is migrating abroad prove to be disastrous. With separations averaging from two to six years, there are definite psychological and social stresses within the family as well as major health concerns. Due to the prolonged separation of couples, male infidelity in Ecuador is relatively common, and some migrants are returning to Ecuador infected with the HIV virus. Divorce rates have risen. In addition, children, especially boys, are now growing up in an environment without any authoritative father figure to raise them in a culture that is "machismo" oriented. The mothers, being completely overburdened by various roles around the household, including work, must often leave the child alone completely for most of the day. Young kids are more and more lured to the influences of Western entertainment, grooming, dress, and values, further expanding the generation gap. This has resulted in an increase in violence, gang activity, joblessness, and inadequate housing. In short term attempts to improve the lives of their families, the complex system is detrimentally caving in on itself.

Begin Translation

Just as cohousing has helped thousands of Danes to raise their kids in a safe, healthy environment and created affordable housing that promotes maximum social interaction and a stimulating intellectual atmosphere, it can readdress the disastrous familial whiplash of transnational migration and be applied in its own Ecuadorian model. It may seem highly unlikely that a community system from socially minded Denmark—who for the past thirty years has always been ranked on top by social scientists as the happiest place on earth is homogenous in demographics, and has had virtually no national turmoil for more than half a century—could be applied successfully in Ecuador. But these differences are not as important as the similarities of these two countries. What matters is the fact that there



Site Plan of Jerngården: A former junkyard, this cohousing community in Aarhus, Denmark, is lined with houses around the block that share a park-like backyard and a common house in the middle of the city.

Photo Credit: McCamant & Durrett

is a problem to which cohousing can be the solution. What makes it even more viable, however, is the fact that Ecuadorians share very similar deep cultural values with Denmark when it comes to community. This will make all the difference in implementation.

Bodil Graa's 1967 publication of *Children Should Have One Hundred Parents* is just as relevant to Ecuadorian society today as it was to Denmark in the sixties. The cohousing model, adaptable in essentially any rural or urban context, would address these very issues of slum living, gang activity, and violence. The communal living aspect of cohousing would provide a viable model for thousands of families who are suffering from migration issues, from both economic and sociable standpoints.

beyond the student community. Describing both countries as "other-dependent" in the way people relate to one another, Foster stresses the fact that both countries have a strong emphasis on the individual that depends heavily on the benefit of a common group. In discussing North Andean cultures, he writes that "individuals are simply not part of society unless they can claim membership to or affiliation with some group, neighborhood or town ... every individual is unique and has the right to advance in his or her own way in the world, as long as it is done with consideration for others."

Foster also describes both countries similarly in that they are both "future and past-oriented." Although the Ecuadorian people have seen their world turned upside down

for development of communities – while they "are influenced by facts and logic, persuasion is best when it confirms already existing beliefs" – the exact ideology upon which it began in Denmark. That being said, finding an appropriate location to start is absolutely critical.

Cuenca: A Hidden Gem of Hope

"First we shape our buildings. Then our buildings start shaping us."

Sir Winston Churchill

With a population of over 400,000 inhabitants, Cuenca is Ecuador's third largest city. Nestled among the clouds in the southern highlands and regarded as one of the best-preserved, richest examples of Spanish colonial

This paper is not about how Cohousing will save Ecuadorian society: the future of Ecuador is an open book. This paper does, however, bring to light serious and neglected issues of which I have experienced first hand, and offers the best possible remedy through my observation and experience of other cultures addressing similar concerns in extremely different contexts.

Tracing back to the strong regionalist trends since the nation's earliest history, Ecuador has a strong local communal mentality embedded within its culture that will prove fundamental in realizing cohousing. In a 2003 study of family therapy in Ecuador, Ingeborg Haug observed that Ecuadorian students "in day-to-day situations tend to place a higher value on the sanctity of relationship bonds over individual recognition, even when the issue is framed as one of ethics." The students explained it as a way to "show solidarity with those less capable or fortunate."

Dean Foster, one of the world's leading cross-cultural experts, observes a promising web of common cultural orientations between and Ecuador and Denmark that extends

on numerous occasions with no immediate control over the events, they maintain an optimistic confidence and a desire to work for change. Denmark, on the other hand, maintains both strong notions of past ideology and future progress in its attempt to harmonize its utopian notion of social welfare.

While it is clear that cohousing is applicable, finding an appropriate location to start is absolutely critical. While Ecuadorians are eager to create a better future, Foster also claims that change and movement can be seen as "destabilizing and unwelcome to the status quo". He categorizes both nations being "process-oriented" over "result-oriented." This is key similarity for translating cohousing, in that Ecuadorians will rely heavily on the rationale

architecture in South America, Cuenca's urban core is listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Trust site. Cuenca has unique historical contexts in both its societal evolution and the development of its built-environment. These discrepancies are an exception to the regional mindsets and intolerant notions of identity that have plagued Ecuadorian politics, economics, and development. At the same time, Cuenca is by far the largest major urban center experiencing the massively devastating social consequences of transnational migration. Because the city is regarded as a 'university town' and sustainable approaches to preserving and restoring the landscapes have become popular, Cuenca seems to be the absolute ideal place to introduce the cohousing model to

Ecuador that can serve as a sustainable and localized example for the rest of the country to follow.

The incessant rivalry and lack of cooperation between the highlands and the coast that create the vicious cycle in inhibiting Ecuadorian national unity are not the rule in Cuenca. While most of the sierra cities “developed as bastions of conservative Spanish culture” with limited contact with the outside world, Cuenca’s proximity to Guayaquil in the southern sierra created a socially moderate intermediate of a city. Linked economically to Guayaquil but sharing a similar social structure of Quito, Cuenca’s support was vied for by the two polarizing cities in populist and partisan disagreements. In 1859, known by historians as the “terrible year,” Ecuador reached its bursting point: the country split itself into self-declared autonomous regions. Cuenca curiously enough entered an alliance with Guayaquil. In one of these instances of high tension disagreements (dealing with the relationship between church and state), Cuenca chose to side with neither Guayaquil nor Quito and organized the Progresista party in 1888 as a middle ground between the Radical Liberal party to the south and the Conservative party to the north. This compromising attitude demonstrates that ‘Cuencanos’ have the capacity to go beyond dogmatic core values and act upon what they feel is right at the time. I believe this bodes well for something as bold as cohousing.

As the capital of the Azuay province, Cuenca naturally suffers from some of the highest amounts of transnational migration in the country. Following an Ecuadorian family who moved from a rural town to Cuenca, author Anne Miles describes the Quitasacas, who, while searching for economic advancement, could never seem to flourish. Miles describes a dismal reality in that:

Sometimes it seems to them that transnational migration is the only choice. Moreover loss of [a] favored son under these circumstances has set in motion a series of shifts in family relationships and brought to the fore emotions that have provoked

them to think about their lives in new and sometimes troubling ways.

The urban fabric in which the remaining and impoverished families live has seemingly become even more dangerous. Miles recounts that everyone has at least one or two stories of being robbed at gunpoint. It is in an environment like this that the supportive network of a cohousing community can really do wonders for a community. If transnational migration is inevitably going to happen, cohousing can at least offer a therapeutic atmosphere for the families that are enduring these separations.

The Athens of Ecuador

Whereas Guayaquil today is seen as a crude port town and Quito as a chaotic, bustling capital city, Cuenca’s rich intellectual, architectural, and artistic histories cause Cuencanos to boast that their city is the “Athens of Ecuador.” Its quiet, yet vibrant cobblestone streets that are lined with two-to-three-story adobe and stucco buildings with tile roofs have a charm to them that gives the city a strong sense of time and place. In fact, Cuenca’s urban history goes back over a thousand years to a Cañari settlement called Tumipampa. In the late 15th Century, after more than 500 years of occupation, the Incan Empire conquered the Cañari and Tumipampa. The Incan ruler modeled the city after Cuzco and wanted to make Tumipampa the capital of the northern kingdom. Tumipampa itself was destroyed in the Incan War of Succession just prior to the Spaniards’ arrival, and the first written record of modern day Cuenca dates back to 1547 when the European chronicler, Pedro de Cieza de Leon, stated that “all is cast down in ruins, but still it can be seen how great they were.” Cuenca was formally founded in 1557, and was laid out with the conventional Spanish colonial gridiron plan, allowing for plenty of room for orderly geometrical expansion with a plaza at the center. Cuencanos have a rich appreciation for the City’s history, and many of those large Incan blocks still remain as cornerstones to standing buildings in the colonial core.

There is a key factor in the historical development of Cuencano domestic architecture that shows great promise for a localized adaptation of the cohousing model. From its earliest beginnings as a Spanish colony, ongoing tensions between the church and private property owners in the city have indirectly shaped the way the urban elite planned their houses. As was the case throughout all the Spanish colonial cities, Cuenca was “conceived and executed as a propaganda vehicle, symbolizing and incarnating civilization.” With the Church being the unquestionable central figure in Andean society, it constantly maintained efforts to acquire and demonstrate maximum authority. Royal ordinances in 1573 restricted private property from being located on the main plazas and enforced uniformity in the facades and roofs of residential housing. While these measures to keep the local elite subordinate in creating grand gestures of prominence within the colonial city were successful, it influenced a manner of domestic living that created an important emphasis on outdoor spaces located within the interior of the dwelling.

Contrasting greatly with Quito, the Cuenca elite was in constant contact with Guayaquil merchants, causing doors to open to European creature comforts and styles. Because riches and sophistication could not be openly flaunted as much in the public, the local aristocracy lived on lots of land within the city grid that were, essentially, small-scale villages: it is in these dwellings of the elite, oddly enough, that a fully functioning community of Ecuadorians from all social tiers worked, ate, slept, and lived in a relative harmony. Through a subconscious, reactionary development over time, separation of the house interior from the outside of the houses of the wealthy became less and less distinct, resulting in a series of rooms and outdoor courtyards that are remarkably applicable to the cohousing model. Unlike common urban trends to polarize living quarters and segregate the wealthy from the poor, these urban houses depended on natives to sustain themselves. Taking this model and

adapting it to urban communities in which everyone sustains each other will, I believe, prove very attractive to Cuenicanos.

A Planner's Dream

Sustainability is not just a fundamental underlying value in cohousing communities, but a major concern that needs to be stressed in Ecuador as a whole. Morner puts Ecuador's environmental sensitivity into brutal context by describing that "in the cosmic version of the ancient Andeans, the Earth Mother, Pachamama, played a crucial role ... the sad truth is, however, that the Andean Earth Mother of today has been crudely exploited and raped."

Cuenca once again takes a central role on this issue, as sustainable land preservation tactics among its university students have been recently employed. "Third World cities experiencing rapid population growth usually results in the form of spontaneous and illegal solutions," states Stella Lowder of the University of Glasgow in regards to Cuenca, "but not in this case." Lowder explains that Cuenca's isolation has allowed the power of architects to shape modern land development to a higher degree; in 1978 every plan for development and construction had to be signed by an architect, and every architect had to be registered with the University of Cuenca. As early as 1993, landscape architecture students from Washington State University and the University of Azuay took the first steps to analyze and map Cuenca's regional resources to guide the city's growth. These early initiatives have laid solid foundations upon which valuable information can be drawn during future "best-practice" land development.

As a city that has continuously compromised ideologies when others refused to budge, Cuenca's residents have a strong sense of pride and love for their city that transcends mere architectural heritage and looks to the future in order to sustain its development through responsible, high quality, and smart design. Even more apparent is Cuenca's transnational migratory problems, which further calls for something to address the

resulting damage to the social fabric of its lower income residents. Past failures in state attempts at 'social interest' housing projects were largely the consequence of the communities not being located within easy access of employment within the old city. Adapting cohousing communities to the urban context and taking design cues from the traditional domestic house will not only address the access-issue (Cuenca is an exemplary example of a pedestrian-friendly city), but will take the idea of 'elite housing with servants' and flip it on its head for a community-based purpose that maintains the very program the house layouts were intended for in the first place. Cohousing in Cuenca is the viable solution.

The Future

An unusual house in a street attracts attention but no impression remains of the street in its entirety. For though it is easy to discover a particular detail, it is very difficult to grasp the whole, no matter how simple it is.

-Steen Eiler Rasmussen

Cities are born and thrive off the basic principal that humans need a certain level of proximity to one another in which to sustain themselves and grow as a civilization. The creations of money, property, writing, and mass transport of trade jump started urban life in cities, and established this very requirement for interdependency. Wider communication, the exchange of ideas, and long-term cultural seepage of materials have crystallized the importance of the city, in that it offers these benefits to society with the strongest dialogues. In its purest form, the community takes the embryonic social structure of the city, and it is here that the greatest influence on an individual can be applied.

This paper is not about how Cohousing will save Ecuadorian society: the future of Ecuador is unwritten. This paper does, however, bring to light serious and neglected issues that I have experienced first-hand and offers the best possible remedy through my observation and experience of other cultures addressing similar concerns in extremely different contexts.

There is still much to do before Cohousing can be applied, and it is absolutely critical that Ecuadorians themselves take the central role in the design process and implementation. Cohousing requires a communal effort; to simply design and build a neighborhood without local input is fundamentally contradictory to the idea of cohousing in its own right. Now widely popular and successful throughout Northern Europe and parts of the United States, cohousing spreads because of common discontent in living options. Kathryn McCamant and Charles Durrett, the pioneers who are largely responsible for introducing cohousing to the United States, describe this dissatisfaction in that "traditional forms of housing no longer address the needs of many people ... Things that people once took for granted – family, community, a sense of belonging – most now be actively sought out. Many people are mis-housed, ill-housed, or unhoused because of lack of appropriate options."

The cohousing concept reestablishes many of the advantages of traditional villages within the concept of our contemporary lives. For this reason I feel that cohousing is something that can make a significant difference in Ecuador, and in no other context can it be more appropriately applied and localized to the existing climate in the city of Cuenca.

by Alexander Morley

The Power of the Agrarian Myth:
The Trend of Protectionist Agricultural Policy in US Legislation



There is a general consensus among academics that agricultural trade liberalization is economically favorable to consumers. According to Pasour, protectionist measures such as “marketing orders, import controls, export subsidies, and other restrictions on competition, distort the allocation of resources and restrict individuals’ freedom to engage in mutually beneficial exchange” (Pasour, 2005: 317). The American public should favor liberalization, generally “Voters-as-consumers prefer liberal trade policies that lower prices and raise real incomes” (Kono, 2006:369). However, the domestic policy of the US is biased against agricultural trade liberalization. Historically there has been a consistent trend favoring protectionist measures, such as agricultural price supports, in US agricultural legislation with no significant public opposition. So why is the US government biased against agricultural trade liberalization and why does the American public not protest against these policies? This question is especially baffling when you consider the extremely small percentage of the American population that are agriculturalists; “far less than 1 percent of Americans live on what would be considered full-time farms and ranches” (Browne, 2001:8). So why do farmers consistently receive a high level of government protection?

According to Browne, the agrarian myth is powerful enough to have “supported farm policy intervention by and within what was once a generally laissez-faire U.S. government” (2001:xiv). The ‘agrarian myth’ will be defined in this paper as Jeffersonian Agrarianism: “a belief in the moral and economic primacy of farming over industry” (Dixon, 2003:145). I will argue that this myth is institutionalized into the US government and ingrained in the consciousness of the American people, largely because of the efforts of agricultural special interests. I will first provide a brief overview of the history of the agrarian myth and US Farm policy. I will use this historical analysis to demonstrate that the Agrarian Myth and the use of this idea to promote agricultural trade policies has

been a constant since it was first popularized by Jefferson. I will then provide various explanations for the success and longevity of this myth. I hypothesize that this myth provides an ideological explanation for the trend of protectionism in US Agricultural Policy. To test my hypothesis I will examine the anomaly that is the free-market oriented 1996 Farm Bill (the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act, or FAIR) and examine the non-idea factors that made the passage of this legislation possible. With this analysis I will demonstrate that the 1996 Farm Bill is merely a blip on the agricultural policy trend line. I will briefly discuss how the 2002 Farm Bill reverted to the traditional protectionist trend. I will conclude that the political setting during the time of FAIR deliberations largely explains the blip in the US agricultural policy trend line which occurred with the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill.

Data/Methodology

In order to understand the agrarian myth and its historical relation to agricultural trade policy in the US, I relied primarily on scholarly articles analyzing farm legislation, how its passage was affected by pressure from farm lobby groups, and the historical influence of the agrarian myth in government. I examined the websites of the USDA and of various farm lobby groups, particularly their mission statements, policy goals, and sections on legislative relationships for evidence of agrarianism rhetoric and to determine where in government agricultural lobby pressure was being applied and for what purposes. I examined reactions of farm lobbies to agricultural legislation and how this effected future legislation. Analyzing data in this area can be difficult as much of it is politically biased. Small farm interests tend to appeal for Democratic support, while free-market oriented agribusiness lobby groups have different agendas and tend to appeal for Republican support. Farm statistics and analysis of legislation often differ depending on the orientation of the organization forwarding this information.

Analysis of the Agrarian Myth and Institutionalized Protectionism in US Government

The Agrarian myth and agricultural bias in US government originated from President Thomas Jefferson’s rhetoric which articulated the idea that the hard-working and self-dependent nature of agrarians would provide the basis for a wholesome American society and that “family farmers were needed to preserve democracy because of their tendency to be farsighted and committed” (Browne, 2002:51). With a basis in this myth, modern US farm policy emerged in 1862 with the conception of the Agricultural Establishment. The Establishment was formed by policy makers to forward the goals of agricultural modernization and western development. In 1914 the USDA was elevated to full cabinet status meaning “a farm and ranch advocate served as presidential advisor on at least formal institutional par with advisors such as the Secretary of War” (Browne, 2001:40). This allowed the Establishment to successfully institutionalize a protectionist farm bias and the special treatment of agriculturalists into US government.

In the 1930s, as a result of the collapse of farm prices during the Great Depression, the number of farm-oriented institutions increased as did populist policy intervention emphasizing selective benefits for producers. With the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1933, “price supports and the loan guarantees that were added to them became the real foundation of U.S. agricultural policy throughout the remainder of the millennium” (Browne, 2001:42). Originally intended as temporary measures, the policies passed in this era continue to influence farm policy. Much of U.S. agricultural commodity policy has its foundations in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1949, known as agriculture’s ‘permanent legislation’. When enacted in the 1930s agrarian myth was relevant; about 25% of the US population lived on farms, agriculture employed 40% of the workforce, agriculture’s direct contribution to GDP was 7%, and farms

were generally small and owner-operated (Young, 1996). The Agrarian Myth is now outdated. In 1996 less than 2% of Americans lived on farms, production agriculture's contribution to GDP was 1.5%, and the small farm was the exception with "20 percent of farm operations producing 80 percent of total U.S. agricultural output" (Young, 1996:2).

Despite its irrelevance to modern America, the agrarian myth continues to survive. The preservers of this myth include bureaucratic service providers, who "believe in the need to keep established institutions alive", and agricultural interest groups, "who simply keep resurrecting the myth to protect and expand their own extensive public policy benefits" (Browne, 2001:60). The success of these groups in preserving the myth may be attributed to the pervasive hopefulness inherent in the American psyche; "America is a land of dreams, of wishful thinking- and generally inadequate understanding of the physical conditions to which dreams wander" (Browne, 2001: 3). Because the Agrarian myth is so deeply entrenched in the values of the American public, legislators feel confident that they can continue to vote for agricultural protectionist policies without negative political repercussions, while being rewarded politically and monetarily by farm lobbies. Gwande&Hoekman find that although agricultural protectionism in the US tends to result in deadweight loss, "lobbying spending provides access to politicians" and "interest group money bends agricultural policy in the United States" (Gwande&Hoekman, 2006:556). The influence of agriculture's institutionalized interests on US legislators is evidenced in the 1985 farm bill where "eligibility for commodity payments was made contingent on a farmer's successful implementation of environmental programs" (Browne, 2001: 109). This provoked outrage among farmers. As a result policy makers distanced themselves from this scheme.

The policy change which occurred in the 1996 Farm Bill was much more radical than that of the 1985 bill; "Under FAIR, target-price

deficiency payments and annual land-idling programs are to be eliminated for at least the next seven years, and are to be replaced with a fixed schedule of 'production flexibility contract payments', completely decoupled from future market prices of planting decisions" (Paarlberg&Orden, 1996:1305). In order to explain the anomaly that is the 1996 Farm Bill, it is important to understand the role of institutions in the generation of farm policy. Institutions are rules governing behavior which "have a specific emphasis on some among the many social goals [and] a bias in favor of what they each are most capable of doing" (Browne, 2001: 25). Once established, institutions are very difficult to reform or fundamentally change because of transaction costs. Transaction costs are "the price placed by the political process on governmental reform-or any other decision" (Browne, 2001:25), including the deals and tradeoffs necessary for change to occur. Institutionalized interest groups cause transaction costs in the US associated with agricultural policy to be very high. Therefore, "policy officials generally govern on the basis of past institutional investments" (Browne, 1996:36), providing a political advantage to agricultural institutions. This explains the slowness of policy reform (termed institutional inertia) and the protectionist trend line in agricultural policy.

The structure of congress allows the institutionalization of interests and the resulting institutional bias for certain interests. Since the 1930s, Congress has been run by decentralized committee rule where "committee and subcommittee governance have been organized quite well to favor farm constituents and farm policy" (Browne, 2001:103). Scholars are in agreement over the influential nature of interest groups in legislation deliberations; "much of the recent analysis of American trade politics follows Schattschneider (1935) in placing industry-based lobbies at center stage (Baldwin, 1985; Grossman&Helpman, 1995)" (Hiscox, 2002:593). Because interest groups have been able to successfully institutionalize themselves in government they are able to

discourage agricultural policy reform efforts among legislators who want to avoid the associated transaction and political costs. The institutionalization of farm lobbies has also provided government legitimization of the Agrarian myth, enabling its continued use as a tool for policy implementation.

Explanation of the 1996 Farm Bill: a divergence in the protectionist policy trend

The political setting in the US during FAIR deliberations explains the diversion from the protectionist trend line in US agricultural policy and radical policy change which occurred with the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill. From 1955-94 Democrats held a majority in one or both houses of congress. The republican midterm election victories in November 1994 considerably changed the composition of congress. This ended the legislative habit of passing single-committee based 'logroll' legislation devised by the members of the agricultural committees who had long been viewed as 'the non-partisan agents of rural and urban-rent seekers' (Paarlberg, 1996:1305). During the 104th Congress politics was partisan, 'the average Republican member voted with the party leadership over 90% of the time, the highest level of support within a majority party in more than twelve years' (Paarlberg, 1996:1306). Democrats support price-support and supply-control agricultural policies which benefit smaller, high cost farmers, while Republicans favor legislation more favorable to agribusiness, such as 'benefit programs for farmers that do not raise market prices or discourage full production' (Paarlberg:1996, 1306). These agricultural policy biases are made apparent by the types of farm lobbies which favor each party, indicated by favorability ratings that these lobbies assign to members of congress. In the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) the National Farmers Union (NFU), which lobbies for agricultural protection and whose main goal is to 'protect family farms and ranches' (National Farmer's Union), tended to rate Democratic House committee chairs much more favorably

than republicans. The opposite is true of the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), which tends to promote free-market policies (Paarlberg, 1996). A Republican dominated congress that favored free-market, agribusiness oriented farm lobbies provided the political environment during FAIR deliberations which allowed this legislation to pass. Additionally, the 1995/1996 market setting affected the political setting which contributed to reform in FAIR legislation. The rapid increase in market commodity prices during FAIR deliberations “explains why changes to the traditional farm-price support policies were enacted while other farm programs, and most nonfarm social entitlements, remained impervious to modification by the new political majorities in the 104th congress” (Paarlberg, 1996:1305).

The rival explanation that the presidential administration was responsible for the passage of FAIR is not supported by history. President Clinton and Secretary of Agriculture Glickman had both “argued that farm policy needed no radical change” (Paarlberg, 1996:1308). When Clinton signed FAIR he “pledged (if re-elected) to introduce legislation in 1997 to re-couple some farm programs and payments to the market, to ensure farmers once again had a ‘safety net’” (Paarlberg, 1996:1308). Additionally, during Clinton’s 1996 reelection campaign it would have been irrational for him to alienate his agricultural supporters and deviate from the party line by supporting agricultural free trade measures.

Young provides the rival explanation that international pressures supporting more free and open trade coming from the 1986-94 Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations and NAFTA explain the passage of FAIR legislation. These institutions did not change the US domestic policy bias towards agricultural protectionism, but they did influence the actions of the Clinton Administration. In exchange for the complacency of farm groups and to secure the votes needed to include GATT negotiations into domestic policy the Clinton Administration promised it would not endorse major policy changes in the

upcoming 1995 farm bill debate and would ask Congress for “discretionary U.S. Department of Agriculture spending levels above the FY 1995 level for 1996 and FY 1997, plus all of the funding for the Export Enhancement Program and related U.S. export subsidy policies that was permitted under the agreement, plus a \$600 million increase in a variety of ‘green box’ export promotion programs” (Paarlberg, 1996:1307). Therefore the GATT and NAFTA supported the continuation of protectionist policy rhetoric by the Clinton Administration.

Young argued the FAIR Act “accelerates the trend towards greater market orientation of the previous two major farm acts” (1996:1). My research does not support Young’s argument for a trend towards liberalization as the 2002 Act was clearly biased towards protectionism. Paarlberg supports my argument that the 1996 Farm Bill cannot be explained by ideas; “absence of a new ideological consensus for market-oriented reform is further confirmed by the scant changes in the sugar, peanut, and dairy programs in 1996” (Paarlberg, 1996:1308). These industries continued to benefit from protectionist policies, with no real attempt for reform by Democrats or Republicans. Despite some protectionist policy continuity, agricultural protectionist sentiment to FAIR was negative.

The immediate negative reactions from agriculturalist protectionist groups to the 1996 Farm Bill pressured movement back to the protectionist trend line. For example, in the agricultural protectionist oriented *InMotion* Magazine, the FAIR Act is attacked as biased against family farms and towards corporate America, calling for action “to make sure this is a short-lived farm bill which will be replaced by one that allows family farmers cost of production plus a reasonable profit” (Perry, 2006:1). Evidence of agricultural protectionist legislation emerged before the next farm bill. In 2001 the largest-scale agricultural producers were each eligible for \$288,000 in federal payments, partially as a result of international trade losses (Browne, 2002). The 2002 Farm bill reversed many of the market-oriented

initiatives implemented in 1996 by “increasing authorized spending and intervention levels in U.S. farm subsidies” (Thompson, 2008:1). International opinion interpreted the 2002 Farm Bill as “an abdication of U.S. leadership in reforming farm policy and liberalizing agricultural trade” (Thompson, 2008:1). The 2002 Farm Bill reinstated the ‘farm safety net’ and reverted to the protectionist trend line in agricultural policy.

The persistence of the Agrarian myth explains the protectionist trend line in US agricultural trade policy, demonstrating that “ideas, as ideals, are as important to politics as the politicians themselves and those who seek to influence them” (Browne, 2002:57). Agricultural interests have been institutionalized into the legislative branch of the US federal government responsible for making policy decisions and have consistently used the agrarian myth as a tool to forward their policy goals. These interest groups have built up bi-partisan networks in the government, such as the “iron triangle” of pro-agricultural protectionist legislators, lobbyists, and institutional administrators, who make agricultural policy reform extremely unlikely. The blip in the US agricultural policy trend line which occurred with the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill can be attributed to the political setting during the time of FAIR deliberations. The 2002 Farm Bill reverted to the traditional policy trend of agricultural protectionism, demonstrating that the 1996 Farm Bill was indeed an anomaly. What will it take to cause the demise of the Agrarian Myth in America? I pose this question for future debate and research.

by Emily Iwan

Global Branding: Li Ning vs. Nike

The aim of this paper is to discuss the global branding and marketing strategies of Li-Ning, one of the leading sportswear companies in the People's Republic of China, as it tries to regain the market in China, in hopes of eventually pushing past the current powerhouses of Nike and Adidas. Once they have succeeded in this task, Li-Ning will then take their branding to the international level. The data gathered shows evidence of the marketing steps and strategies they have taken in order to accomplish their current goal of gaining more popularity at home. The data also shows how similar Li-Ning's strategies are to that of Nike and Adidas and how they are trying to separate themselves in a unique way.

The theories of asymmetrical interdependence, cultural proximity and globalization are discussed in order to make sense of the data I have discovered. This paper will conclude that Li-Ning has made tremendous strides on the home front due to adopting similar marketing and branding strategies from those companies that have proven to be successful. Even though they are still behind, they have come a long way. Only time will tell if they can make the final jump to

No.1 and beat out their foreign competitors. Li Ning has the opportunity to not only drive away the global powerhouses of Nike (United States) and Adidas (Germany), but also to compete with them on an international level and perhaps within their own countries.

Theory

Joseph Straubhaar introduces two crucial concepts to global media and communications: asymmetrical interdependence and cultural proximity, of which the latter is heavily dependent upon the role of the audience. In his essay, "Beyond Media Imperialism: Asymmetrical Interdependence and Cultural Proximity," he states that asymmetrical interdependence is not the result of a one-way flow of media products from First World countries such as the United States to Third World countries around the world. Instead, it is a constant exchange between the spectrum of cultures that enable a two-way communication flow and an equal dependence upon another. Cultural proximity is the idea of people preferring television programming in which the content is familiar to them and they can relate to it.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States was charged with dominating global media for its own advantage, which challenged the one-way flow of news and information they claimed would benefit the development of most countries (Straubhaar 40). The television growth in Brazil through major broadcaster TV Globo and the use of telenovelas was heavily influenced by American models, yet it progressed enough to be able to fully compete with the US. "The result was the mediation and adaptation of aspects of the American model via Brazilian elites who then reinvented their own version of capitalist, commercial media" (48). This commercialism of Brazilian media is the result of going beyond American influences and tailoring their own home market, culture, economy and environment to their specific needs.

It should be noted that national culture is not uniform and is instead, heavily dependent upon social class. For example, the "popular classes" of the lower-middle class, the working class, and the poor show a great liking towards national and local productions (51). Elites and the better educated tend to prefer US programs such as mini-series and music (51).

The role of the audience plays an integral role in determining the progress of the global media, especially those in Third World countries.

Straubhaar labors the point that “the role of the audience is seen within supposedly dependent situations, moving from a view of passive, dominated audience to one of an active audience, conditioned by class, age, gender, and interests, and tending to prefer and select local or national cultural content that is more proximate and relevant to them” (43). But it is important to keep in mind that despite such strides, many countries still continue to rely heavily upon productions from outside of their nation and region.

Roland Robertson introduces the theory of globalization, which states that a broad, global concept or idea, such as a sneaker, can appeal to a specific group of people by focusing on a particular need at a local level. This can not only be incorporated within the specific design of the shoe as it relates to the smaller, more compact feet of the Chinese people, but also can be utilized on a creative level as well (i.e. integrating national colors or themes).

Background and Company History

During the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles, Chinese gymnast Li Ning made a name for himself when he captured three gold medals, two silvers and a bronze. In 1990, he noticed that China did not brand a high-quality sneaker in the sports performance arena. This is how the Li-Ning Co., Ltd. was born. Li created his company by taking the global form of a sneaker and localizing it to a specific need in a specific country; in this case, sports performance in China. “Anything Is Possible” became the slogan, one that is eerily similar to Adidas’ “Nothing Is Impossible”, while the checkmark logo is jarringly comparable to Nike’s “swoosh.” Li-Ning is modeling itself on international companies who have already proven to be successful, yet adapting to its home market, economy and culture to create a brand specified for the people of China. This marketing strategy best exemplifies the academic concepts introduced by Straubhaar and Robertson.

Li-Ning appeals to the Chinese culture while the global media interaction consists of the “development of the appealing product, the expansion of its production, a continued expansion into export, and the eventual peak as markets and audiences became saturated” (Straubhaar 41). As a result, the rising local business of Li-Ning in China would not only actually compete with powerhouses Nike in the United States and Adidas in Europe, but audiences would eventually prefer products in sports performance such as sneakers and apparel that relate to their own culture rather than those that weren’t. Li-Ning’s marketing and branding strategy reflects the concept of cultural proximity. Zhang Zhiyong, President and CEO of Li-Ning said of Nike and Adidas, “They might have shoes that look like ours and everyone has things like shock absorbers, but they don’t have that eastern feeling to them like our shoes have. Every person from every country has different feet and we know how to make shoes that are comfortable for the Chinese population” (Rovell).

This task is easier said than done, however. The branding culture in China is unlike anything known of in the West. In the West, brands mean power, status, and loyalty. The market of the East has the cheap, “made in China” stigma attached to it, where brand names are usually knock-offs. Joe Nocera of the New York Times said, “I went to a big five-story mart called the Silk Market, which was lined with tiny retail outlets all selling ‘branded’ goods of every sort ... but they didn’t say, ‘Do you want a purse?’ They shouted: ‘Louis Vuitton! Gucci! Armani!’ All the goods are knock-offs, of course. But it certainly spoke to the power of brands — a fake Louis Vuitton was somehow ‘better’ than a better-made unbranded purse” (Nocera). This is the market culture that Li-Ning is facing.

In big cities like Shanghai and Beijing, Western brands dominate over domestic brands partly because of the elites and better-educated people in the populous; high-end cities tend to favor Western brands like Nike. On the other hand, the lower middle and

working classes of the smaller cities tend to favor the local, domestic products of Li-Ning (Straubhaar). Quite aware of this fact, Li-Ning’s promotion campaign is only concentrating on the second-tier and third-tier cities, it’s most important markets. “Although Li-Ning hopes to compete with Nike and Adidas in first-tier cities, where consumers wield the highest purchasing power, its fiscal reports showed that the Shanghai and Beijing markets’ contribution to the corporation’s income structure fell from 10% in 2004 to 7% in 2005” (Cheung). Guo Jianxian, chief operating officer at Li-Ning “mentioned that the key for Li-Ning is to cultivate consumers in the second-tier and third-tier cities and draw them closer to sports” (Yifei). Several hundred outlets will open nationwide by the end of 2008, mostly in these cities. “The purchasing power in second-tier and third-tier cities in China is really strong. Everybody has their eyes on those markets, and Li-Ning must go there,” said Guo (Yifei).

It is in these areas, where the population is well over one million, that Li-Ning will be able to establish itself simply because Nike and Adidas have not yet infiltrated them. Guo suggested to Li-Ning executives “to try to come up with shoes that have a distinctly Chinese flavor and would appeal, in an almost patriotic way, to Chinese consumers” (Nocera). Li-Ning responded with the creative and expensive green shoe that was made in honor of the famous Chinese soldier, Lei Feng, who died in 1962 (Nocera). Nike first established itself as a premier sportswear and footwear company before it became popular. “Li-Ning has still has not convinced consumers that it is a professional brand of sports equipment” (Yifei). In order to accomplish that, Li Ning needs to figure out their unique identity, who they want to target and how they will establish themselves in China before they can establish themselves on an international stage. Chiang Jeongwen, a Chinese marketing professor at the Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business was brought in to give marketing advice to Li-Ning. “When kids wear Nike shoes, they feel as though they are the cool kids on the block. I said to

The rising local business of Li-Ning in China would not only actually compete with powerhouses Nike in the United States and Adidas in Europe, but audiences would eventually prefer products in sports performance such as sneakers and apparel that relate to their own culture rather than those that weren't.

the Li-Ning executives, 'What does it mean when you wear a Li-Ning shoe?' They couldn't define it" (Nocera). Chiang's point was not to copy Nike's model. Instead, Li-Ning should be creating a distinct personality that would separate them from their competitors.

During the 1990s, Li-Ning dominated the Chinese market. However, once the foreign companies of Nike and Adidas were allowed inside, Li-Ning found itself struggling to maintain their No. 1 position and by 2004, it had dropped to third with only 18 percent of the Chinese market share while their Western competitors each had more than 20 percent. "There is a powerful sense among Chinese consumers that domestic brands are inferior—and a distinct lack of confidence among Chinese companies in the allure of their own brands" (Nocera). Li-Ning now faces the challenge of emerging as a reputable domestic brand in a country where no one believes in a Chinese brand. "And if these same companies want to export their own branded goods, which is where the real profit lie, they'll have to learn how to create distinct identities that appeal to consumers—in other words, brands" (Nocera). Chiang, the marketing professor said, "When you get right down to it, Nike is a branding company'; to compete, Li-Ning would have to become one as well" (Nocera).

COO Guo stressed that "in the coming years, we are going to have to find a Jordan for Li-Ning. Nike had Jordan. Where is our Jordan?" (Nocera). Michael Jordan had not only the athletic ability and fame, but charisma

to bring in 5 percent of Nike's sales and \$2.6 billion of profit generated from selling Jordan apparel (Yifei). Right now, there is not a single athlete sponsored by Li-Ning that can compare to Jordan or be expected to bring in that type of revenue. China's biggest athlete, Yao Ming, is not even sponsored by Nike, but rather, Reebok. However, China's debatably second biggest athlete, 2004 Olympic gold medal hurdler, Liu Xiang, is sponsored by Nike, which has a full shoe and apparel line just for him. Charlie Denson, the Nike Brand president said, "When I think of Liu Xiang, I think of Michael Jordan in the mid 80s, I think of what Tiger Woods and LeBron James mean to Nike in the United States or what Ronaldinho in Europe and in the world of football" (Revell). This is how Nike remains No.1 in the Chinese market.

Current Strategy

How can Li-Ning expect to compete on a global level without a Chinese front man to lead the way? Their answer: "Part of Li-Ning's marketing strategy is to attract interest among the Chinese customers by using images of Western athletes" (Cheng). Those athletes include NBA stars Shaquille O'Neal, Damon Jones and recent endorser Baron Davis. "This cooperation marks another important step toward the international expansion of Li-Ning," stated the press release on Li-Ning's website. Zhang Zhi, CEO of Li-Ning said, "Professionalism and internationalization have always been the operation targets of Li-Ning. This cooperation represents Li-Ning's another important breakthrough in the

basketball arena. We will continue to develop such win-win cooperation, in order to make Li-Ning become the brand of choice for basketball players and basketball fans and bring the brand concept, 'Anything is Possible,' into full play on the basketball court" (Li-Ning).

Li-Ning first achieved global status in 2002 when it signed a deal with the men and women's national basketball teams in Spain. In 2004, they became the first domestic sportswear company to appear on the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. They formed a partnership with the NBA in 2005 that allowed them to use the league logo as well as sponsor league players to promote their shoes and apparel. In 2006 they signed Damon Jones and Shaquille O'Neal to endorse their products. In 2008, Baron Davis was added to their roster (Liu and Young). Earlier this year, Li-Ning opened its first US office in Beaverton, Washington, Nike's backyard. They hired Alan Hardy, a senior designer at Nike and design director at Converse (which is an affiliate of Nike), to lead the direction of Li-Ning's new outpost in the United States. In 2004, they also hired Ned Frederick, a former research director at Nike, and Daniel Richarch Design, which has also worked with Converse, to develop technology that could compete against the Nike Air lineup (Balfour). "Having expertise in a region you hope to expand into makes a world of sense," said Paul Swangard, managing director of the University of Oregon's Warsaw Sports Marketing Center (Hunsberger). Li-Ning is using former Nike design executives who once

served for their biggest competitor, to ultimately push past them on the international level. And they're doing it in Nike's own backyard.

This isn't the first time Li-Ning has used Nike as a foundation for their success. "It's gleaming corporate campus near Beijing, complete with an indoor swimming pool, basketball courts, and a climbing wall, seem like a page out of Nike's playbook" (Balfour). Nike's world headquarters, located in Beaverton, Washington, consists of 16 buildings on 177 acres (Nike). In the 1980s, Nike developed a light-asset based operational model that "entails outsourcing product manufacturing and retail and distribution business, allowing the company to concentrate efforts on design, research and development, as well as a sales and marketing strategy dominated by spokesperson and advertising. This generates higher rates of investment return with lowered investment input" (Cheung). Li-Ning then used this model to enter the high-end market and directly compete with Nike in 2003. In 2004, they focused primarily on developing basketball products, specifically shoes, through such strategies of sponsoring international sporting events and employing celebrity spokespeople (Cheung). "Mr. Guo and the other Li-Ning executives have big plans for Li-Ning sneakers. Although they are serving the domestic market almost exclusively, they want to begin exporting to Europe and the United States—and go toe-to-toe abroad with Nike and Adidas, as it is currently trying to do in China" (Nocera). Li-Ning currently generates only 1 percent of its \$700 million in revenue abroad, but hopes to be generating over \$2 billion in revenue or 20 percent, to come from exports by the year 2013 (Nocera). The perfect jumpstart to that plan: the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

On the greatest world stage, the Beijing Olympics provided Li-Ning with a much-needed golden opportunity to become an international icon. Founder Li Ning captivated an estimated 4 billion people when he ran around the perimeter of Beijing's National Stadium, the "Bird's Nest," while attached to cables that held him 75 feet in the air, before

lighting the Olympic cauldron (Hunsberger). Not to mention, he was sporting his own Li-Ning apparel and shoes. The results: Li-Ning's share price rose 6 percent overnight (ChinaRetailNews). "About 4.4 million Li-Ning shares usually trade everyday. But on Friday, 9.4 million shares traded. Monday, another 9.8 million shares were traded" (Guppy).

During the Olympics, Li-Ning sponsored the Chinese gymnastic, table tennis and diving teams as well as a variety of other teams from around the globe, including the United States table tennis team, Sudan's track and field athletes, and Sweden's Olympics delegation (Balfour). "Call it paper-tiger marketing. Li-Ning tries to create the illusion of being a global player despite its near-total reliance on its home market. In addition, the company is running an ad campaign called 'One Team, One Belief' featuring European, African, South American—and Chinese—athletes standing | in a stadium with their hands across their hearts" (Balfour). This image can be seen on Li-Ning's company website.

Li-Ning also took a different approach from its global competitors in Beijing. Adidas spent \$80 million to be an official Olympic sponsor, meaning that whatever country medaled at the podium would be sporting their logo. Nike decided to sponsor 22 of 28 Chinese teams who competed in their gear. Li-Ning came up with the unusual marketing strategy of putting their trademark on the Chinese television journalists. "With the announcer's strategy, we needed a platform for publicizing our product and journalists can give us better exposure than I can," said Zhiyong (Rovell). This was a surefire way to separate itself from the competition and it proved to be successful in the short-term. Knowing that it is a smaller business with a limited budget, Li-Ning was effective and intelligent in its marketing campaign during the Olympics. "They are the most efficient marketer for the Olympics in terms of spend vs. return," said Greg Paull, a partner at a market researcher R3 in Beijing (Balfour). Li Ning now faces the challenge of riding the Olympic wave of momentum for as long as possible until it can

think of another clever marketing strategy that will help create global branding awareness.

Discussion

So where does Li-Ning stand now that the Olympics are over? Still behind Nike. Still behind Adidas. The main reason for this is not a lack of leaps and bounds the company has made due to its ability to become asymmetrically independent of its competitors, nor is it for a lack of cultural proximity and the growing appeal it has among the people of China. Its marketing strategies are modeled off of Nike and have proven to be successful while its ability to globalize a broad form of a product has also been more than capable. Instead, the problem for Li-Ning is rooted in its lack of confidence as a legitimate sportswear company, thus it has no solid foundation for its identity. "To compete with the big names either at home or abroad, Li-Ning may need to decide what it wants to be. Today, it's difficult to say whether it's a trendy brand for urban teenagers or a bona fide performance shoemaker, and simply creating an image of global reach won't clear that up. The challenge is to link to a brand idea that is the basis for enduring loyalty," said Tom Doctoroff, chief executive officer for China ad agency JWT (Balfour). The paper-tiger marketing and having journalists instead of athletes wear their logo are ways in which Li-Ning offers a lot of show with little substance. There is no consumer loyalty with that.

The lack of confidence in its products has caused consumers to have an equal lack of confidence. "Li-Ning shoes were purposely priced 20 percent below their Nike and Adidas equivalent ... Li-Ning is simply not confident that its current brand can stand up to its big Western competitors" (Nocera). The difference in company ideology between Nike and Li-Ning is critical and directly proportional to its successes. Li-Ning COO Guo said, "Why should someone buy Li-Ning shoes? It's about value, design and an overall satisfying retail experience" (Cheng). He told Nocera, "What the consumer cares about is the design, material and professional performance" (Nocera).

Nocera responded, "I thought to myself: that's not what they believe at Nike" (Nocera). Charlie Denson, president of Nike Brand believes "it's about youth, it's about excitement, it's about passion. Our focus has always been around the athlete ... and supplying them with the best possible product to pursue their dreams and goals" (Rovell). While Nike is focusing on and more importantly, promoting, the athlete, Li-Ning is focusing on and promoting the company. People invest in companies that put their emphasis of investment on the consumer. Nike is personable. Li-Ning is profitable. Nike has the confidence and the mindset that they will continue to grow and improve and push themselves to provide better sportswear, shoes, equipment and apparel for all future athletes. "The Olympics are a great point in time and the Beijing Olympics are going to transcend the world of sport. They will become a monumental event throughout the world. It represents an incredible opportunity for us as a brand to participate in the world of sport at the highest level on the biggest stage. It's a great checkpoint for us but its not a destination," said Denson (Rovell).

In order for Li-Ning to ever reach the status and success that Nike has, both at home and on a global level, it needs to not only continue to model their marketing strategies from Nike, but also must adopt their mindset as well. They need to establish a company identity and have the confidence that they will be successful. Li-Ning needs to look at catching up to and surpassing Nike, not as a destination, but as a checkmark, as their logo simply suggests.

Li-Ning has been facing troubled times ever since China opened its market to foreign businesses, but the company has taken such tremendous strides in their marketing and branding operations that even Nike and Adidas have started to pay attention. Li-Ning is coming very close to beating Nike at its own game, but right now, Nike still remains a dominant force with international status: two things Li-Ning has yet to accomplish. Will Li-Ning ever recapture its market at home? Will it ever become an international player in the sportswear business? The possibility is certainly out there, but only time will tell.

by Kristen Dalton



A Case Study of the Propoganda Model: American Foreign Policy in Afghanistan 1979-1992

Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model theory argues that the American mass media portrays American foreign interventions in a manner which conform to the dominant interests of the elites; government and big business. This is achieved through the imposition of news "filters" that ensure mass media coverage will fit within certain boundaries of legitimate discourse. The fifth news "filter" identified by Chomsky: "anticommunism" as a national religion and control mechanism", is particularly relevant to the framing of domestic media coverage of US foreign interventions since World War II. In relation to portrayals of the US as a force tirelessly fighting against communism, the boundaries of legitimate discourse dictate that America will be portrayed as only fighting in order to bring peace, to protect our national interests, and to further promote democracy. In foreign interventions the American involvement is framed as a defensive and reluctant response to protect the US and our allies from unjustified aggressors. I will test Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model theory in relation to domestic foreign policy

news coverage through the examination of the Afghan "invasion" by the Soviet Union and the support by the US for the Afghan rebels in that war from 1979-1992.

Blum argues that the facts of the issues involved in the supposed "soviet occupation" of Afghanistan were largely ignored in order to forward the US goals of weakening the Soviet Union and gaining an advantage in the Cold War. In 1980 President Carter condemned the Russian invasion in Afghanistan. During Reagan's March 21, 1988 "Afghanistan Day Speech", the former president claimed that the soviet army "invaded [Afghanistan] to prop up an illegitimate, unrepresentative, and discredited regime." The New York Times echoed the government's anti-communist foreign policy rhetoric: "In 1979, as tens of thousands of Soviet troops streamed into Afghanistan, Moscow's strategy seems straightforward and completely in line with its worldview: a bold military strike, reminiscent of moves into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, would prevent insurrection and chaos from toppling a pro-Soviet and Marxist regime."

Blum argues that in contrast to Reagan

administration rhetoric and the mainstream media reports that reiterated its foreign policy lines, the Soviets actually never "invaded" or "occupied" Afghanistan. Blum states the Soviet troops were invited into Afghanistan by the Afghan government: "In March 1979, Taraki went to Moscow to press the Soviets to send ground troops to help the Afghan army put down the Mujahedeen." Additionally, Soviet troops did not enter Afghanistan until the tyrannical Amin took power; a leader who the Afghan people feared and despised and who the Soviets viewed as illegitimate. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars states that "soviet leaders were genuinely concerned that Afghan strongman Hafizullah Amin was either a U.S. agent or prepared to sell out to the United States." This indicates that the soviets did not support Amin and had a legitimate reason for getting involved. The USSR shared a long border with Afghanistan. It made sense that the soviets would send troops to Afghanistan when the Afghan government was unstable, backwards, and in danger (the soviets believed) of becoming a puppet to United States powers,



their archenemy. Regardless, it was outside the range of legitimate discourse to view any action that would result in the expansion of communism as legitimate because this was in direct opposition to the American foreign policy stance of containment held during the Cold War. Elites viewed communism as “the ultimate evil” because it “has always been the specter haunting property owners, as it threaten the very root of their class and superior status”. The anti-communist media filter articulated by Chomsky ensured that all mainstream media messages would reflect the elite view of communists as evil aggressors regardless of the facts of the situation. The 1987 CBS program, “The Battle for Afghanistan” offered a prime example of the intense anti-communist bias present in mainstream media when Dan Rather reported, “The Soviet objective [in Afghanistan] is either to annex the country or depopulate it.”

The mainstream media consistently accepted and reported the US government’s claim that “the U.S. armed Afghan resistance . . . sought to defeat the Soviet-backed Marxist regime in Kabul,” however, sources outside of the mainstream questioned whether the Afghan government was indeed communist. Blum agrees with the statements made by the new Afghan government under President Noor Mohammed Taraki in 1978 after Hekmatyar was overthrown that the coup “was not a communist takeover” and that they were not “communists” but rather nationalists and revolutionaries. Blum argues this new government was concerned for the people of Afghanistan and made efforts to try to modernize this backwards country. Blum cites the British political Scientist, Fred Halliday’s argument that “the People’s Democratic Party saw the Soviet Union as the only realistic source of support for the long-overdue modernization,” suggesting that Afghans had relations with the Soviets in order to achieve the country’s modernization and survival,

not because of communist sympathies. However, Chomsky argues that the anti-communist control mechanism prohibited the mainstream media from reporting that a country was neither wholly democratic nor wholly communist, but rather somewhere in between - maintaining relations to both types of powers. Because of this filter “issues tend to be framed in terms of a dichotomized world of Communist and anti-communist powers, with gains and losses allocated to contesting sides, and rooting for “our side” considered an entirely legitimate news practice,” and US involvement in Afghanistan was framed as supportive of an Afghan opposition force to this country’s illegitimate “pro-Soviet and Marxist regime.”

Throughout the history of Cold War American interventions, the goal of US foreign policy has been to stop communism, even if this means supporting leaders and regimes that the US would normally consider enemies. According to Chomsky, “If the triumph of communism is the worst imaginable result, the support of fascism abroad is justified as a lesser evil.” This argument is supported by the US backing of the mujahedeen (Afghan Islamic fundamentalist rebels) during their jihad against Soviet “invaders,” despite the fact that they engaged in torture and often expressed anti-American views. For instance, in 1979 the US began supporting Islamic Fundamentalists rebels in Afghanistan “despite the fact that in February of that year some of them had kidnapped the American ambassador in the capital city of Kabul, leading to his death in the rescue attempt.” According to Tim Weiner, as quoted by Blum, the followers of Hekmatyar (the Head of the Islamic Party in Afghanistan who the US conferred large amounts of aid to during their war against the Soviets) “first gained attention by throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil. CIA and State Department officials I have spoken with call him “scary,” “vicious”, and “a fascist”, “definite dictatorship material.” Additionally,

Hekmatyar “hated the United States almost as much as he hated the Russians. His followers screamed “Death to America” along with “Death to the Soviet Union.” Although the mujahedeen did not behave like a typical ally, Dr. Zhugniew Brzenzinski, national security advisor during the Regan Administration, said this was “our chance to give soviet their Vietnam”. So a covert operation developed and the US sent billions of dollars to Afghanistan. Ronald Reagan labeled these rebels “freedom fighters” and our ally in the American goal to end communism. Reagan told the American public that the Afghan rebels “have fought valiantly and against heavy odds to free themselves from the yoke of oppression—from assaults on their liberty, their sovereignty, their dignity, their lives, and their very way of life” and did not report the terror these groups were inflicting. Neither Reagan nor his security advisors publicly considered the possible implications of the radical Islamic beliefs that drove the Mujahedeen and their extremist behavior. Rather, “Americans seized the opportunity to get Muslims on their side by supporting the Afghan war. Now Muslims and the west could team up together against the communists.”

The boundaries of legitimate discourse prevented the mainstream news media from reporting on the aspects of the mujahedeen that the American people would have likely found unacceptable. The media tended to reflect the Reagan administration’s talking points: the mujahedeen as “freedom fighters”, the “tremendous success” of the mujahedeen in driving out the Soviets, and the positive contribution that the Mujahedeen made to America’s winning the Cold War. When mainstream news focused on negative aspects of the war, they framed it in such a way that implied that these hardships resulted from an unwanted war by the Russians: “A million Afghans were killed. If the more than five million Afghan refugees and the two million others who have had to relocate within the country try to return to

Although mujahedeen “freedom fighters” had bombed American embassies, committed human rights abuses, and shared values that contradicted drastically with our culture, the American public supported their cause because they were unaware of these facts, which were not reported by the mainstream media.

their homes, they will find thousands of villages razed, the country's rich agricultural sector and irrigation system shattered and the terrain studded with million of land mines that can still explode or kill a man.”

While the media did describe the death and destruction inside of Afghanistan that resulted from the civil war, blame was not placed on the mujahedeen. The 1988 NYT article “For Rebels outside Kabul, War goes On,” reported that landmines were rocketed at rebel areas from government and Soviet forces inside of Kabul. This article portrayed

the mujahedeen as victims of the war and protectors of civilians. The journalist described the mujahedeen in a positive light: “guerillas try to clear the rocketed areas everyday, picking up the mines one by one and tossing them away, detonating them.” This description of the mujahedeen in this article helped to support their image as “freedom fighters.” For instance, the “renowned guerilla commander” Abdul Haq “justified his rocketing of Kabul. Stressing the importance of sparing the civilian population, he insisted that his men fired only at military targets and

at the airport.” This article also described the mujahedeen as less aggressive than the soviet and government forces.

Critical analysis of the domestic, mainstream news reporting by the American media on the Afghan “invasion” by the Soviet Union (or Afghan Civil War) and the support by the US for the Afghan rebels in that war from 1979-1992 confirms Herman and Chomsky's critique of institutional, systematic biases in the mainstream news media found in their propaganda model. Following Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, the

American mainstream media accepted the government's framing of the Mujahedeen as an ally, fighting a just cause, because the media relied primarily on information provided by government officials and other "agents of power" as their sources. Additionally, journalists in the mainstream media confine their reporting to topics inside of the range of legitimate discourse because advertising is the main source of revenue for the mass media. Mass media outlets avoid stories that appear unpatriotic and therefore likely to alienate readers and advertisers. Also, since the US failure in Vietnam the mass media has been careful to frame its coverage of US interventions abroad in such a manner so as not to cause another "Vietnam syndrome" among the American public. Although mujahedeen "freedom fighters" had bombed American embassies, committed human rights abuses, and shared values that contradicted drastically with our culture, the American public supported their cause because they were unaware of these facts, which were not reported by the mainstream media.

by Emily Iwan



in the Lehigh Valley





When many people gather to live together in close proximity it is inevitable that there will be crime. Such holds true for the Lehigh Valley, where the most urban areas have a pressing problem with a rise in gang activity and the violent crime that is coupled with it. Crime is not only a serious concern for the safety of people already living in the Lehigh Valley, but it is a potential problem as it lowers the quality of life and reduces the attractiveness of the area to families and workers. Distinguishing the Lehigh Valley as an area increasingly prone to crime is the fact that it lies within two driving hours of the major metropolitan areas of Philadelphia and New York City. While the externalities from these cities' crime activity are responsible for a significant portion of the crime in the valley, they are not the cause of all of it. This paper will examine the current crime situation in the Lehigh Valley, compare the situation to that of similar areas, and assess what is being done to keep citizens safe and lower crime rates. The ultimate goal of paper is to provide information for local officials and concerned citizens, as well as to analyze the crime situation without bias, and give outside suggestions.

Data Driven Assessment of Situation

The most consistent and comprehensive source for crime data required for an accurate assessment is obtained through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All crime data available from this source is sorted into Crime Indexes. These Crime Indexes are the acts "considered

most likely to be reported to police and, as a result, are used nationally as a basis for comparison of criminal activity. The offenses are: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny/theft, motor-vehicle theft and arson," (Pennsylvania State Police). These principal crimes are divided into two subcategories- Violent Crimes and Property Crimes. Violent crimes include the offenses of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes are the offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.

The counts of crime are normalized for comparison across cities by computing their rate per 100,000 residents. These categories will be the basis for a majority of the crime assessment in this paper, but it is important to take into account that the data may be less than the actual number of crimes; not all crimes committed may be reported to police.

To begin the analysis and provide a context for the Lehigh Valley, one should examine Pennsylvania's crime rates as a whole. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, Pennsylvania consistently has a lower count of Violent Crimes and Property Crimes per 100,000 people than the United States as a whole.

One alarming observation that is illustrated in these graphs is that crime in Pennsylvania, both Violent and Property, does not decrease

in proportion to national rates. For example, from 1995 to 2007 the US violent crime rate decreased from 636.5 to 466.9, which marks a 27% decrease. The violent crime rate in Pennsylvania, however, only decreased 13%, from 480.3 to 416.5. Similarly, US property crime rates have decreased 37% from 1991 to 2007, while PA property crime rates fell only 24%. This trend indicates that national policies and increased funding that may be effective in other areas of the country are not as effective in Pennsylvania. This calls for an increase in

Casinos create crime locally and do not merely attract it from somewhere else


local concern and action to lower the crime rate, since national policies do not appear to be doing enough at this point in time.

Upon examination crime data specifically for the Lehigh Valley, the rates do not show complete improvement. Of the three main cities, Allentown, Bethlehem and Easton, Allentown and Bethlehem have increasing or steady levels of Violent Crime in recent years, while Easton has seen a drop. Furthermore, while Bethlehem and Easton have maintained Violent and Property Crime rates below the state and national average, Allentown has not.

As shown in Figure 3, the city of Allentown has seen an exceptional jump in the total of Violent Crimes committed per year. The number of murders has more than quadrupled from 5 in 1980 to 21 in 2007, a mere 27 year span. Forcible rapes, robberies and aggravated assault have all increased as well, prompting the total number of violent crimes in Allentown to jump from 321 in 1980 to 870 in 2007. This is a troubling 171% increase in only 27 years, averaging to an approximate increase of 6.3% per year. If this trend continues, it is projected that there will be 1074 violent crimes committed in Allentown in 2010.

This trend has been echoed by the city of Bethlehem. While the number of reported rapes has remained relatively constant since 1999, murders, robberies and assaults have increased. As shown in Figure 4, the total of

Figure 1. Violent Crimes per 100,000 People, 1960 to 2007



violent crimes has not increased steadily, but has increased from 227 in 1999 to 270 in 2007. Data for the year 2006 was not made available by the FBI.

Unlike Allentown and Bethlehem, Easton has seen a decline in violent crime in recent years. As shown in Figure 5, since 1999 the total number of Violent Crimes has fallen from 230 to only 156 in 2007. This represents a 32% decrease over 9 years, which averages to an approximate decrease of 3.5% per year. This data should still cause alarm though, as the number of cases of each crime has not been decreasing steadily. Observable in the table below, the number of reported murders in Easton has increased every year for the past four years, and in the past three years so has the number of robberies. Thus although the net number of Violent Crimes has decreased, this decrease is not a trend across all Violent Crimes.

Figure 6 is a cumulative comparison of the Violent Crime rates. Data for the Lehigh Valley's three main cities is graphed against that for the United States as a whole as well as the state of Pennsylvania. As shown in the graph, Allentown has violent crime rate a considerably higher than the national and state level, while Bethlehem and Easton have rates below the national and state level. This data reveals Allentown as a target area for increased efforts to reduce crime.

Property crimes should also be considered when evaluating the current crime situation in the Lehigh Valley. Following suit to Violent Crimes, the total number of reports of Property Crimes has increased in Allentown in recent years, from 4,946 in 1999 to 5,379 in 2007. This is largely due to an increase in the number of burglaries and larceny-thefts cases; the reported number of burglaries in Allentown has increased 20% since 1999, while the number of larceny-theft cases has increased 7%.

Contrary to Allentown, Bethlehem and Easton have seen a decrease in the total number of Property Crimes since 1999. Cases of burglary, motor vehicle theft and arson in Bethlehem have all fallen since 1999, at 10%,

3% and 46%, respectively. In Easton, however, only cases of burglary and larceny-theft have decreased in recent years. While these crimes have seen 46% and 12% drops, motor vehicle thefts and arson cases have risen 47% and 30% since 1999. Figure 7 presents a comparison of Allentown, Bethlehem and Easton's Property Crime rates to the national and state rate. Allentown is again above both the national and state level, while Bethlehem and Easton are below it.

With homeland security receiving an increasing amount of press in recent years, it is understandable that there has been less attention focused on local crime. For example, on Governor Rendell's website, even though he is the head of The Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, there is nothing listed under his agenda pertaining to making Pennsylvania a safer place to live or decreasing crime rates. This does not do justice to the fact that many long-term residents of Pennsylvania and the Lehigh Valley are concerned that crime is taking over their towns. In a quality-of-life poll conducted by The Morning Call, more than 54% of respondents said that they believe life in Lehigh Valley is getting worse, up from 48% in 2007 (Drobnyk). This is significant because crime has a direct influence on residents' judgment of the quality of life in the area. Furthermore, only 25% of residents in the Lehigh and Northampton counties surveyed this year said that they think life in the Lehigh Valley is getting better. This is the lowest

percentage since The Morning Call began its annual quality-of-life poll in 2003. Even though 81% of people gave local law enforcement a rating of excellent or good, nearly 33% of residents polled by The Morning Call said they are very concerned with becoming a victim of crime. This figure that has been rising steadily over the past five years, as less than 20% of residents said the same in 2003 (Drobnyk). If the Lehigh Valley wants to continue attracting families and workers into it's community and economy, than it needs to tackle the issue of crime to remain an attractive place to live.

Lehigh Valley Crime in Relation to Other Areas

To get a perspective on Allentown, Bethlehem and Easton's crime rates it is worth comparing their crime statistics to that of comparable cities in the northeast region. One such city is Youngstown, Ohio. Like Bethlehem, Youngstown has a history in specialized manufacturing, and in 2007, out of the three major cities in the Lehigh Valley, was closest in population to Bethlehem. The Violent Crime rate in Youngstown in 2007 was 812, which is significantly higher than Bethlehem's Violent Crime rate of 270. Youngstown's Property Crime rate in 2007 was 4,101, which is also significantly higher than Bethlehem's rate of 2,294 that year. So in juxtaposition to Youngstown, Bethlehem is a safer community.

Figure 2. Property Crimes per 100,000 People, 1960 to 2007




Figure 3. Violent Crime in the City of Allentown

Year	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Total Violent Crime
1999	11	39	350	260	660
2000	9	40	349	290	688
2001	8	46	295	269	618
2002	9	58	294	254	615
2003	12	51	359	219	641
2004	11	51	360	230	652
2005	21	45	512	285	863
2006	16	42	684	339	1081
2007	21	20	552	277	870

Figure 4. Violent Crime in the City of Bethlehem

Year	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Total Violent Crime
1999	3	21	84	119	227
2000	3	13	93	113	222
2001	4	14	76	155	249
2002	2	31	98	114	245
2003	1	20	94	75	190
2004	1	24	83	115	223
2005	2	17	114	135	268
2006	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2007	6	24	100	140	270

Another comparable city is Rochester, New York. In 2007 Rochester had a population of 206,686, which makes it most similar to Allentown, which had the largest population in the Lehigh Valley at 107,397. In this year Rochester had a Violent Crime rate of 2,350 and Property Crime rate of 11,277, while Allentown reported rates of 870 and 5,369, respectively. Thus, in both cases Allentown has a crime rate of less than half of that of Rochester, and like Bethlehem was a safer community based on these rates.

An additional city with a manufacturing background is Dayton, Ohio. In 2007 Dayton had a population of 155,526, which makes it again most comparable to Allentown based on size. Dayton's Violent and Property Crime rates were 1,597 and 10,645 in 2007, which again are about twice Allentown's rates. Syracuse,

New York also had crime rates higher than Allentown's in 2007. With a population of 139,880 it is closer in size to Allentown than Dayton, but still had a higher Violent Crime rate of 1,435 and Property Crime rate of 5,964. Thus, after examining Allentown and Bethlehem with cities of similar backgrounds and population sizes, Allentown and Bethlehem have considerably lower crime rates.

When making comparisons regarding the crime rates in the Lehigh valley it is also important to take into account crime activity in New York City and Philadelphia because of the cities' proximity to the Lehigh Valley. This is because the propinquity enables certain externalities from city life to reach the Lehigh Valley, such as gang activity and highly organized drug rings. For example in March of 2008, in what was termed "Operation Dry

Spell," Philadelphia Police announced the break up of two large-scale cocaine organizations, which were reported as distributing cocaine to the Philadelphia suburbs as well as the Lehigh Valley. This case illuminated the fact that drug traffickers' ability to reach the Lehigh Valley is largely facilitated by the I-78 interstate. Such is noted by the Chief of Police in Emmaus, Chief Faust, who acknowledged that, "since the addition of the I-78 corridor, the Lehigh Valley had a population explosion, and with that brings more police incidents and unfortunately, at times, more crime," (NBC 10).

To examine this point more closely, the relationship between Pennsylvania's state population and the total number of crimes reported was considered. As Figure 8 shows, there is a strong positive correlation between population and crime. Using data from 1960 to 2007, the correlation between an increase in population and an increase in crime is calculated to be 0.67. When examined individually, it is unfortunately Violent Crime that has a higher correlation with population, with a correlation statistic of 0.86. Population and Property Crime have a correlation statistic of 0.63.

Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that, "like Philadelphia, Lehigh Valley cities have struggled with crime in recent years. Despite Allentown, Bethlehem and Easton having lower crime rates in every front in 2007 (Appendix A. Table 5), Allentown tied its record high in homicides in 2007 with 21, and Easton and Bethlehem have seen gang activity rise. This rise in Easton and Bethlehem is definitely of great concern, because gangs have the ability to easily migrate from city to city depending on how much pressure they are receiving from the law enforcement agents there. Thus as Bethlehem Police Lt. Robert Righi, who serves as head of his department's criminal investigations unit, reports, "[gang activity has] become more of a regional issue rather than a local issue," (Falsone). Consequently it is crucial that all of the Lehigh Valley support the fight against the infiltration of such activity into the region, and be open to changes in policing strategies.

What Lehigh Valley is Doing to Change

With crime being an urgent problem, several initiatives are in place to safen communities in the Lehigh Valley. One approach that areas such as Easton and Emmaus have taken is a neighborhood approach to policing. This idea of a “neighborhood approach” entails assigning one police officer to a certain neighborhood, in hope that they will get to know the residents on a more personal level. This strategy is based on the notion that this community interaction and support can help control crime, with community members helping to identify suspects, detain vandals and bring problems to the attention of police. In addition to this approach, in 2007 the Emmaus police department began holding public meetings “to talk to residents about setting up neighborhood watch groups to combat crime.” (NBC 10). The efforts have been met with a decrease in crime, and thus as Lehigh County Executive Don Cunningham stated in his 2009 Financial Outlook report, “community policing works, short and simple,” (Cunningham, 2009).

Allentown and Easton have also implemented the “Weed and Seed” program, which is a community-based strategy sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice. “[It] is an innovative, comprehensive multiagency approach to law enforcement, crime prevention, and community revitalization,” (Office of Justice Programs). It is important to acknowledge that Weed and Seed is foremost a strategy, rather than a simply a grant program. Instead of putting a large amount of money towards the problem as a quick and temporary solution, the program aims to prevent, control, and reduce violent crime, drug abuse, and gang activity in designated high-crime neighborhoods across the country on a long term basis. In 2008 a study was conducted evaluating the success of Allentown’s Weed and Seed Program. The executive summary of the report states that, “results of the research revealed many positive changes in the past five years. A major change has been the reduction in crime rates--in total numbers, in rate per population, and as

a percentage of the city’s total crime. [And] residents who were interviewed were more likely to consider that the neighborhood has improved in the past two years rather than declined,” (Eckley, 2). Easton’s official website has also made available a schedule for all the Weed and Seed meetings, enabling newcomers and concerned citizens to get involved, (Community Capacity Development Office). And as always, if residents are in a situation in which they are threatened and feel unable to protect themselves, they can contact the police immediately by dialing 911. In fact, Lehigh County is currently working on approving the 911 response system as well.

A second approach began in 2008, with the construction of a new 911 emergency communication center next to the County Government Center in Allentown. “For the first


time, [this] 911 center will use GPS technology to locate callers through their cell phones, minimizing emergency response time. Keeping the center in downtown Allentown allows for the future possibility of merging Lehigh County and Allentown City operations,” (Cunningham, 2008). The successful pooling of resources between Lehigh County and Allentown would prove very beneficial to policing efforts, and this investment in policing efforts is a tangible sign that Allentown and the Lehigh County are serious about combating crime.

A third innovation has been the Pennsylvania State Police Department’s use of a web-based crime reporting system, (Pennsylvania State Police). Using this web-based system, officers are able to enter monthly updates of Crime Index data into a state police database. Citizens can go to the website and

Figure 5. Violent Crime in the City of Easton

Year	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Total Violent Crime
1999	2	12	81	135	230
2000	1	11	62	103	177
2001	3	16	52	83	154
2002	1	21	52	143	217
2003	1	18	54	85	158
2004	0	19	47	99	165
2005	3	16	47	110	176
2006	4	16	54	92	166
2007	5	14	69	68	156

Figure 6. A Comparison of Violent Crime Rates, 1999 to 2007



view the data as soon as it is submitted. It also attaches names to cases so officers can contact each other. This electronic information sharing increases efficiency, and thus helps the valley-wide effort to combat crime.

New Casino in Bethlehem

In 2006 the announcement of the construction of a new Casino in Bethlehem was met by mixed feelings. While some argued that it would stimulate the lagging local economy, others saw it as a catalyst for increased gang activities and Violent Crimes. While there is justification for both sides of the argument, historically casinos have had connections with organized crime. One study analyzed crime data collected from all 3,165 U.S. counties in the United States, from 1977 to 1996, by looking

at local crime rates before and after casinos opened. The study found that crime began to rise after the first year, slowly at first and then at an increasing rate. Crime continued to rise until it had far surpassed what it would have been if the casino had never opened. “By the fifth year of operation, robberies were up 136%; aggravated assaults, 91%; auto theft, 78%; burglary, 50%; larceny, 38%; and rape, 21%. Controlling for other factors, 8.6% of property crimes and 12.6% of violent crimes were attributed to casinos,” (Morrin). Furthermore, the conductor of the study found that, “crime rates didn’t rise in neighboring counties while they soared in casino counties—[which is] evidence that casinos create crime locally and don’t merely attract it from somewhere else,” (Morrin). Despite these published findings,

the casino is planning to open by 2009. In an attempt to assuage a rise in crime, Bethlehem should increase the number of officers on patrol in the area around the casino, if not assign one officer to be stationed there permanently. The town should also make sure that the casino employs legitimate security personnel to assist in the local police department’s efforts to mitigate crime, and encourage a continuous exchange of observations and information.

“On the [national] political front, crime has fallen way behind issues such as Iraq, health care and gas prices, not to mention the meltdown of our financial system,” (Jones). As of November 2008, the United States’ economy has entered a recession, and in times of negative economic growth people are more likely to be unemployed, become desperate, and resort to illegal criminal activities. Therefore, now more than ever elected officials, police and community members need to take an active stance to protect their Lehigh Valley communities and provide a safe environment for all residents. Elected officials should continue to allocate funds to policing efforts, police should continue to take a personal interest in the neighborhoods they are policing, and community members should continue their involvement with the successful Weed and Seed program. The Lehigh Valley is a unit, and “Allentown’s problem today could be Easton’s problem tomorrow” (Falsone). It is thus imperative that the Lehigh Valley as a whole takes the initiative and continues to take a stand against crime.

by Stephanie Magnunson

Figure 8. Total Reported Crime per 100,000 People vs. State Population





Figure 7. A Comparison of Property Crime rates, 1999 to 2007



Elected officials should continue to allocate funds to policing efforts,
police should continue to take a personal interest in the
neighborhoods they are policing,
and community members should continue their involvement with the successful
Weed and Seed program.



Table 1.
Data for Figure 1.
Violent Crimes per 100,000 People.

Year	USA	PA
1960	160.9	99
1961	158.1	97.9
1962	162.3	104.2
1963	168.2	111
1964	190.6	123.6
1965	200.2	142.2
1966	220	131
1967	253.2	138.6
1968	298.4	176.8
1969	328.7	193.9
1970	363.5	220.2
1971	396	268.7
1972	401	277.1
1973	417.4	272.2
1974	461.1	315
1975	487.8	329.2
1976	467.8	294.9
1977	475.9	282.8
1978	497.8	301.1
1979	548.9	333.6
1980	596.6	363.9
1981	594.3	371.7
1982	571.1	360.4
1983	537.7	342.8
1984	539.2	320.6
1985	556.6	331.1
1986	617.7	358.6
1987	609.7	369.4
1988	637.2	362
1989	663.1	378.6
1990	731.8	431
1991	758.1	450
1992	757.5	427
1993	746.8	417.5
1994	713.6	426.7
1995	684.6	427.3
1996	636.5	480.3
1997	610.8	442.1
1998	567.5	420.5
1999	523	420.5
2000	506.5	420
2001	504.4	410.4
2002	494.4	402.1
2003	475.8	397.8
2004	463.2	411.5
2005	469	425
2006	473.5	439.4
2007	466.9	416.5

Table 2.
Data for Figure 2.
Property Crimes per 100,000 People.

Year	USA	PA
1960	1726.3	950.5
1961	1747.9	949.6
1962	1857.5	1029.9
1963	2012.1	1122.3
1964	2197.5	1244.6
1965	2248.8	1345.9
1966	2450.9	1362.2
1967	2736.5	1527.9
1968	3071.8	1760.2
1969	3351.3	1823.9
1970	3621	1965.6
1971	3768.8	2299.5
1972	3560.4	2133.6
1973	3737	2229.5
1974	4389.3	2738.5
1975	4810.7	3020.3
1976	4819.5	3045
1977	4601.7	2834.7
1978	4642.5	2883.6
1979	5016.6	3161.8
1980	5353.3	3372.4
1981	5263.8	3311.5
1982	5032.5	3092.3
1983	4637.3	2852.6
1984	4492.1	2738.9
1985	4650.5	2706.4
1986	4862.6	2743.3
1987	4940.3	2793.9
1988	5027.1	2814.4
1989	5077.9	2981.8
1990	5088.5	3045.1
1991	5139.7	3108.6
1992	4902.7	2965.7
1993	4737.7	2853.9
1994	4660	2845.2
1995	4591.3	2937.6
1996	4450.1	3076.1
1997	4311.9	2989.4
1998	4052.5	2852.4
1999	3743.6	2693.2
2000	3618.3	2575.3
2001	3656.1	2550.7
2002	3630.6	2440.4
2003	3591.2	2430.2
2004	3514.1	2417.3
2005	3432	2422
2006	3334.5	2443.5
2007	3,263.50	2,361.30

Table3.
Data for Figure 8.
Population and Reported Crime in Pennsylvania.

Year	Population	Violent Crime	Property Crime	Total Crime
1960	11319366	11203	107586	118789
1961	11468000	11223	108895	120118
1962	11376000	11856	117167	129023
1963	11424000	12678	128209	140887
1964	11459000	14162	142616	156778
1965	11520000	16384	155050	171434
1966	11582000	15169	157775	172944
1967	11629000	16119	177676	193795
1968	11712000	20710	206151	226861
1969	11803000	22887	215276	238163
1970	11793909	25970	231825	257795
1971	11879000	31917	273153	305070
1972	11926000	33052	254458	287510
1973	11902000	32397	265361	297758
1974	11835000	37281	324104	361385
1975	11827000	38933	357206	396139
1976	11862000	34985	361199	396184
1977	11785000	33328	334069	367397
1978	11750000	35381	338824	374205
1979	11731000	39133	370914	410047
1980	11824220	43032	398761	441793
1981	11864000	44104	392872	436976
1982	11865000	42767	366903	409670
1983	11895000	40782	339321	380103
1984	11901000	38154	325960	364114
1985	11853000	39240	320788	360028
1986	11889000	42629	326149	368778
1987	11936000	44087	333476	377563
1988	12027000	43534	338486	382020
1989	12040000	45586	359008	404594
1990	11881643	51213	361805	413018
1991	11961000	53824	371814	425638
1992	12009000	51276	356155	407431
1993	12048000	50295	343841	394136
1994	12052000	51425	342901	394326
1995	12072000	51586	354623	406209
1996	12056000	57905	370851	428756
1997	12020000	53140	359323	412463
1998	12001000	50470	342318	392788
1999	11994000	50431	323021	373452
2000	12281054	51584	316274	367858
2001	12287150	50432	313408	363840
2002	12328827	49578	300868	350446
2003	12370761	49210	300639	349849
2004	12394471	50998	299611	350609
2005	12405348	52761	300444	353205
2006	12440621	54665	303988	358653

Table 4.

Data for Figure 7.

A Comparison of Property Crime rates, 1999 to 2007.

Year	USA	PA	Allentown	Bethlehem	Easton
1999	3743.6	2693.2	4946	2339	1278
2000	3618.3	2575.3	4881	2240	1046
2001	3656.1	2550.7	4,660	2,226	1092
2002	3630.6	2440.4	5410	2170	978
2003	3591.2	2430.2	5,654	1,965	1,138
2004	3514.1	2417.3	5,780	2,195	1,141
2005	3432	2422	5,771	2,301	1,078
2006	3334.5	2443.5	6,059	2,295	1,424
2007	3,263.50	2,361.30	5,333	2,288	1,074

Table 5.

2007 Crime Rates by City.

City	Pop.	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson	Violent Crime Total	Property Crime Total
New York	8,220,196	496	875	21,787	27,295	20,914	115,318	13,256	-	50,453	149,488
Philadelphia	1,435,533	392	956	10,258	9,574	11,524	39,167	11,104	-	21,180	61,795
Allentown	107,397	21	20	552	277	1,335	3,462	536	46	870	5,379
Bethlehem	72,908	6	24	100	140	439	1,721	128	6	270	2,294
Easton	26,207	5	14	69	68	141	826	107	13	156	1,087

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